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This PhD thesis consists of three independent empirical research papers about credit 
ratings and the connection between credit ratings and the financial market.  
A credit rating agency (CRA) is a third-party financial institution providing 
assessments and recommendations for other market participants about the 
performances of firms, the default risk of financial instruments issued by those firms 
and the credit quality of sovereign countries who issue government debts. On account 
of the essentiality of information transparency in the modern financial system, the 
credit rating industry is gaining importance in terms of its role as an information-
provider for market participants and of its function to reduce the information 
asymmetry in the financial market. Due to this significant importance, CRAs may 
impact the behaviors of market participants by offering signals about the firms or 
financial instruments and hence have a strong influence on the stability of the financial 
market. The aim of this PhD thesis is to discuss the relationship between credit ratings 
and the financial market from three perspectives: the link between sovereign ratings 
and firm’s performances in the context of the European debt crisis, the role of credit 
ratings in the pricing of asset-backed securities (ABS) before and after the global 
financial crisis, and the motivation of self-interests of the CRA industry. 
In the first empirical paper, I investigate the shock of sovereign downgrades and the 
association between them with the performances of listed banks which are registered 
in the downgraded countries. The previous literature shows the connection between 
sovereign ratings and bank performances and hypothesizes some potential channels 
(such as the government debt and government guarantee) by which sovereign ratings 
impact bank performances. Nonetheless, individual bank ratings are neglected in 
these analyses. I fill in this gap by studying the role of bank ratings in the transmission 
of effects of sovereign downgrades on bank performances. I find that sovereign rating 
3 
 
downgrades followed by bank rating changes have a stronger impact on the bank 
stock returns and Z scores (a proxy of the bank insolvency risk) than those which are 
not followed by bank rating changes. To further tease out the independent effect of 
sovereign and bank rating downgrades, I take advantage of ‘sovereign-ceiling policy’ 
which creates the semi-passive bank rating downgrades when the sovereign rating 
ceiling has been downgraded. The empirical tests of the banks downgrades triggered 
by the sovereign ceiling policy help us to conclude that bank rating downgrades 
provide extra information to the market even if they occur no more than two days after 
the sovereign ratings are downgraded.  
In the second empirical paper, I focus on the ABS market and the role of CRAs in the 
determination of ABS prices. I investigate whether the reactions of ABS investors to 
credit ratings have significantly changed since the shock of the global financial crisis. 
To empirically test the ABS investors’ behavior, I run a series of regressions to study 
the correlation between ABS issuance spread and the issuance credit ratings in pre-
and post-crisis periods. I find evidence of a weaker reaction of ABS investors to the 
ratings offered by credit rating agencies after the financial crisis. To supplement the 
static-regression analysis, I apply event-analysis methods to identify the ABS price 
reactions to the rating events in the two periods and identify weaker price reaction 
degrees after the crisis. The conclusion is that before the 2008 crisis, ABS investors’ 
decisions, reflected by both the issuance spread and transaction prices, were 
significantly associated with the ratings offered by CRAs while the post-crisis period 
has seen a weaker link between spread/prices and CRAs’ announcements, indicating 
a smaller influence of CRAs on the ABS market. 
The third empirical paper discusses CRA self-interests from the perspective of the 
association between rating solicitation status and the conservatism as well as the 
quality of rating services. It contributes the literature by applying the gap between 
unsolicited and solicited ratings as a measurement to investigate the motivation of 
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CRAs. Based on a simplified theoretical model, I raise the hypothesis of self-selection 
to demonstrate the motivation of firms who do not solicit rating services and the 
rationality of rating agencies’ decision to offer ratings with more conservative levels 
for unsolicited rating recipients. Firms who realize that their future performances will 
deteriorate are less likely to solicit ratings from rating agencies. Rating agencies 
capture this signal and offer unsolicited ratings to those firms with a more conservative 
rating reflecting the self-selection effect. I empirically test this hypothesis using 
Moody’s unsolicited rating data and I obtain two findings. The first finding is that 
controlling for fundamental factors, Moody’s unsolicited ratings are lower than 
solicited ones. The second finding is that the rating qualities of both types of ratings 
are not significantly different from each other.  
My research contributes to both the academic literature and the practical field of the 
credit rating industry by providing a comprehensive discussion on the connection 
between a variety of credit rating services (sovereign ratings, firm ratings and bank 
ratings) and the market reactions (issuance and transaction prices, insolvency risk 
and default risk) in different cases (the structured finance products, the sovereign 
ceiling policy and the issuance of unsolicited ratings). The study also investigates the 
shock of two recent financial crises (global financial crisis and European debt crisis) 
on the credit rating industry, which provides suggestive findings for the regulators who 
are willing to take some actions to intervene in the CRA industry in order to enhance 






Credit rating agencies are professional institutions that evaluate the creditworthiness 
of firms or financial products issued by firms for investors. They play an essential role 
as the information provider in the financial market to benefit both the lenders and 
borrowers, in terms of enhancing the communication of information between both 
sides. However, with the expansion of the market scale of credit rating industry and 
the financial regulation reforms linking the regulatory requirements with the credit 
ratings, CRAs have gradually obtained oligopolistic power. The enhancement of such 
power enables CRAs to influence the market participants’ decisions. My thesis 
consists of three independent essays investigating three issues in the context of this 
role transformation of credit rating agencies.  
The first essay is a study on the relationship among sovereign ratings (for 
creditworthiness of countries), bank ratings (for creditworthiness of individual banks) 
and the bank performances. I conclude that sovereign ratings provide additional 
information for the financial market besides the information which has been provided 
by the bank ratings. The second study is designed to test the relationship between 
credit ratings and the prices of Asset-Backed Securities (ABS), an innovative complex 
financial product. I find that the occurrence of the global financial crisis is associated 
with a weaker relationship, which implies a weaker market influence of credit rating 
agencies. In the third paper, I measure the self-interest motivation of credit rating 
agencies by studying the comparison between the unsolicited ratings, which are not 
paid by the firms to CRAs, and the solicited ratings which are paid for. I do not find 
evidence to show that the credit rating agencies issue biased ratings due to their 
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1. Chapter I: Introduction 
“There are two superpowers in the world today in my opinion. There’s the United 
States and there’s Moody’s Bond Rating Service. The United States can destroy you 
by dropping bombs, and Moody’s can destroy you by downgrading your bonds. And 
believe me, it’s not clear sometimes who’s more powerful.” 
---Thomas Friedman, PBS Interview, 1996 
 
What is the most valuable ‘silver bullet’ in the financial industry? For most financial 
professionals, the answer should be ‘information’. For investors (or lenders), it is the 
access to and the availability of accurate, timely and useful information that 
determines a successful investment strategy, a profitable financial project or a high-
quality market portfolio. For firms (or borrowers), they have to ensure that the 
information can be clearly and adequately delivered to investors for their projects or 
entities to have a higher probability of being funded. However, information asymmetry 
is a significant barrier for both the lending and borrowing sides. The lending side 
(particularly individual investors) is unable to capture all the useful information of the 
firms or projects of their interests due to the lack of professional skills or resources. 
Furthermore, the borrowing side has its self-interested incentive of disclosing positive 
information and hiding negative information to attract more investors.  
Therefore, the aforementioned feature of the blocked channel of information 
communication between the lending and borrowing sides calls for special institutions 
which provide expertise to fill in the information gap. The banking industry, as well as 
other financial institutions such as mutual funds, have reduced the cost of information 
asymmetry to some extent, by separating the lenders from the borrowers and playing 
the ‘proxy’ of lenders to manage their invested money. However, they do not directly 
disclose the information of invested firms/projects to the investors. Additionally, the 
financial instruments (loans, stock shares, bonds and other financial products) create 
new barriers of information communication: the structures, clauses and designs 
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behind these financial instruments are complex and difficult to analyze. In this context, 
credit rating is one of the most significant industries whose main business is to collect, 
evaluate and disclose information regarding the quality of financial instruments and 
financial entities.  
My PhD thesis presents my research outcomes in three separate studies about the 
credit rating industry. The three papers aim to find empirical evidence from three 
angles (the sovereign ratings, the structured finance product ratings and the 
unsolicited ratings) to figure out the role transformation of credit rating: from an 
information provider to a market influencer. In this chapter, I present the background 
of the CRA’s (credit rating agency) role transformation which includes a brief history, 
the inherent policy support of regulators, the market scale, the phenomenon of 
oligopoly, the payment model and the complexity of rated financial instruments. 
Section 1.3 is a summary of my three independent studies. Section 1.4 is a summary 
of the data and research method and in Section 1.5 I describe the contribution made 
in the three essays. 
1.1 Brief history and the initial function of the credit rating industry 
The credit rating industry is one of the industries whose aim is to provide information 
for investors. A credit rating agency is an institution giving rating opinions to the 
markets by applying professional risk models to assess the default risks of a financial 
instrument (security), an institution (firm) or even a country (sovereign).  The origin of 
the rating industry can be traced back to the early 20th century, before which investors 
themselves assessed the securities' creditworthiness. Because the US railway bond 
market boomed in the early 1900s, the market was eager to have an information 
provider who could offer a neutral analysis regarding the quality of those railway bonds. 
John Moody then published a creditworthiness evaluation for a railway bond, which 
became the first ‘credit rating’ product in history (Sinclair, 2014). A brief history of this 
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industry is summarized by White (2010), Sy (2009) and Lynch (2008). The main 
reason for the origination of the credit rating industry was investors’ increasing 
demand for sufficient information and the ability of specific institutions to provide such 
information. In other words, the initial function of the credit rating industry was to 
reduce information asymmetry.  
With the development of credit rating industry, investors (i.e. rating users) are relying 
more on this service in terms of rating accuracy, stability and timeliness (Altman & 
Rijken, 2004; Cheng & Neamtiu, 2009). However, there is an inherent conflict among 
those three demands. If the CRAs would like to maintain the stability, they have to 
sacrifice timeliness by being careful when deciding to change the ratings and vice 
versa. In order to balance these demands, CRAs invented two special regimes, credit 
watch and outlook by which they can keep the rating levels constant but express their 
opinions on the rated firms1 (Alsakka & ap Gwilym, 2012).  
With the rise of growing demand of users for accuracy, timeliness and stability, the 
recent years see a speedy expansion of the credit rating industry. However, it 
transpired that the initial aim of the credit rating industry has not been consistently 
fulfilled concomitant to the development of the rating services, the rapid expansion of 
modern, complex financial products, and the issuance of a series of rating-based 
financial regulations. To be specific, credit rating agencies have played the role not 
only of an information provider, as they should, but also of a market influencer with 
special powers to influence the market variations, for example, the debt yield (Cantor 
and Packer, 1996), CDS spreads (Hull et al., 2004; Finnerty et al., 2004) and index 
options (Tran et al., 2014). Realizing their effects on the market, CRAs try to convince 
users that they would not negatively impact the market by conducting a ‘though-the-
cycle’ methodologies (Topp & Perl, 2010). However, the transformation of such roles, 
                                                          
1 A credit watch implies a stronger opinion than an outlook and is issued for a shorter time (3 months 
for credit watch and 1-2 years for credit rating outlook). 
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entwined with the potential motivation of the self-interest of rating agencies and the 
trend of three-party oligopoly, makes both scholars and practitioners concerned about 
the actual function of this industry. Is it still providing information for investors, as rating 
agencies themselves claim to be doing, or has it become an obstructer of information 
transmission by providing biased information for investors due to its interests? 
In Section 1.2 I describe the factors that have led to the role transformation of the 
credit rating industry from an information provider to a market influencer: the 
regulation effect which makes rating agencies more powerful, the emergence of 
complex innovative financial products and the huge domestic scale of rating services, 
the oligopolistic phenomenon of the industry and the issuer-pay model. 
1.2  Role transformation of the credit rating industry 
1.2.1 The regulation effect 
In terms of the regulation effect of credit ratings in the US where all the big three CRAs 
(Moody’s, S&P2 and Fitch) are registered, some key dates should be noted: 
 1934: The SEC (United States Securities and Exchange Commission) was 
founded and companies were required to provide standardized financial 
statements. The ratings’ formats were transformed to letter combinations (AAA, 
AA etc.) and are still used currently; 
 1936: The bank regulators restricted the banks to only invest ‘investment-
grade’ securities. Later on such regulations were imitated by the regulators of 
insurance companies and pension funds; 
                                                          
2 S&P: Short for ‘Standard and Poor’s’ 
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 1975:  The SEC linked the minimum capital requirements on the banking 
sector to the ratings given by the big three rating agencies, ‘crystallizing the 
centrality of the three rating agencies’. 
According to the regulatory policies, the security issuers should get the ratings from 
the CRAs before they officially issue the securities to the public market. In other words, 
the regulators gradually ‘released’ some part of their powers to the Big Three CRAs. 
The companies who were willing to issue debts and the financial institutions (the 
servicers or trustees) who serve their clients in the debt issuance process viewed the 
‘satisfactory’ ratings given by CRAs as a special symbol of recognition approved by 
regulators.  
The US financial regulator (SEC) realized that they needed to take actions to monitor 
the big credit rating agencies given that some power of determining the issuance of 
financial instruments had been released to them. Therefore, the regulator enhanced 
the regulations on CRAs through a series of policies: 
 1975: NRSROs (“nationally recognized statistical rating organizations”) were 
introduced and applied by the SEC. Ratings provided by only those agencies 
approved by regulators as NRSRO are valid as references of debt issuance 
and capital requirements; 
 2006: The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 2006 was published. This policy 
enhanced disclosure requirements and transparency requirements, prohibited 
CRAs to ‘deal with’ issuers and emphasized the separation of rating 
determination departments and fee negotiation departments within an agency 
in case of conflict of interests etc.; 
 2008: The Dodd-Frank Act was released to restrict CRAs by increasing their 
costs for issuing biased ratings and partially delinking the minimal 
requirements of bank-holding securities with the credit rating levels.  
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However, even with those actions of monitoring the credit rating industry, the 
malfunction of CRAs was repeated again and again in some historical events, such 
as the Enron event (2001), the Worldcom (2004) event, the sub-prime mortgage 
collapse (2007) and the European sovereign crisis (2011).  
The effects of regulation on the market impact of credit ratings are discussed in the 
second chapter of this thesis (the first paper). 
1.2.2 The emergence of complex innovative financial products 
Financial practitioners always make every effort they can to create complex structures 
and contracts for new financial products, such as asset-backed securities (ABS) which 
were created in the 1970s and expanded with the introduction of the Copula technique 
(2000). These financial innovations broaden the information gap between investors 
and issuers since it is difficult for individual investors to have an intuitive feeling or 
evaluation of the quality of the issuers because the actual indicator of issuer quality 
has been hidden behind the extremely complex valuation methods, onerous contract 
clauses or mazy equity structures. Therefore, the investors would rely more on the 
opinions of CRAs who are viewed as experts in dealing with these financial innovation 
products. Such reliance of investors enhances the power of CRAs on the financial 
market and gives them a stronger influence on other market participants.  
The third chapter (the second paper) will discuss ABS, an example of the asset 
securitization products, and its relationship with credit ratings. Structured finance 
(Asset-Backed Security, also ABS) is an important outcome of the financial innovation 
in the 20th century. It splits the risks owned by buyers and sellers of a single security 
by establishing a security pool where payments to investors are based on the incomes 
of the backing securities (collateralized securities). Different from traditional 
investment instruments through which the issuers and investors of the securities 
transact directly, in ABS transactions, an institution called a ‘Special Purpose 
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Vehicle’(SPV) organizes the transactions as a bridge between the specific issuer and 
the general investors. The investors receive the payments in an order determined by 
their payment priority reflecting the purchasing prices or spreads (this procedure is 
called ‘tranching’ and each of the payment obligations with specific payment priority 
is called a ‘tranche’).  Due to the complex procedure of pooling and tranching, 
investors tend to turn to CRAs for a rating demonstrating its default risk. Despite a 
decreasing trend of the proportion of ABS ratings among all the entities since the 
financial crisis (perhaps attributable to the shock of the financial crisis or the restriction 
of the Dodd-Frank Act issued after the crisis), the percentage has been above 7% 
since 2009 when the SEC started publishing annual reports on the industry (see 
Figure 1-1). It shows that the rating services for ABS products take a significant 
proportion of the whole rating industry, which reflects a large demand for ABS ratings.   
Figure 1-1 Percentage of ABS ratings among all the rated entities 
 
Data Source: Annual report on nationally recognized statistical rating organizations (NRSROs) (2009 – 
2017) 
 1.2.3 Market scale, oligopoly and the issuer-pay model 
Since the global financial crisis (2007-8), the SEC has published a report each year 
to disclose the statistics of the credit rating industry in the previous year. According to 
these reports, I present the number of outstanding credit ratings on the US market 
from 2009-2016 as well as the proportion of rating dealings provided by the Big Three 
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Table 1-1 Number of Outstanding Credit Ratings on US Market and those issued by the 'Big 
Three' CRAs 
Year Total No. of 
Ratings 
Proportion 
  Moody’s S&P Fitch Sum of the Big Three 
2009 3,123,748 35.61% 40.18% 21.51% 97.30% 
2010 2,816,599 36.90% 42.27% 17.93% 97.09% 
2011 2,611,582 38.25% 44.82% 13.35% 96.42% 
2012 2,504,584 36.87% 45.65% 13.99% 96.50% 
2013 2,437,046 37.01% 46.15% 13.39% 96.55% 
2014 2,420,094 34.77% 48.60% 12.44% 95.81% 
2015 2,334,600 34.37% 49.13% 13.00% 96.50% 
2016 2,285,804 34.17% 48.92% 13.28% 96.37% 
 Data source: Annual report on nationally recognized statistical rating organizations (2010 – 2017). 
Even though the global financial crisis negatively affected the credit rating industry 
(reflected by a descending number of total outstanding credit ratings), the amount has 
remained at an extremely high level above two million deals, which means that there 
are on average over two million entities (including not only firms but also financial 
instruments and sovereigns) which are rated by CRAs each year. Such a large market 
scale indicates a common practice in the market of financial entities turning to CRAs 
for rating services. This provides a necessary condition for the role transformation of 
the credit rating industry: a big market scale of rating services is accompanied by 
significant market influence owned by the credit rating agencies, which potentially 
creates their self-interested motivation rather than the motivation of serving the 
investors. 
In addition, from Table 1-1, it can be observed that the Big Three CRAs took the 
market share of over 96% from 2009-2017, which is significant evidence of a 
phenomenon of three-party oligopoly: currently there are hundreds of credit rating 
agencies in the world but only the three included in Table 1-1 hold a high reputation 
and take the biggest part of the rating market.  
The oligopolistic feature is an essential reason for the existence and maintenance of 
the ‘issuer-pay model’ (Utzig, 2010), by which it is the issuers (or the firms who are 
willing to issue financial products) rather than the investors who pay the service fees 
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to the CRAs. Before the 1970s the rating agencies collected service fees from 
investors who wanted to see the rating results of the bonds of the investors’ interests. 
The trigger of the transformation from the investor-pay model to the issuer-pay model 
is the default event of the Penn-Central Railroad Company. The most widely accepted 
reason is that the previous investor-pay model incurred a free-rider problem which 
means that after an investor bought the rating, other investors could ‘share’ it with the 
buyer with a much lower cost. Another relatively convincing explanation is that with 
the increasing power implied in a satisfying rating, the issuers had higher incentives 
to obtain a rating than the investors.(Jiang et al., 2012) However, on the other hand, 
the increasing fees of rating services is an essential driver of the payment method 
change because the investors, especially the individual ones, were no longer 
financially able to pay the rating fees due to a more complex and costly rating 
procedure conducted by credit rating agencies.  
Whatever its reasons are, the transformation of payment model brought up a vested 
interest group of credit rating agencies whose revenues are collected from only the 
security issuers but whose rating results influence the entire financial markets. Under 
the issuer-pay model, the issuers have the motivation to keep more ‘stable’ ratings for 
rated firms and hence less timely in terms of identifying their potential risks (Cornaggia 
and Cornaggia, 2013). In the fourth chapter of the thesis (the third paper), I will 
conduct a specific study on the link between the rating quality and the fee payment 
model of the rating services. 
Therefore, the huge market scale of the rating market, the oligopolistic position which 
the Big Three CRAs have and the issuer-pay model with issuers’ willingness of being 
rated higher to finance their projects, collectively determine a predominant power of 
the big CRAs (Partnoy, 2006). 
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1.3 Topics of the three essays of the thesis 
In the context of the background of the role transformation of CRAs described in 
Section 1.2, I present three independent studies on the market influence of CRAs in 
Chapters II, III and IV respectively.  
The three chapters aim to answer the following questions: 
1) Do sovereign rating actions have a shock on the bank performances in the PIIGS 
(Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain) countries? Do individual bank downgrades 
enhance the influence of sovereign downgrades? 
2) Do credit ratings (both issuance rating actions and rating changes) have an impact 
on the prices (issuance spreads and transaction prices) on ABS market? Has such 
impact declined since the occurrence of global financial crisis (2007-08)?  
3) Is the solicitation status of credit ratings associated with the rating qualities? What 
is the incentive of CRAs to issue lower ratings for the firms who do not pay for the 
rating services? 
Chapter II is the first independent paper, which is designed to test the relationship 
among sovereign ratings, bank ratings and bank performances. As one of the rating 
types, a sovereign rating is published by CRAs to evaluate the quality of government 
debts issued by specific countries. From the perspective of information 
communication, the sovereign ratings should provide investors with additional useful 
sources for them to make investment decisions about the firms or financial products 
in the rated countries. I investigate this function of sovereign ratings by testing whether 
sovereign downgrades provide additional information for the market besides the 
information provided by bank rating downgrades which follow these sovereign 
downgrades. The empirical results I obtain are favorable to the function of sovereign 
ratings: even after considering the information of bank ratings, I find evidence that 
sovereign downgrades provide additional information for the market, reflected by the 
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changes in stock prices and Z score (a proxy for bank insolvency). The essential tool 
I use to tease out the effects of bank ratings and sovereign ratings is the exogenous 
shock associated with the ‘sovereign-ceiling policy’. This policy defines that the bank 
rating level should not exceed the sovereign rating level of the country where the bank 
is listed. Therefore, according to this policy, if the bank rating level is equal to the 
sovereign rating level and the sovereign rating is downgraded afterwards, the bank 
rating has to be downgraded to obey the policy. This provides an exogenous shock 
on the downgrades of bank ratings and helps me to specifically measure the additive 
effect of the following of bank ratings to the sovereign ratings.  
In Chapter III, I present the research outcomes of my second study. The study is 
focused on a type of financial innovation starting in the 1970s, the Asset-Backed 
Security (ABS), and the relationship between ABS pricing and the credit ratings given 
to it. As a consequence of the complex payment structure of the ABS products and 
the difficulty for investors to identify the real lenders of these products, the credit rating 
is one of the essential components for the ABS to be issued publicly. This enhances 
the statements I make in Section 1.2, that the strong power of credit ratings transforms 
the role of CRAs from information provider to market influencer. However, my data 
analysis results show that after the occurrence of the global financial crisis in 2007-
08, the connection between ABS issuance/transaction prices and the levels of credit 
ratings offered to the ABS product has been weaker than before the crisis. To support 
the hypothesis of a weaker connection from an empirical perspective, I apply the D-i-
D (Difference-in-Difference) technique to compare the variation of prices following 
credit ratings between the pre- and post- crisis periods. The weaker connection is 
likely a reflection of several possible factors: the effort of de-linking the regulatory 
requirements with credit ratings by regulators, the collapse of CRAs’ reputation and/or 
the increasing motivation of the investors to evaluate ABS quality instead of relying 
on the opinions given by CRAs.  
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Chapter IV is the third study which is designed to determine the motivation of CRAs 
to issue unsolicited ratings with no fee payments. The majority of rating services 
offered by CRAs are solicited ratings and are paid for by the issuers of the financial 
products. However, the Big Three CRAs offer some unsolicited ratings to the public 
without being paid for by the issuers. What is the incentive of CRAs to provide those 
rating services without economic benefits? Do they offer biased lower ratings for those 
companies who do not pay them in order to ‘blackmail’ them? By a series of empirical 
analyses, I find that the reason for a lower rating level for ‘non-paying’ firms is the 
‘self-selection’ effect of the firms rather than a ‘blackmail’ effect. Firms with a weak 
quality are more likely not to request the rating services of CRAs. CRAs observe this 
and rate them at a lower level without advanced solicitation. I support this finding by 
studying the actual ex-post performances of the ‘paying’ and ‘non-paying’ firms. This 
finding is favorable to the reputation of CRAs: no evidence is found to show that CRAs 
deliberately issue lower ratings for the firms who do not pay them; the lower ratings 
reflect their observation of self-selection effect. It implies that even though CRAs may 
have their self-interest concerning their profitability, it does not seriously undermine 
the basic fairness of the services provided by them.  
1.4 Summary of research data and methodology 
To achieve the research goals described in Section 1.3, I apply empirical research 
methods using three types of historical financial data: market data, accounting data 
and rating data.  
The market data refers to the issuance or transaction prices of financial instruments. 
In Chapter II, I use bank stock transaction prices as a reflection of investors’ reactions 
to the rating variations. In Chapter III, the issuance and transaction prices of ABS are 
collected to measure the market impact of ABS rating changes. In Chapter IV, I use 
the stock prices as a component of the iteration solution to calculate Distance-To-
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Default (DTD), an indicator of the default risk of the firms. The market data are 
collected from the Bloomberg and Datastream databases. In Chapters II and III, ‘stock 
returns’ are used as a measure of market reactions to credit rating actions but the 
formats of ‘stock returns’ are different. In Chapter 2, numerical return is taken to 
measure the stock market variation (
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡+1−𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡




) but in Chapter III, abnormal return (AR) and 
standardized abnormal return (SAR) are also calculated to supplement the 
conventional stock return measures.   
The accounting data refers to the quarterly or annual data obtained from the financial 
reports of listed firms (or banks). It reflects the size, profitability and other fundamental 
information of the firms and is generally used to test the long-term relationship 
between firm/security performances and credit ratings. In Chapter II, I collect the basic 
accounting-based fundamentals of the banks to calculate the Z scores of banks which 
indicate the insolvency risk. In Chapter III, I use the basic information of ABS deals as 
control variables to study the link between ABS issuance prices and ABS ratings. In 
Chapter IV, accounting-based variables are essential components for my use of the 
iteration technique to obtain the DTD. The accounting data are also collected from the 
Bloomberg and Datastream databases. 
The rating data are the historical rating levels of firms, securities or countries. 
Currently, the rating notch indicator is formatted as a combination of letters and 
numbers (or positive and negative signs). For instance, the top level of ratings is AAA 
for Moody’s, S&P and Fitch. The second highest level is Aa1 (Moody’s) and AA+ (S&P 
and Fitch), followed by Aa2 (Moody’s) and AA (S&P and Fitch), Aa3 (Moody’s) and 
AA- (S&P and Fitch) and so on. To apply the rating levels in the statistical analysis, I 
transform their format into numerical style. The details of this transformation are not 
the same in all the three studies (they are explained in the next three chapters) but 
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the principle is the same: rating levels are transformed into positive integers starting 
from 1, and a lower number indicates a higher rating level. The data sources of the 
historical ratings are the Bloomberg database and documents published on CRAs’ 
websites.  
1.5 Contributions 
My research contributes to the literature of the credit rating industry by providing three 
empirical studies in the context of the role transformation of CRAs. I find substantial 
evidence to show a connection between the credit ratings and the market reactions, 
which suggests that CRAs play the role of a market influencer. 
Firstly, I study a couple of categories of ratings. Previous research only focuses on 
single types of ratings in their research. For example, some of them study the ratings 
for commercial banks (Richards and Deddouche, 2003, Panetta et al., 2011, Acharya 
et al., 2014, Alsakka et al., 2014) while others study the ratings for firms in non-
financial sectors (Xia, 2014) or special financial instruments (Ashcraft et al., 2011; 
Fabozzi and Vink, 2012; Mählmann, 2012). However, each of these previous studies 
only focuses on a restricted scope of the rating industry. In my thesis, I cover all the 
three types of rating recipients. For firm ratings, I examine not only ratings for general 
firms (Chapter IV) but also for banks (Chapter II); for security ratings, I investigate the 
relationship between the rating levels and the prices of stocks (Chapter II) and ABS 
(Chapter III) to show the market influence of ratings; for countries, the sovereign rating 
and the relationship between sovereign ratings and firm ratings, as well as the market 
reactions to both types of ratings are studied (Chapter II).  
Furthermore, my research covers different measures of ‘market reactions’. In previous 
research, scholars use stock returns or bond spreads as usual indicators of market 
reaction to credit ratings (Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2002; Brooks et al., 2004; Durbin 
and Ng, 2005; Adelino and Ferreira, 2016). Those indicators only cover the 
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information on short-term reactions of secondary market investors but reflect neither 
the long-term reactions of the market to the rating changes nor the issuance market 
situations. In my thesis, the measurement of market reaction ranges from short-term 
indicators such as daily stock prices (Chapter II), ABS issuance and transaction prices 
(Chapter III) and DTD indicating insolvency risk (Chapter IV), to long-term indicators 
such as the Z score (Chapter II).  
Lastly, my research also involves the rating industry before and after two recent 
financial crises, the global financial crisis (2007-08) and the European debt crisis 
(2011-2014). These two recent financial crises have profoundly changed the 
reputation and market influence of CRAs and hence are non-negligible factors when 
discussing the credit rating industry. Although a few scholars discuss the change of 
the credit rating industry after the global financial crisis (Utzig, 2010; White, 2010), 
most of these studies discuss the reform plan for the rating industry in the post-crisis 
period from a qualitative perspective. In my thesis I use empirical analyses to 
investigate the change of CRA activities after the crises.  Chapter II studies the 
sovereign ratings of five European countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and 
Spain), which experienced a large number of sovereign downgrades during the 
European debt crisis. Chapter III explores the change in the rating-price link of ABS 
markets before and after the global financial crisis in 2007-08. I find a weaker 
relationship between credit ratings and issuance/transaction prices after the financial 
crisis. This provides a signal for the market that the CRAs have a weaker influence on 
the market in the post-crisis period.  
My research also provides useful information for practitioners in the financial field. For 
CRAs, the research in my thesis helps them to get a comprehensive knowledge of 
their role transformation after the global financial crisis. The empirical results about 
how sovereign ratings, ABS ratings and unsolicited ratings impact the market may 
help them to improve their function as information providers in the financial market 
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and realize that the new role of market influencers enables them to either provide 
more transparency for the market or block the information channel due to conflict of 
interest. For other participants in the financial market (banks and investors), this study 
may help them empirically measure the impact of CRAs and obtain a deeper 
understanding about how to react to CRA’s opinions. In addition, for financial 
regulators, my research offers evidence suggesting a call for stricter regulation for the 
rating industry, especially for those big CRAs who have sufficient power to influence 




2. Chapter II Do bank rating changes following sovereign 
rating changes provide extra information? Evidence from 
the sovereign-ceiling policy 
“The reputation of western credit rating agencies has been questioned for a long time, 
with the decline of their authority and significance.” 
--Comments of the Xinhua News Agency (a Chinese stated-owned news agency) after 
the announcement of the sovereign downgrades of China released by Moody’s (23 
May 2017) and the subsequent downgrades of a number of Chinese 
commercial/policy banks (Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of Communications Co, 
Agricultural Development Bank of China, China Development Bank Corporation and 
the Export-Import Bank of China) a day later (24 May 2017) 
2.1 Introduction 
The opening quotation of this chapter is a comment from a Chinese state-owned news 
agency to respond downgrade actions taken by Moody’s for Chinese sovereigns and 
some of the main commercial banks. This comment seems to contradict the statement 
in Chapter 1 that the role of CRAs has come to be a market influencer. Therefore, the 
aim of this chapter is to further explore whether CRAs have an impact on the global 
market, from a perspective of sovereign ratings and bank ratings. 
The literature widely discusses the relationship between sovereign risks and bank 
performances. Caporale et al. (2012) discuss the relationship between sovereign 
characteristics and the individual bank performances in each country. Furthermore, to 
examine and measure the sovereign risk, scholars focus on an essential indicator, the 
sovereign ratings. As defined, the sovereign rating reflects the credit rating agency’s 
(CRA) assessment of the government debt’s quality. By its nature, it is not linked to 
the performances of commercial banks located in the corresponding countries. 
However, the majority of the literature (Panetta et al., 2011; Correa et al., 2014; 
Acharya et al., 2014; Brunnermeier et al., 2016; Gibson et al., 2016) observes that 
sovereign rating significantly impacts bank behaviours and bank performances. They 
find a significant variation of stock/bond prices which follows the sovereign rating 
32 
 
events occurring in corresponding countries. It suggests that investors change their 
attitudes towards the banks whose countries receive sovereign rating events.  
Therefore, the channel by which sovereign ratings affect bank performances is 
investigated and explored by scholars. The mainstream literature studies the factors 
related to the governments of countries encountering sovereign rating events and 
discusses the potential conduits by which government activities may affect the 
commercial banks; for instance, the government debts held by domestic banks, the 
quality of government guarantees for banks and so on.  
In this paper, I offer another angle, the bank entity ratings, to explain the connection 
between sovereign ratings and bank performances. The literature discovers two 
phenomena (Richards and Deddouche, 2004; Williams et al., 2013; Alsakka et al., 
2014): sovereign rating actions are very likely to be followed by bank rating actions 
and bank ratings naturally impact the market performances of the corresponding 
banks. I combine these two phenomena, consider the potential channel of sovereign 
ratings’ impact on bank performances and show evidence to support the hypothesis 
that bank ratings play a ‘middleman’ role by transmitting the sovereign ratings’ impact 
to the bank performances.  
In this chapter, I define ‘bank performances’ from two perspectives: a short-term 
analysis of stock return shock (on a daily basis) and a long-term analysis of insolvency 
risk (reflected by Z score on an annual basis).  
For analysis on a daily (an annual) basis, I focus on the cases where sovereign rating 
events and bank rating events occur sequentially with an interval shorter than two 
transaction days. The reason for choosing those special cases as the analyzed 
sample is to reflect the relationship between sovereign ratings and bank ratings in an 
institutional scenario. In the scenario where bank ratings follow sovereign ratings in a 
short interval, the information provided by the latter may be covered by that offered 
by the former if bank ratings do not transmit or enhance the impact of sovereign ratings. 
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In other words, I define ‘the transmission of sovereign rating impact’ by testing whether 
investors/bankers receive extra information from the bank rating events which follow 
the sovereign rating events. For the long-term analysis, I focus on rating events 
occurring within a calendar year to define the scenario that sovereign rating actions 
are followed by bank rating actions.  
The hypothesis is empirically tested based on two sub-hypotheses. The first 
hypothesis indicates that if a sovereign rating action is followed by a bank rating action, 
the power of the effects of sovereign rating downgrades on bank performances would 
be enhanced. In other words, if a change in bank rating follows a sovereign 
downgrade, the impact on the performances of the corresponding bank is stronger 
than if the bank ratings did not follow the sovereign downgrades. However, this finding 
alone does not enable me to conclude that bank ratings act as the channel because 
the enhancement of power may be derived from the independent impact of the bank 
rating downgrades rather than the effect of the ‘follow’ of bank ratings to sovereign 
downgrades.  
To examine the ‘channel’ effect, I further explore the first hypothesis by applying an 
exogenous shock on the bank rating downgrades which are not related to the 
independent characteristics of the rated banks. I use the sovereign-ceiling policy as 
the shock, which regulates the CRAs to offer ratings for individual firms at a level not 
higher than the sovereign ratings in the corresponding countries. According to this 
policy, if a bank is rated at the same level as the sovereign rating and the sovereign 
rating is downgraded, the CRA will downgrade the bank rating following the sovereign 
downgrade to satisfy the requirement of the policy.  
Therefore, the second hypothesis is designed to test the effect of sovereign-ceiling 
policy on the transmission of sovereign rating downgrades’ impact. I empirically test 
the hypothesis that bank rating downgrades, which follow the sovereign rating 
downgrades triggered by the sovereign ceiling policy have, on average, a weaker 
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impact on bank performances than other bank rating downgrades following sovereign 
downgrades but not triggered by the policy. It enhances the hypothesis of channel 
effect of bank ratings: bank rating downgrades triggered by the sovereign ceiling 
policy (which can be viewed as passive actions by CRAs) enhance the effect of the 
sovereign rating downgrades at a lower degree, which shows that the active bank 
downgrades enhance sovereign ratings downgrades’ effect besides their independent 
impacts.  
In this research, I extend the scope of ‘bank performances’. The traditional indicator, 
stock returns, is applied by the mainstream of literature to test the market reaction to 
rating changes (West, 1973; Hand et al., 1992; Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2002; 
Brooks et al., 2004; Gibson et al., 2016). I follow this stream of literature by testing the 
stock returns in ten-day time window after the occurrence of sovereign rating changes. 
Besides the short-term indicator, some scholars also raise some long-term indicators 
of the impact of rating changes, for instance, lending strategy and funding strategy 
(Adelino and Ferreira, 2016), or cross country bank flows (Kim and Wu, 2011). 
However, I consider that the function of credit ratings is to predict the credit risks of 
firms or countries. Therefore, a long-term indicator of the credit risk of rated banks is 
selected to test the power of sovereign ratings. I use a Z score as the indicator of 
banks’ insolvency risk, which is a reflection of the bank credit risk. I further test whether 
the sovereign ratings have a significant effect on the Z score change in the following 
year, whether such effect is enhanced by the following of bank ratings and whether 
the fact that the bank downgrade is triggered by the sovereign ceiling policy is related 
to a weaker shock. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 describes the background of 
the research, states the research questions and related hypotheses regarding my 
research topic and presents my contributions to the existing literature. In Section 2.3 
I describe my sample, the types of sovereign rating downgrades, the considered 
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variables and some essential indicators. Section 2.4 shows the regression models 
which are designed to test the hypotheses shown in Section 2.2 using the data 
described in Section 2.3. I also report the empirical results of those regression models 
and discuss how these results can be interpreted to support the hypotheses 
concerning the channel effects of bank ratings in the context of sovereign rating 
downgrades. Section 2.5 concludes this chapter. 
2.2 Background, Hypotheses and Contributions 
Sovereign risk is an essential factor of observing and studying the performances and 
behavior of the banking sector (Panetta et al., 2011). Among the diversified 
measurements of sovereign risk, the sovereign rating is viewed as an essential 
indicator of the sovereign risk of rated countries.  
The sovereign rating, on the one hand, reflects the generalized performances (of all 
related economic sectors) of a country. On the other hand, it releases information to 
the market and changes the behavior and performance of specific industries in that 
country. Previous research investigates how the sovereign ratings impact the 
economic behaviors or performances from an empirical perspective. These studies 
not only analyze the single market impact, such as sovereign ratings’ effect on bond 
prices, (Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2002), stock returns (Brooks et al., 2004), CDS 
spreads (Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010) and economic cycle (Kaminsky and 
Schmukler, 2002), but also investigate the cross-country effect (spill-over effect) 
(Ferreira and Gama, 2007; Arezki et al., 2011; Abad et al., 2018). 
The banking industry is one of the sectors which are sensitive to the information 
released by the sovereign ratings (Gibson et al., 2016). Therefore, scholars focus on 
the association between the sovereign ratings offered by CRAs to a country, and the 
reactions of banks which are located, registered or listed in that country. Based on the 
finding that sovereign ratings are significantly related to the bank performances, the 
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literature discusses the potential channel by which sovereign ratings impact bank 
performances. The government debt held by commercial banks located in the 
corresponding countries is regarded as a significant conduit of the impact of sovereign 
ratings on bank performances (Panetta et al., 2011; Correa et al., 2014; Acharya et 
al., 2014). During the period of sovereign downgrades, the quality of government debt 
deteriorates, and it negatively affects the quality of commercial banks who hold a large 
number of government debts. Moreover, the low quality of government guarantees 
due to the sovereign rating downgrades are also regarded as a factor to transmit the 
impact of sovereign ratings to the bank sector (Panetta et al., 2011; Acharya et al., 
2014). Government bailout is also a factor which is discussed as a potential channel 
of sovereign-bank relations (Fratzscher and Rieth, 2015). Davies & Ng (2011) explore 
the possibility that a value reduction of sovereign bonds held by domestic banks would 
trigger margin calls by counterparties which makes the situation worse. To summarize 
the mentioned channels, DeBruyckere et al., (2013) conducted a comprehensive 
empirical analysis using European banks to show that the validity of sovereign-bank 
channels is sensitive to three factors: capital buffer, funding structure and the 
proportion of traditional activities. They also find that government intervention plays 
an essential role in the channel effect which strongly support the hypothesis that the 
government guarantee is a significant factor to affect the sovereign-bank channel.  
Additionally, the literature mentions some other potential factors, such as the decline 
of service demands as a consequence of poor fiscal condition (Correa et al., 2014) 
and the free capital mobility (Brunnermeier et al., 2016).  
The cross-country effects of sovereign risks on bank performances are also discussed 
by many scholars. Alter & Beyer (2014) uses sovereign CDS as an indicator of 
sovereign risks and find a significant link between Spanish sovereign risks and bank 
performances in other countries.  
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However, the majority of the literature does not consider another potential channel, 
which is the bank rating changes after the sovereign rating changes. Panetta et al. 
(2011) mention the possibility of bank ratings acting as the channel to enhance the 
impact of sovereign rating changes on bank performance, but they do not provide 
detailed discussion and empirical evidence to prove this. Davies & Ng (2011) also 
raised the potential channel of bank ratings. They believe that the sovereign rating 
downgrades are followed by the bank rating downgrades and the latter actions 
increase the funding cost or restrict the market access of commercial banks. Some 
researchers observe the phenomenon that bank ratings have a high likelihood of 
following the changes of sovereign ratings (Williams et al., 2013; Alsakka et al., 2014). 
Others find that bank ratings are followed by variations in bank performances 
(Richards and Deddouche, 2004). Since the sovereign ratings are followed by bank 
ratings and the bank ratings impact the performances, it is reasonable to hypothesize 
that bank ratings partially transmit (or enhance) the power of sovereign ratings to 
affect the bank performances. 
To define the concept of ‘bank performances’, I use two indicators, a short-term one 
and a long-term one. For the short-term measure, I apply stock returns in a 10-day 
time window following the sovereign rating events to capture the effect of sovereign 
ratings. Stock prices reflect the expectation of investors, so the literature uses the 
stock returns as an essential indicator of firm performances reacting to the rating 
changes (Hand et al., 1992; Dichev and Piotroski, 2001; Richards and Deddouche, 
2003).  
For the long-term measure, I take the insolvency risk of banks as the measurement 
of sovereign rating impact. CRAs design credit ratings as an assessment of the rated 
entity’s credit risks. For banks, insolvency risk is an essential indication of credit risk. 
Therefore, the link between sovereign ratings in the current year and the insolvency 
risk in the following year is regarded as a reflection sovereign ratings’ predictability of 
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bank performances. Specifically, I use the Z score as an indicator of annual bank 
performances in terms of insolvency risk. Z score is commonly used in empirical 
papers to measure the probability of banks/bank risk takings (Boyd et al., 2006; Gropp 
et al., 2013; Ignatowski and Korte, 2014; Anginer et al., 2014; Adhikari and Agrawal, 
2016) and insolvency (Strobel, 2011; Lepetit and Strobel, 2013; Lepetit and Strobel, 
2015). From a statistical perspective, the Z score is equal to the square of the upper 
bound of the probability of the event that the sum of ROAA (Return on Average Asset) 
and CAR (Capital-Asset Ratio) is equal or less than zero (Hannan and Hanweck, 
1988). A higher Z score is equivalent to a lower probability of becoming insolvent, 
which reflects a lower insolvency risk of banks. From a mathematical perspective,  
Z score=(ROAA+μ(CAR))/(σ(ROAA)) 
where μ(∙) and σ(∙) are the mean and standard deviation respectively. 
The principal objective of this research is to investigate whether bank rating (BR) 
enhances the power of signals released by sovereign rating (SR) downgrades (i.e., 
whether the BR downgrades provide extra information to the market 
investors/bankers besides SR downgrades leading them). I focus on the information 
transmission of SR-BR-Performance conduit by testing whether the information 
contents of SR downgrades are different in two scenarios:  
Scenario 1: SR downgrades with BR downgrades followed; 
Scenario 2: SR downgrades without BR downgrades followed. 
Based on the definition of bank performances, to achieve my research objective of 
identifying the channel ‘SR-BR-Performance’, I focus on the impact of SR downgrades 
on bank stock returns (daily) and Z scores (annually). BR downgrades which occur 
following SR downgrades are then identified to test whether the SR downgrades in 




However, this test alone cannot fully tease out the independent effects and enhanced 
effects of SR and BR. Specifically, for Scenario 1, two types of rating downgrade (SR 
and BR) occur simultaneously, so it cannot be directly observed whether the gap of 
effects for Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 is due to the enhancement of the followed bank 
ratings to the sovereign ratings or the independent effect of the bank ratings. 
There are three sources of information to the market for the cases when a bank rating 
downgrade follows a sovereign downgrade:  
Source 1: the information provided by SR downgrades; 
Source 2: the information provided by BR downgrades; 
Source 3: the information provided by the fact that the SR downgrade is followed by 
BR. 
The information source I am interested in is ‘Source 3’. It indicates the extent by which 
a following bank rating actions would enhance the effect of SR downgrades. Even if I 
obtain empirical results showing that SR downgrades fitting Scenario 1 have a greater 
impact on bank performances than those fitting Scenario 2, I am unable to state 
whether the enhancement of impact is due to Source 2 or Source 3. To extract the 
effect of Source 3, I apply an exogenous shock on the follow of BR downgrades to SR 
downgrades despite the specific bank’s information.   
To have a more convincing discussion, I further consider a particular case, sovereign 
ceiling policy, as the exogenous shock. The sovereign ceiling policy refers to the 
requirement that the rating level of firms in a country should not exceed the sovereign 
rating of that country. I acknowledge that the ceiling policy was required as a 
compulsory action for CRAs until 1997, when Standard & Poors firstly rated firms with 
a higher level than the sovereign ceiling (Borensztein et al., 2013). Since then, the 
ceiling policy has become a conventional policy. Although it is arguable whether CRAs 
have strictly followed the policy, a large body of literature believes that the ceiling 
policy plays a decisive role in the process of CRAs determining the firm rating levels 
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(Borensztein et al., 2013; Almeida et al., 2017). Specific for bank ratings, Klusak et al., 
2017 apply the case of disclosure of unsolicited rating status to present that the ceiling 
channel is a significant factor to transmit the influence of sovereign rating actions. 
Based on this consensus, many scholars apply the ceiling policy as a research tool to 
study the impact of credit ratings on the market. Their research range from the bond 
spreads (Durbin and Ng, 2005) to the loan supply (Adelino and Ferreira, 2016). 
In this essay, I only consider the rating downgrades rather than upgrades for two 
reasons. Firstly, rating downgrades have a more significant impact on the market than 
upgrades. In other words, the market is more sensitive to bad news than to good. 
(Hand et al., 1992; Dichev and Piotroski, 2001; Drago and Gallo, 2016). The second 
reason is that only downgrades of SR may trigger the sovereign ceiling policy while 
upgrades are not related to the policy. According to the ceiling policy, BR has to be 
downgraded after the SR downgrade occurs if the BR was at the same level with SR 
before SR was downgraded. Therefore, I further split Scenario 1 into two sub-
categories: 
Scenario 1: SR downgrades with BR downgrades followed; 
      Scenario 1.1: SR downgrades which trigger the sovereign-ceiling policy with BR 
downgrades followed; 
      Scenario 1.2: SR downgrades which do not trigger the sovereign-ceiling policy 
with BR downgrades followed; 
Scenario 2: SR downgrades without BR downgrades followed. 
The information source decomposition is shown in Figure 1. 
Scenario 1.1 should be viewed as semi-passive downgrades while Scenario 1.2 is 
regarded as fully-active downgrades. Scenario 1.1 (semi-passive downgrades) is 
associated with only a part of the information of Source 3 because the BR downgrades 
are announced by the CRA due to the regulation of the sovereign ceiling policy and 
hence are partially compulsory. Scenario 1.2 (active downgrades) is associated with 
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all the information of Source 3 because the BR downgrades following SR downgrades 
are not compulsory. Therefore, if the BR following SR provides extra information, the 
fully-active downgrades should have an impact on stock returns/Z scores at a higher 
degree than semi-passive ones. In other words, the average gap of market impact on 
bank performances between Scenario 1.1 and Scenario 1.2 should be significant.  
 
Figure 2-1 Information source decomposition for Scenarios 1.1 and 1.2 
 
To summarize my research objectives, I raise the research questions and 
corresponding hypotheses as follows. 
Question 2-1: Do BRs enhance the power of signals released by SR downgrades? 
Hypothesis 2-1: SR downgrades followed by BR downgrades have a stronger 












SR downgrade is 




SR downgrade is 
followed by BR 
For Scenario 1.1, the dash area is excluded 
because the BR follows the SR due to the 
sovereign-ceiling policy (semi-passive). 
Source 3 is not fully active in this case. 
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Question 2-2: Do active BR downgrades provide extra information to the market 
besides SR downgrades leading them? 
Hypothesis 2-2: Among the SR downgrades followed by BR downgrades, the average 
association between SR downgrades and stock returns/Z scores is weaker if the BR 
downgrades are triggered by the sovereign ceiling policy. 
My research contributes to the literature as follows. 
1. To my knowledge, this study is the first to specifically investigate bank entity ratings 
as a factor to explain the impact of sovereign ratings on bank performances. The 
existence of the channel ‘SR-BR-Performance’ shows that sovereign rating 
downgrades negatively impact market or management performances of banks 
partially by the enhancement of bank rating downgrades sequentially. I acknowledge 
that, even if I show evidence of the bank ratings’ role of transmitting and enhancing 
the effect of sovereign ratings, it does not mean that the bank rating is the sole channel 
of that. Discussions about other potential channels described by the literature, such 
as the government debt, government guarantees and financial service demands are 
still constructive regarding this issue. The way I contribute to the literature is to provide 
a new angle of entity ratings to explain the ‘SR-Performance’ link. 
2. I consider the case of sovereign-ceiling policy to further tease out the impact of 
sovereign rating downgrades and bank rating downgrades and solve the problem that 
the short duration between occurrences of these two types of rating downgrades may 
contaminate the analysis result. Defining the bank rating downgrades following 
sovereign rating downgrades triggered by the sovereign ceiling policy as ‘semi-
passive’ and others as ‘active’, I apply a difference-in-difference analysis to test 
whether the gap of effects between semi-passive and active downgrades is significant.  
3. I extend the scope of ‘bank performance’, from the short-term indicator (stock 
returns) to the long-term one (insolvency risk). The short-term impact of sovereign 
ratings on the stock returns reflects how the secondary market investors react to the 
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sovereign rating events in a certain period of time. The long-term impact of sovereign 
ratings on the Z score reflects the predictability of credit ratings in terms of the 
insolvency risk of banks located in the downgraded countries. I find evidence to show 
that sovereign ratings have both the short-term and the long-term impacts on bank 
stock returns and Z scores. The impacts are both enhanced by the follow of bank 
rating events, which provide extra information both to the investors and on the 
predictability of insolvency risk. 
2.3 Data and Sample 
2.3.1 Sample description 
I collect the data of historical credit ratings (from Bloomberg), stock prices and 
accounting information (Thomson Reuters) of listed banks who received ratings by all 
the Big Three rating agencies (Moody’s, S&P and Fitch). Sample banks are those who 
are registered and listed in five EU countries, PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, 
and Spain). Since the objective of my research is to study the sovereign rating 
downgrade events and their effect on bank performances, it is necessary that I have 
a sufficient number of sovereign rating downgrades in the sample period occurring in 
the corresponding countries. That is why I filter out countries in the EU other than 
PIIGS (The sample of PIIGS is also applied by Gibson et al., 2016). The criteria ‘rated 
by the three CRAs’, ‘listed on the stock market’ and ‘registered in the PIIGS countries’ 
significantly reduces the number of sampled banks. In addition, to ensure the 
consistency of my analysis, I filter out the banks which did not exist before 2009 and 
the banks disappearing (for possible reasons such as M&A or bankruptcy) before 
2018. After filtering, I have 25 sample banks. The sample period is Jan 1991-Jan 2018. 
1991 is the year when the first downgrade event is observed for the sample banks 
and 2018 is when the research was conducted. The bank ID, countries, and the 
number of sovereign rating downgrades by each CRA is shown in Table 2-1. 
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I observe that the five countries experience a number of sovereign downgrades in the 
sample period. Greece is the country receiving the greatest number of sovereign 
downgrades because there are two rounds of debt crises in Greece (2009 and 2015). 
The numbers of sovereign downgrades are not significantly different among each of 
the three CRAs. Therefore, in the short-term analysis I do not split the sovereign 
rating/bank rating downgrades for each of the three CRAs but treat each of them 
equally in the regressions. However, for the long-term analysis, I run regression 
separately, using annual rating downgrades for each of the three CRAs because I can 
only obtain data of Z scores and accounting-based variables on an annual basis and 
the rating downgrades for each year are difficult to measure when I consider all the 
three CRAs together. For most of the fiscal years I observe downgrades with different 
notches for different CRAs so it is more convenient and reasonable to measure the 
annual rating changes for each CRA separately. 
The initial dataset I obtain is in the format of a daily basis and the number of daily 
observations is 187,550 (25 banks × 7502 days) including missing values (the reason 
for missing values is that for some dates the bank is not listed or not established) and 
176,498 excluding missing values. For the dataset to be run on an annual basis (Z 
score case) I set a parallel dataset for Z score which has 725 observations (25 banks 
× 29 years). 
Focusing on the sovereign rating events which are fitted to the sample banks, I 
examine the pair of SRD-Bank (SRD: Sovereign Rating Downgrades), where the 
sample banks receive sovereign rating downgrades (countries where the banks are 
registered and listed are downgraded by one of the three rating agencies). For the 25 
sample banks, I identify 724 SR changes (both downgrades and upgrades), where 
504 are downgrade cases (SRD-Bank). 
In the sample of ‘SRD-Bank’ pairs, I further identify the ‘followed by BR’ cases: for the 
SR changes on the banks, if the bank’s entity rating (issuers’ rating) also changed in 
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the same direction on the same day or one day later, I identify this case as ‘followed 
by BR’. I identify 399 cases both satisfying the ‘SRD-Bank’ and ‘followed by BR’. 
The reasons that I choose ‘no more than two days’ as the criteria to define ‘followed 
by BR’ are, 1) for the distribution of duration between sovereign downgrades and bank 
downgrades shows that most of events occur with an interval shorter than 2 days (see 
Table 2.2, the ratio is 399/594=79.2%) and 2) if setting a long interval, it would be 
more difficult to clarify whether bank downgrades actually ‘follows’ the corresponding 
sovereign downgrades or they are independent events.  
In the sample of ‘SRD-Followed by BR’, I further identify ‘at the ceiling’ cases where 
the BR level was equal to the SR level after the SR changes. For cases satisfying 
both ‘SRD-Followed by BR’ and ‘at the ceiling’, I assume that the rating agencies 
semi-passively downgrade BRs to maintain the condition that BR should be at a level 
not exceeding the SR level. I identify 119 cases of ‘downgrades triggered by ceiling 
policy’. Table 2-2 shows the distribution of the identified events. 
The number of sovereign downgrades is larger than that of upgrades. This indicates 
that during the sample period, the situation of sovereign risks of the five countries is 
deteriorating. It shows that PIIGS has experienced sovereign debt crisis since 2009. 
For sovereign downgrades, nearly 75% are followed by bank rating downgrades, 
which shows evidence of a strong link between sovereign ratings and firm ratings 









Table 2-1 Information of sampled banks and countries in Chapter II 
This table shows the country and number of SRD (Sovereign Rating Downgrades) for each of the 
sample countries (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain), offered by the three credit rating 
agencies (Moody’s, S&P and Fitch) in the empirical analysis. 
Bank Name Bloomberg ID Country No. of SRD 
   Moody’s S&P Fitch 
National Bank of Greece ETE GA Equity 
Greece 14 16 14 
Piraeus Bank TPEIR GA Equity 
Eurobank Ergasias EUROB GA Equity 
Alpha Bank ALPHA GA Equity 
Egnatia Bank EGNAK GA Equity 
Emporiki TEMP GA Equity 
Banco Santander SAN SM Equity 
Spain 9 8 5 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya 
Argentina 
BBVA SM Equity 
CaixaBank CABK SM Equity 
Banco de Sabadell SAB SM Equity 
Bankia BKIA SM Equity 
Banco Popular Espanol POP SM Equity 
Bankinter BKT SM Equity 
Banco Espanol de Credito BTO SM Equity 
Bank of Ireland BKIR ID Equity 
Ireland 7 7 7 
Allied Irish Bank ALBK ID Equity 
UniCredit UCG IM Equity 
Italy 9 8 7 
Intesa Sanpaolo ISP IM Equity 
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro BNL IM Equity 
Credito Emiliano CE IM Equity 
Banca Carige CRG IM Equity 
Banco Espirito Santo BES PL Equity 
Portugal 7 10 4 
Banco Comercial Portugues BCP PL Equity 
Banco BPI BPI PL Equity 
Banco Santander Totta CPDP PL Equity 
It also enhances my motivation for conducting this research: since bank ratings have 
a very high likelihood of following sovereign ratings, it is possible that sovereign rating 
downgrades impact bank performances through the channel of bank ratings. For SRD 
followed by BR downgrades, nearly 30% trigger the sovereign-ceiling policy. The 
adequate number of cases triggering the policy provides the possibility of conducting 
a D-i-D analysis on the trigger-policy BR downgrades following SR downgrades and 
testing whether the semi-passive downgrades have weaker effects on bank 
performances than active downgrades. 
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Table 2-2 Distribution of sovereign rating changes in the sample  
This table shows the distribution of the identified events according to the types of rating changes. 
‘Sovereign Change’ refers to the cases when the country where the sample bank is registered in receives 
sovereign rating changes by at least one of the three CRAs (Moody’s, S&P and Fitch). ‘BR’ refers to the 
‘Bank Ratings’. ‘Ceiling policy’ refers to the ‘sovereign ceiling policy’ according to which the firm rating 
levels should not be higher than the corresponding country sovereign rating levels. 
SovereignChange  724       
  Upgrade 220     
  Downgrade 504     
    
Not Followed 
by BR  105   
    Followed by BR   399   
      
Triggered by Ceiling Policy 
(Semi-Passive)  119 
      
Not Triggered by  Ceiling 
Policy (Fully Active)  280 
2.3.2 Variables in the short-term stock return analysis 
The key dependent variables in the short-term analysis and the long-term analysis are 
stock returns and Z scores respectively.  
For daily stock returns, I use time windows from 1 to 10 and another window of 20 
days to test the ratings’ effects on short-term market reactions. The selection of time 
windows (from 1 to 10 days) follows the work by Brooks et al. (2004) and the 20-day 
window is selected as a benchmark of the decay of shocks’ effect. I recognize that 10-
day window may be too long so there may be some contaminated events which would 
make the results biased. The most significant ‘contaminated events’ are the rating 
actions by other CRAs so in this section I regard rating events announced by each of 
the three CRAs as homogenous events.  
Based on Hypothesis 1, I expect a significant association between sovereign ratings 
and stock returns for time windows from 1 to 10 and that the significance recedes or 
disappears for the time window of 20 days to show that the shock of sovereign ratings 
on stock prices occurs in a short-term period. For each day (t), I define  






𝐷1 is the starting date of the time window and 𝐷2 is the last day of the time window. 
In details, I have a number of combinations of [𝐷1, 𝐷2]: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡[𝑡 − 2, 𝑡 − 1] which measures the 1-day daily returns before the occurrence of 
sovereign rating downgrades. The reason that I include the time window before the 
event in my analysis is to use it as a benchmark and compare the results of ‘before-
event’ return with those of ‘after-event’ one to intuitively present the shock of sovereign 
rating downgrades.  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡[𝑡 − 1, 𝑡 + 𝑇] where T are integers ranging from 1 to 10 and 20. It measures the 
daily returns after the occurrence of sovereign rating downgrades. For each day t, I 
use the last price on day (t-1) as the baseline price instead of the price on the day t. 
The reason is that to study the effect of sovereign rating downgrades on day t, I am 
unable to simply assume that the downgrade announcements are released before, 
during or after the transaction time of day t so it may cause some bias using the prices 
on the current day as the baseline price. However, if I take the last price on the day 
before the downgrade announcements as the baseline, the corresponding price 
returns for period [t-1, t+T] are able to capture the shock of the announcements, 
regardless of whether the downgrades are announced during the transaction time on 
day t.  
This method of measuring stock returns is derived from the work by Kaminsky, G. 
Schmukler (2002) and Gibson et al., (2016) who use logarithm of stock prices as the 
indicator of stock price reactions to rating actions. Mathematically, the logarithm of 
stock prices should have the same implication of the format of stock returns applied 
in this section.   
To control the market conditions, I use the return of stock index in the respective 
countries in the corresponding time windows. 






𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 refers to the market index of the country where bank i is registered and listed 
in. For Greek, Spanish, Irish, Italian and Portuguese banks, I use the ASE (Athens 
Stock Exchange) General Index, IBEX 35, ISEQ (Irish Stock Exchange) Overall Index, 
FTSE MIB and PSI (Portugal Stock Index) 20 for the index reference, respectively.  
The rating level of sample banks is an essential factor to be controlled for when 
analysing the effect of sovereign ratings on bank stock returns. I assume that 
sovereign rating downgrades have different magnitudes of shock on stock prices for 
banks with different rating levels which have been assigned to the banks. It is 
reasonable to propose that sovereign ratings have a stronger shock on lower-rated 
banks because the sovereign risk deterioration may have a greater negative shock on 
investors’ confidence in the banks whose credit condition is worse. Brooks et al., 
(2004) raised a strategy of categorizing different rating notches into four groups 
according to ‘broad similarities’. Therefore, I categorize the rating levels into four 
groups: Above AA- (Aa3), AA- (Aa3) to BBB- (Baa3), BBB- (Baa3) to B- (B3) and 
Below B- (B3)3. The reason of categorizing rating levels into the four groups is to 
consider both the balance of number of observations for each of the groups (I try to 
keep the differences among the proportions of observations between any two of the 
groups at a level not larger than 50%) and the implication of the rating levels (Brooks 
et al., 2004) (BBB- or Baa3 is the threshold of investment/grade classes, B- or B3 is 
the threshold between ‘margin to default’ and others so I categorize the rating levels 
by taking these two specific levels as boundaries). The distribution of daily rating level 
categories for the sample banks by each of the three CRAs (each observation is a 
pair of bank-rating on a daily basis) is shown in Table 2-3. 
                                                          





Table 2-3 Rating levels (daily) distribution of the three CRAs 
Category of Bank Ratings Moody’s S&P Fitch 
 No. Percentage No. Percentage No. Percentage 
Above_AA- (Aa3) 65416 38.76% 48740 30.00% 74328 51.53% 
AA (Aa3) to BBB (Baa3) 73127 43.33% 83801 51.58% 47571 32.98% 
BBB- (Baa3) to B- (B3) 17516 10.38% 19999 12.31% 16054 11.13% 
Below_B (B3) 12708 7.53% 9917 6.10% 6298 4.37% 
Total 168767 100% 162457 100% 144251 100% 
 
As shown in Table 2-3, investment grade levels (Above BBB- or Baa3) take the 
majority of daily rating observations for all the three CRAs (over 80%). ‘Margin to 
default’ ratings take no more than 8% of the sample. 
2.3.3 Variable in the long-term analysis on Z scores 






ROAA𝑖,𝑡: return on average assets of bank i in year t; 
CAR𝑖,𝑡: Capital-Asset ratio of bank i in year t; 
σ(ROAA)𝑖: standard deviation of return on average assets of bank i in the full period 
of the sample (1991-2017). 
Data is collected from Thomson Reuters.  
There are three components in the expression of Z score, ROAA,  𝜇(𝐶𝐴𝑅)  and 
𝜎(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴). Lepetit and Strobel (2015) point out that to make Z score time-varying, each 
of these three components can be established in different ways, including taking 
current values, using moving average/variance or full-sample average/variance. In 
this chapter, I avoid using moving average/variance because the selection of moving 
length is subjective in existing papers. 




Figure 2-2 Distribution of Z score (annually) for the sample banks 
 
The highest Z score in the sample is 7.226 and the lowest is -4.363. From the 
perspective of probability, a Z score of 7.226 indicates a probability of insolvency at a 
level very close to 0 and a Z score of -4.363 indicates a probability of insolvency at a 
level very close to 100%. The majority of Z scores range from 0 (50% of insolvency 
risk) to 3 (1.35% of insolvency risk). The shape of the distribution is right-skewed, 
which means that extreme values concentrate in the range of high-value Z score (low-
risk region).   
Naturally, the insolvency risk of a bank in the current year is also determined by the 
accounting behavior of the bank in the previous year. Therefore, a series of 
accounting-based variables regarding the risk-related performances of banks are 
collected. These variables control the effects of pre-year performances on the Z 
scores of the following year. The methods of establishing these variables are applied 
by Kleinow and Moreira (2016): 
Firm Size: the total assets of the banks; 







, an indicator reflecting the loss 




 represents the leverage ratio (the capital structure) of 
banks in the previous year.  
2.4 Models and Results 
My analyses are conducted in three stages for short-term stock returns and long-term 
Z scores respectively.  
The first stage is to regress the bank performances (stock returns and Z scores) on 
the indicators of sovereign rating downgrades to present the link between sovereign 
rating downgrades and bank performances. This stage is the starting point of the 
entire analysis by showing that sovereign rating downgrades are associated with the 
bank performances. The regression method of measuring stock return reactions to 
rating actions was applied by West (1973), Brooks (2004) and Gibson et al (2016). 
Specifically, the downgrades of sovereign ratings should be followed by a drop in 
short-term stock prices and a rise in long-term Z scores. 
For the second stage, I replace the sovereign rating downgrades by specific SR 
downgrades which are followed by bank rating downgrades to show whether the sizes 
of corresponding estimates are bigger than those in the first stage. The rise of 
estimate sizes indicates that BR downgrades enhance the power of the connection 
between the leading SR downgrades and the bank performances. That would show 
evidence for Hypothesis 2-1. 
In the third stage, I conduct the D-i-D analysis on the SR downgrades followed by BR 
downgrades to investigate how the sovereign ceiling policy moderates the effects of 
SR downgrades on the bank performances. For the D-i-D analysis, the treatment 
group includes the SR downgrades followed by BR downgrades due to the sovereign 
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ceiling policy. They are also regarded as ‘semi-passive’ downgrades because it is 
either the credit rating agencies’ decision or the ceiling policy that triggers the 
individual bank downgrades. The control group includes the SR downgrades followed 
by BR downgrades not triggered by the sovereign ceiling policy. They are regarded 
as ‘active’ downgrades because it is entirely the CRAs’ decision to downgrade the 
individual bank. If Hypothesis 2-2 holds, I expect a result showing that the treatment 
group has a weaker effect on the bank performances than the control group. 
 
2.4.1 Short-term: daily stock returns (fixed-effect panel regression) 
Model 2-1-1: SR downgrades 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡[𝐷1, 𝐷2]  = 𝛼 + 𝛽2−1−1𝑆𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2−1−1𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡[𝐷1, 𝐷2]  + 𝜗2−1−1.1𝐵𝑅𝐿𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜗2−1−1.2(𝐵𝑅𝐿𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑆𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜗2−1−1.3𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡[𝐷1, 𝐷2] : daily stock return of bank i on day t, in the time window [𝐷1, 𝐷2]. The 
definition and application of [𝐷1, 𝐷2] is stated in Section 2.3.2.  
𝑆𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡 :dummy equal to 1 if the country where bank i listed and registered is 
downgraded, by one of the three CRAs at day t and 0 if else. Corresponding estimate, 
𝛽2−1−1, captures the stock return changes between one day before and T days after 
the bank i receives a sovereign downgrade. 
𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡[𝐷1, 𝐷2]: daily index return of the market where bank i is listed, with the same 
time window as 𝑅𝑖,𝑡(𝐷1, 𝐷2). 𝛾2−1−1 controls the link between the market condition and 
the stock returns. 
𝐵𝑅𝐿𝑖,𝑡: dummy variables indicating the average bank rating level (of the big three) of 
bank i. 𝜗2−1−1.1 and 𝜗2−1−1.2 control the fixed effect of bank levels and the interaction 
between bank levels and SR downgrades. The aim of adding these two fixed effect 
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controls is to consider different degrees of impact of SR downgrades on stock returns 
for banks with different credit conditions (reflected by bank rating levels).  
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡: the year of day t. 𝜗2−1−1.3, controls the time effect (European debt crisis etc.) 
𝛿𝑖: unobservable heterogeneity of bank i. 
Descriptive statistics are displayed in Appendix 2-1. The average stock returns are 
very close to zero (slightly less than 0 but with a relatively large standard deviation) 
whatever the time windows are. This is reasonable because from the overall 
perspective, the stock returns should not be significantly larger or smaller than zero in 
a very long term (over 10 years in this chapter). The numeric average rating level is 
around 19 (equivalent to level A). It shows that for all the banks in the whole period, 
average rating level is above the investment grade threshold (BBB).  
The result of Model 2-1-1 is shown in Table 2-4. 
Estimates on SRD are significantly negative for any 𝑅𝑖,𝑡[𝑡 − 1, 𝑡 + 𝑇] where T range 
from 1 to 10. Regarding the benchmark window 𝑅𝑖,𝑡[𝑡 − 2, 𝑡 − 1], although I find a 
negative estimate which shows that the stock return before the event is also negative, 
its magnitude (-0.63) is much smaller than the estimates for time windows [t-1, t+T] 
(the sizes are around -4 to -5). This indicates that, compared with the returns before 
the events, a bank’s short-term stock returns are lower after it receives a sovereign 
rating downgrade. The consistent market reaction does not exist for time window 
longer than 20 days (The estimate is insignificant for T=20).  
The short-term association between SRD and stock returns exists after I control the 
market index, bank rating level and its interactions with SRD. This result is consistent 
with the results obtained by other scholars (Brooks et al., 2004; Gibson et al., 2016). 
Model 2-1-2: SR downgrades followed by BR downgrades 
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𝑅𝑖,𝑡[𝐷1, 𝐷2]  = 𝛼 + 𝛽2−1−2.𝑆𝑅𝐷_𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑑_𝐵𝑦_𝐵𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2−1−2𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡[𝐷1, 𝐷2]
+ 𝜗2−1−2.1𝐵𝑅𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜗2−1−2.2(𝐵𝑅𝐿𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑆𝑅𝐷_𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑑_𝐵𝑦_𝐵𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡)
+ 𝜗2−1−2.3𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 
𝑆𝑅𝐷_𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑑_𝐵𝑦_𝐵𝑅𝑖,𝑡 : dummy equal to 1 if the bank i receives sovereign 
downgrades which are followed by the bank rating downgrades (at the same day, or 
after 1 day) on day t and equal to 0 else; 
The estimate on the 𝑆𝑅𝐷_𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑑_𝐵𝑦_𝐵𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡  captures the relationship between 
specific sovereign rating downgrades followed by bank rating downgrades and stock 
returns. The result is shown in Table 2-5. 
The estimates are insignificant for the time window [t-2, t-1] while those are 
consistently significantly negative for [t-1, t+T], which shows that SR downgrades are 
followed by a drop of stock prices within the 10-day time window (even in 20 days).  
Additionally, if I compare the size of estimates of parameters on SR downgrades in 
Model 2-1-1 and Model 2-1-2, I find a significant trend that the sizes in Model 2-1-2 
are always larger than those in Model 2-1-1 for [t-1,t+T]. This shows evidence that the 
degree of stock price  
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Table 2-4 Regression of Stock Returns on Sovereign Rating Downgrades  
This table shows the regression result of Model 2-1-1. The regression is run on the basis of daily bank-rating pairs. Sample banks are the listed commercial banks in 
the PIIGS countries (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain). The dependent variable is the stock returns of the time windows [t-2, t-1] and [t-1, t+T] (T=1 to 10 
and 20), where the first component is the starting day of the time window and the second component is the last day of the time window and day t indicates the day of 
the corresponding transaction day. The key independent variable is SRD (Sovereign Rating Downgrades), dummy equal to 1 if the country where bank i listed and 
registered is downgraded, by one of the three CRAs on day t and 0 if else. Index Return is the daily index return of the market where bank i is listed, with the same 
time window as the dependent variable. Year and Firm fixed effects are controlled. The fixed effect of bank rating levels and the interaction between bank rating 
levels and SR downgrades are also controlled.  Figures in the brackets are corresponding t-statistics.  
N refers to the number of banks and T refers to the number of observations for each of the banks in the panel regression. 
*** 1% significance level 
** 5% significance level 
* 10% significance level 
Time window  
[Starting day, Last day] 
[t-2, t-1] [t-1, t+1] [t-1, t+2] [t-1, t+3] [t-1, t+4] [t-1, t+5] [t-1, t+6] [t-1, t+7] [t-1, t+8] [t-1, t+9] [t-1, t+10] [t-1, t+20] 

















































Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Rating Level 
(BRL) Fixed Effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BRL*SRD Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 31.27% 31.14% 31.51% 31.47% 31.40% 31.35% 31.35% 31.47% 31.82% 32.17% 32.43% 34.76% 
N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
T 7500 7500 7499 7498 7497 7496 7495 7494 7493 7492 7491 7482 
a: The actual coefficients are those figures shown in the table times 10-3         
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decreases is larger if the sovereign rating downgrades are followed by bank rating 
downgrades.  
Model 2-1-3: D-i-D analysis of BR downgrades triggering the ceiling policy 
In this section of analysis, I focus on the cases of SRD followed by BR downgrades 
and identify scenarios where the BR downgrades occur when the SRD triggers the 
sovereign ceiling policy (the semi-passive followed BR downgrades).  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡[𝐷1, 𝐷2]  = 𝛼 + 𝛽2−1−3.1 × 𝑆𝑅𝐷_𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑑_𝐵𝑦_𝐵𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2−1−3.2𝐴𝑡_𝐶𝑒𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽2−1−3.3(𝑆𝑅𝐷_𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑑_𝐵𝑦_𝐵𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐴𝑡_𝐶𝑒𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡)
+ 𝛾2−1−3𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡[𝐷1, 𝐷2] + 𝜗2−1−3.1𝐵𝑅𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜗2−1−3.2𝐵𝑅𝐿𝑖,𝑡
× 𝑆𝑅𝐷_𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑑_𝐵𝑦_𝐵𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜗2−1−3.3𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 
𝐴𝑡_𝐶𝑒𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 : dummy equal to 1 if the bank rating level of bank i is equal to the 
sovereign rating level at day t and 0 else. 𝛽1.3.3 , the estimate on interaction 
term,(𝑆𝑅𝐷_𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑑_𝐵𝑦_𝐵𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐴𝑡_𝐶𝑒𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡), is the D-i-D estimate which captures 
how the sovereign ceiling policy moderates such effect. The result is shown in Table 
2-6. 
𝛽2−1−3.3  is significantly positive for most of the T (excluding T=3,4 and 5). Since the 
estimates on SRD (𝛽2−1−3.1) are negative, the positive sign of D-i-D estimators shows 
that the treatment group which includes the SRD, followed by BR downgrades to obey 
the rule of the sovereign ceiling policy, has a weaker stock return effect than the 
control group (SRD followed by BR downgrades not triggering the policy). The finding 
shows that SRDs followed by semi-passive BR downgrades are associated with a 
weaker stock return reaction than those followed by active BR downgrades. This is 
consistent with Hypothesis 2-2 and indicates that the information provided by the 
follow of BR downgrades to SR downgrades is significant besides the information 
provided by the independent effect of BR downgrades.  
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Table 2-5 Regression of Stock Returns on Sovereign Rating Downgrades which are followed by Bank Rating Downgrades 
This table shows the regression result of Model 2-1-2. The regression is run on the basis of daily bank-rating pairs. Sample banks are the listed commercial banks in 
the PIIGS countries (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain). The dependent variable is the stock returns of the time windows [t-2, t-1] and [t-1, t+T] (T=1 to 10 and 
20), where the first component is the starting day of the time window and the second component is the last day of the time window and day t indicates the day of the 
corresponding transaction day. The key independent variable is SRD_Followed by BRD (Sovereign Rating Downgrades followed by Bank Rating Downgrades), dummy 
equal to 1 if the bank i receives sovereign downgrades which are followed by the bank rating downgrades (at the same day, or after 1 day) on day t and equal to 0 else. 
Index Return is the daily index return of the market where bank i is listed, with the same time window as the dependent variable. Year and Firm fixed effects are 
controlled. The fixed effect of bank rating levels and the interaction between bank rating levels and SR downgrades are also controlled.  Figures in the brackets are 
corresponding t-statistics. 
N refers to the number of banks and T refers to the number of observations for each of the banks in the panel regression. 
*** 1% significance level  
** 5% significance level  
* 10% significance level 
Time window  
[Starting day, Last day] 
[t-2, t-1] [t-1, t+1] [t-1, t+2] [t-1, t+3] [t-1, t+4] [t-1, t+5] [t-1, t+6] [t-1, t+7] [t-1, t+8] [t-1, t+9] [t-1, t+10] [t-1, t+20] 
             
















































Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Rating Level (BRL) Fixed 
Effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BRL*SR Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 31.27% 31.17% 31.53% 31.49% 31.42% 31.35% 31.36% 31.47% 31.82% 32.17% 32.43% 34.76% 
N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
T 7500 7500 7499 7498 7497 7496 7495 7494 7493 7492 7491 7482 





Table 2-6 Regression of Stock Returns on Sovereign Rating Downgrades which are followed by Bank Rating Downgrades (triggered by Ceiling 
Policy or not) 
This table shows the regression result of Model 2-1-3. The regression is run on the basis of daily bank-rating pairs. Sample banks are the listed commercial banks in 
the PIIGS countries (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain). The dependent variable is the stock returns of the time windows [t-2, t-1] and [t-1, t+T] (T=1 to 10 and 
20), where the first component is the starting day of the time window and the second component is the last day of the time window and day t indicates the day of the 
corresponding transaction day. The key independent variables include: SRD_Followed by BRD (Sovereign Rating Downgrades followed by Bank Rating Downgrades), 
dummy equal to 1 if the bank i receives sovereign downgrades which are followed by the bank rating downgrades (on the same day, or after 1 day) on day t and equal 
to 0 else; At_Ceiling, dummy equal to 1 if the bank rating level of bank i is equal to the sovereign rating level on day t and 0 else and the interaction term between 
SDR_Followed_by_BRD and At_Ceiling. Index Return is the daily index return of the market where bank i is listed, with the same time window as the dependent 
variable. Year and Firm fixed effects are controlled. The fixed effect of bank rating levels and the interaction between bank rating levels and SR downgrades are also 
controlled.  Figures in the brackets are corresponding t-statistics. 
N refers to the number of banks and T refers to the number of observations for each of the banks in the panel regression. 
*** 1% significance level ;** 5% significance level ;* 10% significance level 
 
Time window 
[Starting day, Last day] 
[t-2, t-1] [t-1, t+1] [t-1, t+2] [t-1, t+3] [t-1, t+4] [t-1, t+5] [t-1, t+6] [t-1, t+7] [t-1, t+8] [t-1, t+9] [t-1, t+10] [t-1, t+20] 
             


































































































Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Rating Level (BRL) 
Fixed Effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BRL*Followed Fixed 
Effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 31.27% 31.67% 31.69% 31.60% 31.50% 31.44% 31.42% 31.53% 31.87% 32.22% 32.48% 34.76% 
N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
T 7500 7500 7499 7498 7497 7496 7495 7494 7493 7492 7491 7482 
a: The actual coefficients are those figures shown in the table times 10-3 
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2.4.2 Long-term: Z scores (fixed-effect panel regression) 
Observations in the analysis of this section are on an annual basis but the rating 
changes occur on a daily basis. Therefore, I consider the rating level gaps (SR and 
BR) between the end and the beginning of each year as a proxy of ‘annual rating 
change’. Rating changes (i.e. SR downgrades, BR downgrades, the trigger of ceiling 
policy) are identified, measured and considered for each of the Big Three CRAs 
separately.  
The model set of Z score analysis is parallel to that of stock return analysis. 
Model 2-2-1: The association between SR downgrades and Z score  
𝑍𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽2−2−1𝑆𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑋′𝑖,𝑡𝛾2−2−1 + 𝛿𝑖 
𝑍𝑖,𝑡+1 is the Z score of bank i in the year (t+1); 
𝑆𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡 dummy equal to 1 if the sovereign rating of bank i is downgraded in year t and 
0 else. The corresponding estimate, 𝛽2−2−1  captures the association between 
sovereign downgrades in a year and the change of Z scores in the following year. 
𝑋′𝑖,𝑡 : vector of accounting-based control variables (total assets, return on assets, 
capital ratio, NPL (Non-performing Loan) ratio and deposit ratio). 𝛾2−2−1 is the group 
of estimates on each of the control variables. 
𝛿𝑖: unobservable heterogeneity of bank i. 
Model 2-2-2: The association between SR downgrades followed by BR downgrades 
and Z score 
𝑍𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽2−2−2𝑆𝑅𝐷_𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑦 𝐵𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑋′𝑖,𝑡𝛾2−2−2 + 𝛿𝑖 
𝑆𝑅𝐷_𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑦 𝐵𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡, dummy variable equal to 1 if the sovereign rating of bank i 
is downgraded in year t and the bank rating of bank i during year t changes in the 
same direction with sovereign rating changes and 0 else. Corresponding estimate, 
𝛽2−2−2 captures the association between specific sovereign downgrades, which are 
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followed by BR downgrades, in a year and the change of Z scores in the following 
year. 
Model 2-2-3 D-i-D analysis of BR downgrades triggering the ceiling policy 
𝑍𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽2−2−3.1𝑆𝑅𝐷_𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑦 𝐵𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2−2−3.2𝐴𝑡_𝐶𝑒𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽2−2−3.2(𝑆𝑅𝐷_𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑦 𝐵𝑅𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐴𝑡_𝐶𝑒𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑋′𝑖,𝑡𝛾2−2−3 + 𝛿𝑖 
𝐴𝑡_𝐶𝑒𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡: dummy variable equal to 1 if the rating level of sovereign rating of the 
country where bank i is registered and listed is the same as the rating level of bank 
rating of bank i at the end of year t, and equal to 0 if else. 
𝛽2−2−3.2, the coefficient on the interaction term plays the role of D-i-D estimate which 
captures the effect of the sovereign ceiling policy on the link between sovereign rating 
downgrades and the Z scores.  
I do not find previous papers which regress Z scores to credit rating variables, but the 
Z score is widely used as an indicator of bank risks by recent research (Chiaramonte 
et al., 2016; Li et al., 2017).  
For Models 2-2-1 , 2-2-2 and 2-2-3, due to the mismatch of data frequency between 
the daily rating-based variables (𝑆𝑅𝐷, 𝑆𝑅𝐷_𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑦 𝐵𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡 and 
𝑆𝑅𝐷_𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑦 𝐵𝑅𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐴𝑡_𝐶𝑒𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 ) and the annual accounting-based variables 
(Z score, and control variables), I have to transform the rating-based variables into an 
annual format (i.e. measuring the rating change in whole years instead of within single 
days). I acknowledge that this is inconsistent with the tests for stock-return case and 
may introduce noises into the regressions.  
Results of Models 2-2-1 are shown in Table 2-7. Results of Models 2-2-2 and 2-2-3 
are shown in Table 2-8. Empirical results show that estimates on SRD and 
SRD_Followed_by_BRD in Models 2-2-1 and 2-2-2 are significantly negative. It 
means that sovereign rating downgrades, when followed by bank rating downgrades, 
are associated with a lower value of Z score (a higher risk of insolvency) in the 
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following year. It indicates that sovereign ratings have predictability on the future 
insolvency risk of banks registered in the corresponding countries.  
Comparing the sizes of estimates in Model 2-2-2 with those in Model 2-2-1, I find that 
sizes in Model 2-2-2 are greater than 2-2-1. This offers evidence that, on average, the 
link between SR downgrades and the rise of insolvency risk is stronger if the SR 
downgrades are followed by BR downgrades.  
For Model 2-2-3, I find significantly positive D-i-D estimates on the interaction term. 
Since 𝛽2−2−3.1, the estimates on SRD_Followed by BRD, is negative, the positive sign 
of estimates on interaction term means that the treatment group (BR downgrades 
triggered by the sovereign ceiling policy) is associated with a smaller size of 
SRD_Followed by BRD estimates than the control group (BR downgrades not 
triggered by the sovereign ceiling policy). This indicates that SRD followed by semi-
passive BR downgrades have a weaker impact on Z score than that followed by active 
BR downgrades. This is consistent with the Hypothesis 2-2 and indicates that the extra 
information is provided by the fact that bank downgrades follow sovereign 
downgrades beyond the information provided by the independent effect of BR 
downgrades. 
Estimates on the control variables show the link between insolvency risk and bank 
fundamentals. From Table 2-7, I find that a lower Z score (a higher insolvency risk) is 
associated with a larger bank size, a lower return on assets, a higher NPL ratio and a 
higher deposit ratio. 
To summarize the findings of both the short-term and long-term analyses, I describe 
the main empirical results as follows.  
Sovereign rating downgrades are associated with the drop of stock returns within a 
10-day time window and the rise of the insolvency risk of banks listed in the 
corresponding countries in the following year. Model 2-1-1 and Model 2-2-1 both 
support the statement by reporting significantly negative estimates of sovereign rating 
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downgrades. This finding enhances the conclusions drawn by other scholars who find 
a strong link between sovereign ratings and bank performances and raise hypotheses 
based on this link (Panetta et al., 2011; Correa et al., 2014; Acharya et al., 2014; 
Gibson et al., 2016). The next empirical result shows that specific sovereign rating 
downgrades followed by bank rating downgrades have a greater impact on stock 
returns than those not followed by bank rating downgrades. This finding is reflected 
by estimates on sovereign rating downgrades in Model 2-1-2 and Model 2-2-2 with a 
larger size than the estimates in Model 2-1-1 and Model 2-2-1. This shows initial 
evidence of the role of bank ratings played in the transmission of sovereign 
downgrades’ relationship with stock returns and Z scores. The existence of followed 
bank rating downgrades is statistically associated with a stronger relationship 
between stock returns and Z scores and sovereign rating downgrades. However, I am 
unable to conclude that bank ratings’ following is a factor in enhancing the effect of 
sovereign downgrades because sovereign rating downgrades and following bank 
rating downgrades usually occur in a very short time interval. The enhancement of 
market reaction and Z score variation may be a consequence of the independent 
effect of bank rating downgrades but not due to the fact the bank rating downgrades 
occur following a sovereign rating downgrade. Therefore, I further split the sample of 
sovereign rating downgrades followed by bank rating downgrades into two groups 
according to whether or not they trigger the sovereign-ceiling policy. 
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Table 2-7 Regression of Z scores on Sovereign Rating Downgrades  
This table shows the regression result of Model 2-2-1. The regression is run on the basis of annual bank-rating pairs. Sample banks are the listed commercial banks 




. ROAA refers to the return on the average assets; CAR refers to the capital-asset ratio and σ(ROAA) refers to the standard deviation of return on 
average assets of bank i in the full period of sample (1991-2017). The key independent variable include: SDR (Sovereign Rating Downgrades), dummy equal to 1 if 
the sovereign rating of bank i is downgraded in year t and 0 else. Control variables include: Firm Size, the total assets of the firm, RoA, the return on assets, NPL (Non-
performing Loan) ratio and Deposit Ratio. Firm fixed effects are controlled. The regressions are run separately for rating changes announced by Moody’s, S&P and 
Fitch. Figures in the brackets are corresponding t-statistics. 
N refers to the number of banks and T refers to the number of observations for each of the banks in the panel regression. 
*** 1% significance level  
** 5% significance level  
* 10% significance level 
Model 2-2-1 




































Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
R2 78.81% 77.75% 77.08% 
N 29 29 26 




Table 2-8 Regression of Z scores on Sovereign Rating Downgrades followed by Bank Rating Downgrades (triggered by the ceiling policy or not) 
This table shows the regression result of Models 2-2-2 and 2-2-3. The regression is run on the basis of annual bank-rating pairs. Sample banks are the listed commercial 




. ROAA refers to the return on the average assets; CAR refers to the capital-asset ratio and σ(ROAA) refers to the standard deviation of return 
on average assets of bank i in the full period of sample (1991-2017). The key independent variable include: SRD_Followed_by_BRD (Sovereign Rating Downgrades 
followed by Bank Ratings), dummy variable equal to 1 if sovereign rating of bank i is downgraded in year t and the bank rating of bank i during year t changes in the 
same direction with sovereign rating changes and 0 else; At_Ceiling, the dummy variable equal to 1 if at the end of year t the rating level of sovereign rating of the 
country where bank i is registered and listed is the same as the rating level of bank rating of bank i, and equal to 0 if else and the interaction term between 
SRD_Followed_by_BRD and At_Ceiling. Control variables include: Firm Size, the total assets of the firm, RoA, the return on assets, NPL (Non-Performing Loan) ratio 
and Deposit Ratio. Firm fixed effects are controlled. The regressions are run separately for rating changes announced by Moody’s, S&P and Fitch. Figures in the 
brackets are corresponding t-statistics. 
N refers to the number of banks and T refers to the number of observations for each of the banks in the panel regression. 
*** 1% significance level  
** 5% significance level  
* 10% significance level 
Model 2-2-2  2-2-3 
Rating Agency Moody S&P Fitch  Moody S&P Fitch 




























Accounting-Based Controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
R2 79.41% 79.82% 78.36%  79.60% 80.91% 80.50% 
N 29 29 26  29 29 26 
T 25 25 25  25 25 25 
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For bank rating downgrades following sovereign rating downgrades, those who trigger 
the sovereign ceiling policy (semi-passive) have a weaker relationship with the stock 
returns than those who do not trigger it (active). This finding is obtained by observing 
significantly positive D-i-D estimates in Model 2-1-3 and Model 2-2-3. The observation 
of a significant effect of sovereign-ceiling policy on the credit rating determination is 
consistent with the conclusions by Borensztein et al. (2013) and Almeida et al. (2017). 
As an exogenous shock on the occurrence of bank rating downgrades which follow 
sovereign rating downgrades, the sovereign ceiling policy helps me to tease out the 
‘follow’ effects from the effects of independent bank downgrades. I find that semi-
passive bank rating downgrades following sovereign rating downgrades have a 
weaker link with the drop of stock returns and Z scores than do active bank rating 
downgrades. This offers evidence that the active downgrades of bank ratings after 
sovereign rating downgrades provide extra information to the stock market and the 
predictability of insolvency risk besides the independent impact of sovereign and bank 
rating downgrades.  
2.4.3 Robustness check 
I conduct three robustness tests, two for the short-term analysis and one for the long-
term analysis.  
For short-term analysis, I replace the time windows of [t-1, t+T] by [t, t+T] to consider 
the shock of sovereign ratings on the stock returns with the day when the ratings are 
released as the benchmark day. In the main test, I take the day before the rating 
change announcement day, (t-1), as the benchmark to rule out possibility that CRAs 
announce the rating changes after the stock transactions terminate on the 
announcement day. However, the cost of using [t-1, t+T] instead of [t, t+T] is that I 
ignore the time interval [t-1, t] and do not consider some possible market events during 
this interval which may also impact the stock returns. Therefore, I analyze the cases 
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of [t, t+T] and re-run all the regressions shown in Models 2-1-1, 2-1-2 and 2-1-3 to 
examine the consistency of the results. 
To save space I do not show the regression tables in the main part but have put them 
in Appendix (Appendix 2-2). I do not find significant changes of results from the 
original tests using time window [t-1, t+T] in terms of the sign, size and significance of 
coefficients on key independent variables. This shows that the omitted events (if 
applicable) do not influence the estimation of the impact of sovereign ratings on the 
stock returns, or the role of sovereign-ceiling policy.  
Another robustness check is to apply two-way clustering of standard errors to re-
estimate the t-value of estimators. To deal with the possibly existing heteroscedasticity 
problem (unobserved characteristics of observations are correlated with each other 
within same clusters, for example, same stock/bank4, same country or same year), I 
cluster standard errors for all regressions in Models 2-1-1, 2-1-2 and 2-1-3 by year 
level and stock/bank-year level (two-way clustering). The two-way clustered standard 
errors are adjusted by (N-1)/(N-P)× G/(G-1),where N is the sample size, P is the 
number of independent variables, and G is the number of clusters (Ma, 2014). To save 
space I do not show the regression tables in the main part but they are put in the 
Appendix (Appendix 2-3). The re-estimation of t-value does not change the sign or 
the size, but only the standard error and significance of estimators. I find a significant 
reduction of t-values for all of the estimates after the re-estimation, but only a few of 
the estimates turn to be insignificant (having been significant in the original 
regressions). For details, the D-i-D estimators in Model 2-1-3 (on the interaction term 
between At_Ceiling and 𝑆𝑅𝐷_𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑑_𝐵𝑦_𝐵𝑅𝐷) for the time windows of [t-1, t+2] and 
[t-1, t+6] are significantly positive in the original models but insignificant after I cluster 
                                                          
4 Stock level for stock return cases and bank level for Z score cases. 
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the standard errors. The significance of all the other estimators except these two 
remain even if I use two-way clustering of the standard errors.  
For the long-term analysis of Z scores, I take the robustness check of changing the 
format of Z scores (the dependent variable). As mentioned in the section of ‘Data and 
Sample’, I do not take the time-varying ROAA, CAR or σ(ROAA) into consideration 
when establishing the Z score indicator for analysis. In this robustness check, another 
two formats of Z scores, 𝑍(𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 1)𝑡 and 𝑍(𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 2)𝑡, also mentioned by 
Lepetit and Strobel (2015) are adopted to replace the dependent variables in Models 
2-2-1. 2-2-2 and 2-2-3.  
Z(Alternative 1)t =




ROAAt,3years̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅+CARt
σ(ROAA)t,3years
; where 𝑋𝑡,3𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ refers to the three-year moving 
average of variable X in year t and 𝜎(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴)𝑦,3𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 refers to the three-year moving 
standard deviation of ROAA in year t. 
The correlations between each pair of the three Z scores are shown in Table 2-9. 
Table 2-9 Correlation Matrix among the three proxies of Z scores 
 Z (Original) Z (Alternative 1) 
Z (Alternative 
2) 
Z (Original) 1 0.2489 0.246 
Z (Alternative 1)  1 0.9993 
Z (Alternative 2)   1 
 
I find that the correlation between Z(Alternative 1)y and Z(Alternative 2)yis extremely 
high (99.93%) so these two substitutes can be regarded as the same one. I replace 
the original Z score with Z(Alternative 1)y and re-run the regressions in Models 2-1-1, 
2-1-2 and 2-1-3. The results of updated regressions are put in the Appendix (Appendix 
2-4). I find that the only significant change of empirical results is for Model 2-2-1. The 
estimates on 𝑆𝑅𝐷 are significantly negative in the original model, while after I change 
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the format of Z scores, the estimates are still negative but not significant except in the 
case of S&P. However, estimates on 𝑆𝑅𝐷_𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑑_𝐵𝑦_𝐵𝑅𝐷  remain significantly 
negative. Therefore, although the results of Model 2-2-1 are different for different Z 
scores, this does not change the conclusion regarding the Hypothesis 2-1: the follow 
of bank rating downgrades enhances the power of sovereign rating downgrades.  
2.5 Conclusion 
I empirically examine the role that bank ratings play in the mechanism by which 
sovereign ratings affect bank performances. Twenty-five main banks from PIIGS 
countries which received a significant number of sovereign rating downgrades in the 
sample period (1991-2017) are selected as the research sample. For the sample 
banks, I identify 504 sovereign rating downgrade events and find that these sovereign 
rating downgrades have a significant relation with the short-term performances of 
stock returns of those banks in time windows no more than 10-day. I further select 
those sovereign downgrade events which are followed by bank rating downgrades 
within no more than two transaction days, test the association between those specific 
sovereign events and the stock returns and find a significant relationship with larger 
magnitudes (larger sizes of estimated coefficients) than those sovereign rating 
downgrades not followed by bank ratings. To further rule out the effect of following 
bank rating downgrades, I apply the cases of bank rating downgrades following 
sovereign rating downgrades which trigger the sovereign-ceiling policy and hence are 
regarded as ‘semi-passive’ reactions to sovereign rating downgrades. The semi-
passive bank downgrades are associated with a weaker effect on the stock returns 
than active downgrades, which indicates that the active bank downgrades provide 
extra information about the negative performances of corresponding banks to the 
investors as well as the independent effects of the sovereign rating downgrades and 
the subsequent bank rating downgrades. This finding supports my hypothesis and is 
70 
 
consistent with the statement that bank ratings play a role of enhancing the power of 
sovereign rating’s impact on bank performances (i.e. bank ratings partially transmit 
the effect from sovereign ratings to the bank performances).  
I extend my analysis of short-term performances of bank stock returns to a long-term 
indicator, Z score, which mirrors the insolvency risk of banks on an annual basis. Z 
score is an indicator of banks’ credit risk and the role of CRAs is to assess the credit 
risks of firms. Therefore, I test the association between Z score in the current year 
and the rating levels (both sovereign and bank ratings) at the end of the previous year 
to investigate the information (i.e. predictability of future credit risks) provided by 
sovereign ratings in two scenarios, 1) SRs are followed by BRs and 2) SRs are not 
followed by BRs. Parallel tests, similar to those for stock returns, are conducted on 
the annual dataset of Z score, sovereign rating changes and a series of accounting-
based control variables. I find similar empirical results to those for the stock return 
analysis: sovereign downgrades have a significant link with the decrease of Z score 
(i.e. the increase of insolvency risk); bank downgrades following those sovereign 
downgrades enhance such link and provide extra information (predictability) to the Z 
score variations. 
I acknowledge two limitations in my research. The first limitation is that I only consider 
downgrade cases but not upgrade ones. The reasons for ruling out upgrade scenarios 
are, 1) the sovereign ceiling policy only works for sovereign and entity rating 
downgrades and 2) the literature has concluded that investors/firms react to bad news 
(downgrades) more significantly. However, this reduces the number of sovereign 
rating changes included in my sample and leaves a gap of the effect of sovereign 
rating upgrades on the market. The second limitation is the selection of PIIGS but not 
all the EU countries because other countries received zero or very few sovereign 
downgrades in the sample period. However, it may also have some negative 
consequences on the representativeness of my sample. 
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3. Chapter III ABS market reaction to credit ratings before 
and after the financial crisis  
“The default rates (of AAA tranches) are already up from 1% to 4%, fellas. And if they 
rise up to 8%, and they will, a lot of these BBBs are going to zero too.” 
--Lines in the movie ‘Big Short’ (2016) in a scene when a financial analyst explains 
the possibility of the ABS market collapsing (including the collapse of highly-rated ABS 
tranches) to some fund managers before the 2008 global financial crisis  
3.1 Introduction 
The US subprime mortgage crisis (2007) and the accompanying global financial crisis 
(2008) highlight the role played by CRAs and the importance of the asset 
securitization market. CRAs have been criticized for providing structured finance 
products (mainly represented by ABS, asset-backed securities), securities issued in 
the asset securitization market, with inaccurate and biased ratings (Morkötter et al, 
2009; Griffin et al, 2011; He et al, 2011; Kraft, 2015). These ratings convinced 
investors to invest in an astonishing amount of ABS (asset-backed securities), 
particularly MBS (mortgage-backed securities) (Friedman and Posner, 2011).  
In this light, this chapter is designed to study the market reaction to ratings provided 
by CRAs with regard to ABS (including MBS) and the possible change in this reaction 
in the wake of the financial crisis. The reason for selecting ABS to study CRAs is not 
only that ABS were the first sector to collapse in the financial crisis but also that the 
ABS market is believed to have reacted to credit ratings to a greater extent than other 
types of investors through the following channels: information intermediate function, 
historical behavioral reliance and rating-based regulations (Fender and Mitchell, 2005; 
Coval et al., 2009).  
The reaction of the ABS market to credit ratings is a natural phenomenon under a 
condition of information asymmetry. CRAs (mainly the top three, Moody’s, S&P and 
Fitch) are trusted by market participants due to ‘the financial market complexity and 
borrower diversity’ (Cantor and Packer, 1995). The information intermediate function 
72 
 
is more significant in a structured finance market because of the complexity of ABS 
securities.  
In addition, due to their historical reputation, leading CRAs have ‘trained’ investors in 
a behavioral pattern of reacting to their ratings. For example, many market participants 
use credit ratings offered by the top three CRAs as a ‘trigger’ of commercial contracts. 
Some investors require traders to sell certain securities immediately if they are 
downgraded below certain boundaries, such as the BBB notch. For the structured 
finance market, the behavioral reaction to credit ratings still exists because structured 
finance products were created at least 70 years, after credit rating industry was 
created so structured finance investors inherited the thinking pattern of reacting to 
CRAs (Servigny and Jobst, 2007).  
Another reason for investors’ reaction to CRAs involves financial regulations. Since 
the 1970s, the SEC has gradually taken action to link regulatory requirements to 
ratings. In Basel II, at least two types of regulation, risk-sensitive capital and 
investment limitation, are based on credit ratings. When calculating capital, financial 
institutions (particularly banks) are allowed by the policy to use different weights on 
securities with different credit ratings. Hence, as institutional investors, banks have to 
react to ratings by adjusting their investment portfolio according to credit ratings given 
to the securities. Another regulation concerning ratings is investment limitation, 
whereby certain investors are not allowed to hold securities under certain levels of 
rating grades (Darbellay, 2013).  
However, the three channels mentioned above have undergone some changes since 
the 2007 subprime crisis. The CRAs’ function as information intermediates has been 
questioned (Mattarocci, 2013); their reputation has been dramatically undermined 
(Lynch, 2008) and regulators have expressed their willingness to remove credit ratings 
from regulatory requirements (Darbellay, 2013). 
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CRAs failed to foretell the collapse of subprime securities before the crisis occurred. 
Such poor performances are not consistent with the role of information providers 
which CRAs should have played. Therefore, they were subject to a large number of 
harsh comments (Lynch, 2008; Morkötter et al, 2009; Griffin et al, 2011; He et al, 2011; 
Mattarocci, 2013; Kraft, 2015). It was questioned whether CRAs were able to remove 
information asymmetry as they are required to do and whether the market may not 
regard ratings as a source of extra information. Thus, due to the criticism of CRAs’ 
poor performances, market reactions may be weakened.  
Regarding regulation changes in the rating industry, the most significant action taken 
by US regulators was the release of the Dodd-Frank Act 2010. This is a financial 
market reform plan signed by President Obama aiming to re-regulate the financial 
system in response to the financial disaster. This Act highlights that credit ratings 
should be gradually removed from the criteria of financial regulations. Reformers claim 
that the removal of rating-based regulations can eliminate the influence of credit 
ratings on the financial system from the regulatory perspective.  
In the context, I conduct an empirical test to study the reaction of ABS to credit rating 
actions before and after the global financial crisis. The main objective of this research 
is to assess the extent of the market’s reaction to ratings and figure out whether this 
reaction has diminished since the 2008 financial crisis, as many articles suggest 
(Lynch, 2008; Darbellay, 2013; Mattarocci, 2013) and as the regulators expect.  
The research contributes not only to investors and rating agencies themselves, but 
also to the normal operation of the financial system. On the one hand, the reaction of 
investors to ratings provides a possibility of realizing information symmetry, which is 
a vital element of the efficient market theory. However, on the other hand, since 
conflict of interest exists in the rating market, the impact of ratings on the market may 
make investors’ decisions biased or even harm the financial system.  
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Conflict of interest results from the issuer-pay business model of CRAs and an 
oligopolistic trend of the rating industry (high concentration of the Big Three and 
barriers to new entrants) and the collective market power of the Big Three (Mattarocci, 
2013). All these three factors (conflicts of interest, oligopolistic trend and the Big Three 
CRAs’ collective market power) can be enhanced by the fact that the market relies on 
CRAs. Investors’ trust in CRAs makes issuers more willing to maintain the issuer-pay 
model and pay CRAs for a satisfactory rating to attract investors. Furthermore, the 
influence of ratings on the market creates a high profit for leading CRAs, exacerbating 
the concentration in the rating industry and raising the barriers to small and new CRAs. 
Thus, reactions to CRAs may undermine market efficiency via conflict of interest, while 
at the same time enhancing conflict of interest.  
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 consists of an introduction to CRAs 
and ABS, a literature review of related research of other scholars and a list of the 
contributions of this paper beyond the existing literature. Section 3.3 describes the 
dataset used and my empirical results as well as robustness test results. In Section 
3.4 I present my two main hypotheses and four sub-hypotheses about the market 
reactions to credit ratings, raise two assumptions to make hypotheses reasonable, 
and state the methodology used to test these hypotheses for both the primary market 
data and secondary market data. Section 3.5 concludes the chapter. 
3.2 Background, related research and contribution 
My research in this chapter can be positioned into three strands of literature: CRAs’ 
market reaction, the ABS (structured finance product) ratings and the evaluation of 
CRA performances. The first strand of literature uses different measures of market 
reaction (bond/stock prices, CDS, cross-country effects etc.) to test CRA’s influencing 
power. The second strand of literature discusses the mechanism of the issuance of 
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ABS and the reaction of ABS prices to rating actions. The third strand consists of 
positive and negative views on the reform of CRA industry. 
My research makes incremental contributions to the three strands of literature: firstly, 
I use both the issuance- and transaction- period data to measure the market reaction 
to CRAs’ actions. Secondly, I include different types of ABS in my dataset to contribute 
the second strand of literature. Lastly, by comparing the post-crisis reaction of ABS 
market to rating actions with the pre-crisis one, I supplement the literature of CRA 
performance evaluation and find that the reaction is weaker after the financial crisis. 
3.2.1 Market reaction to CRAs 
In this section, I summarize the literatures which study the relationship between the 
market reactions and CRAs’ actions. The literature can be divided into two streams: 
theoretical research and empirical research.  
Theoretical papers aim to study the economic equilibrium between credit rating 
providers (CRAs) and market participants. Bolton et al. (2012) establish a game theory 
model on the equilibrium of the behaviors of CRAs, debt issuers and investors in order 
to investigate the effect of CRA competition on the rating quality given by the agencies 
and to investigate the relationship between the trust of investors and the rating quality. 
Fender and Mitchell (2005) successfully foretell the possibility of model risk of rating 
agencies due to the over-reliance on ratings. Noh and Dong Woo (2014) build a game 
theory model with five participants: one issuer, one private credit rating agency, one 
public credit rating agency, one ‘rater’ with information acquisition technology and a 
continuum of investors. They conclude that a reform creating a ‘public CRA’ can work 
only if the distribution of type of issuer projects and the impact of high rating benefits 
are known.  
In terms of empirical research on the market (investors’) reactions to the credit ratings, 
early papers focus on the credit ratings of conventional bonds (West, 1973; Weinstein, 
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1977). Recent papers have tried to find more details about the bond price reactions 
to credit rating actions. Kliger and Sarig (2000) checked the bond ratings’ influence 
on the firm, debt and equity values and implied options prices. Iannotta et al. (2013) 
applied the concept of ‘quality spread’ (the yield difference between the Baa and Aaa 
tranches) to represent the predictive power of ratings and demonstrated that the 
influence of credit ratings on the issuance spread is greater if the ‘quality spread’ is 
higher. Abad and Robles (2015) tested the historical rating change announcements 
and their effects on the risk-return binomial, concluding that the CRAs’ rating 
announcements reveal new information to the market.  
Other than normal bonds, other types of bonds have also attracted attention in 
academic studies. Liu and Thakor (1984) investigated the independent impact of 
ratings on state bond yields, while Stover (1991) focused on the relationship between 
the yield of newly issued municipal bonds and bond ratings.  
In addition, many scholars have discussed the relationship between stock prices and 
rating announcements.  Hand et al. (1992) compared the result of the stock market 
with that of the bond market and found asymmetric effects between negative and 
positive announcements, as well as distinct effects on investment-grade securities 
and non-investment-grade securities. Dichev and Piotroski (2001) tested the long-run 
variation of stock returns following corresponding bond rating changes. Jung et al. 
(2013) examined how credit ratings affect the behavior of stock analysts’ earnings 
forecast revision. An interesting research conducted by Agarwal et al. (2016) uses 
text-mining techniques finding a significant relationship between the tones of the texts 
in rating action reports and the CAR (cumulative abnormal return) in the secondary 
market. This finding strengthens the hypothesis of the CRAs’ influence on the financial 
market. 
Apart from traditional financial instruments, bonds and stocks, related derivatives such 
as CDS (credit default swap) are of interest to many scholars (Hull et al., 2004; Chava 
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et al., 2012; Drago and Gallo, 2016). The empirical literature also covers the impact 
of credit ratings on activities in the financial market, such as payment methods in the 
M&A process (Karampatsas et al., 2014), capital structure decisions (Kisgen, 2006), 
sovereign issuance funding (Kiff et al., 2012) and real private investment (Chen et al., 
2013). Moreover, other studies (Kräussl, 2005; Afonso et al., 2012) discuss the impact 
of sovereign rating announcements on countries’ indicators of macroeconomic 
condition, reflected by an established index of speculative market pressure and 
sovereign bond/CDS prices. 
To investigate the market reaction to credit ratings, scholars do not only use the data 
within single countries but also study the cross-country effect from the rating actions 
in one country to the financial market of another country. Ferreira and Gama (2007) 
use a dataset including 29 countries and find that the rating actions for the sovereign 
debt in one country have an effect on the stock market in other countries. 
Grammatikos & Vermeulen (2012) extend this investigation by studying the contagion 
effect between different country groups. Besides the stock market, cross-country 
effects on exchange rate market are also discussed. Subaşı (2008) use emerging 
market data to study whether the upgrades/downgrades of a sovereign rating would 
have an impact on the exchange rate in other countries. Alsakka, R., & ap Gwilym, O. 
(2012, b) further test whether three main CRAs have different patterns of the impact 
on exchange market.  
3.2.2 Credit ratings of structured finance products   
This paper focuses on the credit ratings of structured finance products. Structured 
finance (Asset-Backed Security, known as ABS) is an important outcome of financial 
innovation in the 20th century. In contrast to traditional investment instruments 
through which the issuers and investors of the securities transact directly, in ABS 
transactions, an institution called a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) organizes the 
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transactions as a bridge between the specific issuer and the general investors. The 
investors receive the payments in an order based on their payment priority, reflecting 
the purchasing prices or spread (this procedure is called ‘tranching’ and each of the 
payment obligations with specific payment priority is called a ‘tranche’).  
The process described above is also called asset securitization. The incentives driving 
the creation and evolution of asset securitization were summarized by Cowan (2003), 
who points out that traditional mortgages were illiquid for investors, exposing lenders 
to the risk that they may not be able to find buyers when they wished to sell the 
securities they hold.  
Credit ratings are essential to asset securitization, because according to the regulation, 
simultaneous to issuing the tranches of an ABS, issuers need to turn to the CRAs 
asking them to give each of the tranches a ‘rating’, demonstrating its default risk. Due 
to the complexity of ABS stemming from the pooling and tranching procedures, 
investors tend to believe the opinions offered by the CRAs via their rating results on 
the securities. 
Some studies indicate the reaction of the ABS market to credit ratings by testing the 
association between ABS issuance spread and its credit ratings holding other 
variables constant. Ashcraft et al. (2011) investigated the relationship between the 
rating given by CRAs and the prices of MBS and found that rating and yields were 
always correlated: higher rating, lower yields. Similarly, Fabozzi and Vink (2012) 
tested European ABS data to assess the significance of the ratings’ parameters on 
the yield spread (focusing only on the AAA tranches, which attract the most attention 
from the market).  
In contrast to the papers above where the authors directly regress issuance spread 
on the ratings, other scholars use alternative factors to indicate ratings’ influences. 
Mählmann (2012) used the CDO-ABS issuance yield’s ability to predict the future 
outcomes.                 
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3.2.3 Evaluation of CRA performances 
Researching on the bond rating industry (not the ABS or CDO), Baghai et al. (2014) 
get a conclusion that the CRAs were getting more and more conservative in rating 
corporate debts since 1985 instead of inflating the ratings which means that for same 
PD, they gave lower ratings. Other scholars test the bond market data (bond spreads) 
to demonstrate the conflicts of interests of CRAs (Covitz et al., 2003). For the 
securitization products (CDO), some papers also conduct research on the credit rating 
agencies and give them positive remarks. Griffin, et al. (2013) distinguish the concept 
of rating shopping, where investors solicit the ‘best’ rating among the multiple 
agencies and that of rating catering, the CRA’s incentives to attract businesses. Peña 
et al. (2015) use the Italian market data to reject the hypotheses of rating catering 
Although a large number of scholars defend the credit rating agencies by empirical 
tests, some other authors use empirical results to offer negative remarks against 
CRAs. Among those negative papers, most of them claim that they find a clue to prove 
that CRAs ‘inflate’ their ratings in order to please the issuers who pay the rating fees.  
He et al. (2011) separate the sample MBS tranches into two parts according to the 
sizes of tranche issuers (big issuer and small issuer), select an index, the fraction of 
AAA tranches among all the tranches to demonstrate the ‘favour’ of CRAs to the 
issuers. Besides, they use the tranches’ price changes during the crisis as a proxy of 
performances during the crisis and compare the performances of MBS issued by big 
and small issuers both in the non-boom period (2000 to 2003) and boom period (2003 
to 2006). They conclude that CRAs prefer offering ‘fake’ ratings to big issuers for 
revenues. Other indicators of rating shopping (or catering) are established to test the 
performances of CRAs. For instance, Morkötter et al. (2009) define and identify the 
rating shopping by comparing the characteristics of rated securities. In their story, if 
the credit rating agencies act in a way of rating shopping, the patterns in the 
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characteristics of CDOs rated by the same credit rating agency should be common 
and such patterns should be diversified among different credit rating agencies. Their 
test results demonstrate that there exists a common characteristic pattern within each 
of the group thus enhance the view of rating shopping.  Efing et al. (2013) introduce 
an index named ‘Deal rating-implied spread’ reflecting the overall market value of all 
securities within one deal and empirically identify an association between the issuers’ 
business to the CRA and the ratings offered by the CRA. Such association is stronger 
for deals with more complicated deal structure. It enhances the statement that CRAs 
favour ‘bigger’ issuers and offer bias ratings.  
3.2.4 Contribution of this research 
In contrast to the majority of researchers who focus on the reaction of traditional 
financial products (bonds and stocks) to credit ratings (West, 1973; Weinstein, 1973; 
Liu and Thakor, 1984; Stover, 1991; Hand et al., 1992; Kliger and Sarig, 2000; Dichev 
and Piotroski, 2001; Iannotta et al., 2013; Abad and Robles, 2015). Those research 
finds a significant association between the credit rating levels (changes) and the 
market prices (or variation of market prices). Among these scholars, only a very small 
group of researchers have studied structured finance products (Ashcraft et al., 2011; 
Fabozzi and Vink, 2012) and find a relationship between spreads and credit rating 
levels. Even among that limited number of papers concerning structured finance 
market ratings, almost all discuss mortgage-backed securities while omitting other 
types of ABS in their datasets. My research includes not only MBS but also other non-
MBS to reflect the entire structured finance market. 
Furthermore, previous research focuses on the pre-crisis situation (Hand et al., 1992; 
Kliger and Sarig, 2000; Dichev and Piotroski, 2001) while my study aims to compare 
the situations pre- and post- to investigate whether the market reaction to changes in 
ratings has become weaker after the financial crisis. The reason for differentiating 
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between pre-crisis and post-crisis performances of the credit rating impact on the ABS 
market is that the recent financial crisis has undermined CRAs’ reputation by a 
considerable number of media reports making negative comments on the CRAs’ role 
in the crisis. Whether such great reputational loss has led to a decrease in the ABS 
market reaction to credit ratings has not been studied previously, to my knowledge. 
Furthermore, US credit rating reforms which were declared after the crisis aim to 
remove the rating-based regulations so it provides a background that investors may 
react to those ratings to a lower extent than they did in the pre-crisis era.  
Although research on the traditional bond or stock markets uses data of the secondary 
market (Hand et al., 1992; Dichev and Piotroski, 2001), most of the previous research 
on structured finance products investigates only the primary market data, which 
covers the security issuance stage but not the transaction stage (Fabozzi and Vink, 
2012). This leaves a gap in the research on the reaction of ABS spread/prices to credit 
ratings. As mentioned in Section 3.1, three bridges between investors and CRAs are 
the information intermediate function of CRAs, rating-based regulations, and investors’ 
behavior. The primary market’s reaction to CRAs can partially reflect CRAs’ function 
of information intermediates as investors indirectly capture non-public information on 
issued ABS by observing ratings. The reaction also reflects CRA’s function as 
providers of rating-based regulatory license (some regulations about ABS are based 
on their initial ratings). The secondary market’s reaction is a reflection of the function 
of information intermediates (investors view downgrades as a negative signal) and 
regulatory license providers (some market participants are required by regulations to 
sell certain securities if they are downgraded). It also reflects the behaviors of 
investors (for instance, homogeneous selling following a downgrade) due to the 
feature of real-time trading in the secondary market. Therefore, as an essential part 
of the asset securitization market, the transaction stage of structured finance products 
82 
 
should not be ignored. In this paper, to comprehensively study the ABS market, I 
investigate both the primary and the secondary ABS markets. The cross-sectional and 
the panel data analyses are conducted to demonstrate the market reactions to ratings 
in those two markets, respectively.                
3.3 Hypotheses, assumptions and methodology  
3.3.1 Hypotheses and assumptions 
I split my empirical test into two parts: issuance data for the primary market and 
transaction data for the secondary market.  
Two hypotheses are proposed to test the reaction of the ABS market to credit ratings 
and the potential change in this reaction after the financial crisis.  
Hypothesis 3-1: There exists a significant association between security prices and 
the issuance/change of credit ratings in the ABS market. 
Hypothesis 3-2: The association between security prices and the issuance/change 
of credit ratings in the ABS market has become significantly weaker after the financial 
crisis. 
For Hypothesis 3-1, two sub-hypotheses are designed to reflect the situations in the 
primary market and the secondary market, respectively. 
Hypothesis 3-1a: In the issuance stage of ABS, controlling for a set of characteristics 
variables, the ABS issuance spread is significantly associated with their issuance 
credit ratings.  
For issuance data, the market reactions to credit ratings are reflected by the 
association between the variation of issuance credit ratings among different ABS 
tranches and the variation of issuance spread of those ABS tranches after controlling 










In the issuance stage, ABSs are priced relative to a benchmark interest rate in a form 
of ‘yield’. Issuance spread is the part of issuance yield above the benchmark rate. A 
higher issuance spread is equivalent to a lower issuance price. Fabozzi et al. (2012) 
state that the issuance credit ratings mirror information of ABSs’ risk characteristics 
and that those characteristics are open to ABS investors in the ABS issuance reports. 
Therefore, if the issuance ratings still affect the issuance spread controlling all of the 
characteristics equally, it is reasonable to claim that investors consider extra 
information besides open information when they price newly-issued ABS.  
Hypothesis 3-1b: In the transaction stage of ABS, a significant price decrease occurs 
in certain time windows after one ABS receives negative rating announcements from 
CRAs. 
For transaction data, the market reaction to credit ratings can be evaluated through 
the price reactions to rating change announcements. When an ABS receives negative 
credit rating announcements from CRAs, investors react to them by accepting lower 
transaction prices, which is reflected by a significant price decrease in certain windows 
after the announcements are released.  
In my research, ‘rating change announcements’ are identified as four types of 
announcements offered by CRAs about certain ABS (shown in Table 3-1): 
Table 3-1 Four types of rating announcements 
 Real rating change Possible rating change5 
Positive  Actual upgrade Possible upgrade  
Negative Actual downgrade Possible downgrade 
 
                                                          
5 put into watch lists or outlook announcements 
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According to many studies (Hand et al., 1992; Dichev and Piotroski, 2001; Jung et al., 
2013; Drago and Gallo, 2016), shocks of positive announcements on the market are 
weaker than those of negative announcements. In my research about ABS’ price 
reactions, I also find consistent evidence of such asymmetric shocks. Therefore, in 
this paper I use only negative announcements (actual downgrade and possible 
downgrade) as the testing sample. ‘Actual downgrade’ refers to an announcement 
indicating that the CRA has decided to downgrade the ratings of certain ABS while a 
‘possible downgrade’ announcement is just a warning that the CRA may downgrade 
that ABS at a certain time in the future.  
Hypothesis 3-1b implies that the immediate price reactions to negative rating 
announcements can be a proxy of investors’ attitudes towards those announcements. 
If I can find evidence to show that, compared to non-announcement dates and 
controlling for relevant variables, more negative price returns are observed on days in 
a certain window around negative rating announcements, it may indicate that 
investors follow the CRAs’ downgrade suggestions by accepting a lower transaction 
price of that downgraded ABS.     
Similar to Hypothesis 3-1, I also divide Hypothesis 3-2, which indicates a decreased 
reaction to ratings, into two sub-hypotheses according to the market division: 
Hypothesis 3-2a: Compared to the pre-crisis period, the association between ABS 
issuance spread and issuance ratings has become weaker since the financial crisis. 
Hypothesis 3-2b: Compared to the pre-crisis period, the size of ABS transaction 
price decrease following negative credit rating announcements has diminished after 
the financial crisis. 
Each sub-hypothesis works for each market (primary or secondary), indicating a lower 
degree of market reaction to CRAs’ actions.  
I realize that the rating market and ABS market have both experienced a profound 
change since the financial crisis and that therefore some factors may make my 
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hypotheses invalid: 1) if, in the primary market,  CRAs systematically adjusted their 
implications of rating scales which differentiates the meaning of same rating scale 
after the crisis, then the ratings in two periods are incomparable thus the seemingly 
weaker association between ratings and issuance spreads are not attributed to a 
weaker market reaction but to the rating-scale implication transformation; 2) if, in the 
secondary market, the transaction liquidity has been significantly reduced since the 
financial crisis which makes the market inactive, then the seemingly weaker 
association between price variation and rating announcements is not a reflection of 
weaker market reactions to ratings but that of an inactive market.  
Therefore, in order to ensure that my hypotheses are valid, two assumptions are 
raised and tested: 
 1)  The implication of issuance rating scales at a same level does not show a 
significant change after the financial crisis; 
 2)  The liquidity of the secondary ABS market is sufficiently high to maintain the 
market active in the post-crisis period. 
3.3.2 Methodology 
I conduct analyses on the primary and the secondary market situations to test my 
hypotheses. For the tests of each market, corresponding assumptions are firstly 
tested before regressions of (issuance or transaction) price indicators on rating 
indicators are conducted. 
3.3.2.1 Primary market (Hypotheses 3-1a and 3-2a) 
Assumption: rating implication stability 
The assumption of the main test concerns the stability of rating scales before and after 
the financial crisis. In other words, I need to check whether rating agencies imply 
different risk characteristics by the same rating levels after the financial crisis and to 
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confirm that rating scales before and after the financial crisis are comparable, which 
is an essential condition of my main test.  
I follow the research by Fabozzi and Vink (2012) who test the determination of rating 
scales by running ordered logit regressions of issuance rating indicators on a series 
of fundamental characteristics. To check whether rating agencies have significantly 
adjusted such determination after the financial crisis, I add a dummy (equal to 1 if the 
ABS is issued after the financial crisis) as an independent variable to estimate the 
degree of rating-implication drift in the post-crisis period.  
The dataset is divided into two sub-samples: MBS and non-MBS. MBS is a special 
type of ABS whose backing securities are mortgage-related. The reason for 
separating MBS from other ABS is that the spread determining regime, the risk 
characteristics, and the credit rating features differ between mortgage-backed 
securities and other types of ABSs. All of the research on the primary market is 
conducted separately for MBS and non-MBS datasets.  
The assumption test is conducted separately for each rating agency of the big three 
(Moody’s, S&P and Fitch). 
I have put the regression results in the Appendix (Appendix 3-2). My results show that 
the estimated coefficients on the post-crisis dummy are insignificant, which shows that 
controlling fundamental characteristics, rating agencies do not over-rate or under-rate 
ABS after the financial crisis. This enhances my assumption that the rating 
implications of the same rating levels are stable in the two periods thus the ratings 
offered by rating agencies are comparable before and after the financial crisis. 
Main Test 
OLS regression analyses were designed to test the association between the issuance 
spread of ABS and the rating-related variables, the time dummy variables and the 
interaction terms of those two types of variables, viewing the tranche characteristics 
as control variables.  
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My main regressions are displayed in Equations (3-1) and (3-2). 
ln(𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖) = 𝛼3−1 + 𝛽3−1,1𝑁𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽3−1,2𝑁𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽3−1,(𝑝+2)𝐶𝑝𝑖 +
P
𝑝=1
1,𝑖        (3 − 1)      
ln(𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖) = 𝛼3−2 + 𝛽3−2,1𝑁𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽3−2,2𝑁𝑖 + 𝛽3−2,3𝐷𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽3−2,4𝑃𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽3−2,5𝑁𝑅𝑖 × 𝐷𝐶𝑖
+ 𝛽3−2,6𝑁𝑅𝑖 × 𝑃𝐶𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽3−2,(𝑝+6)𝐶𝑝𝑖 +
P
𝑝=1
2,𝑖                                                (3
− 2) 
A description of all the variables is given in Table 3-2 (the details of variable 𝑁𝑅𝑖 are 
shown in Table 3-3) and 𝐶𝑝𝑖s refer to the nine variables of tranche characteristics 
playing the role of control variables in this regression. Some of the control variables 
are introduced in Fabozzi’s paper (2012) and the rating-related and dummy-related 
variables are introduced in this paper in order to test Hypotheses 3-1a and 3-2a. A 
trade-off between the size of the sample and the diversity of control variables has to 
be considered in this analysis. Since not all information on tranches on all control 
variables can be collected, adding some of the control variables (WAL, WAC and 
credit support) reduces the size of the samples used to estimate the coefficients. 
Therefore, I cluster the control variables into three levels (shown in Table 3-2). 
Variables of Level 1 indicate basic information of the ABS tranches and are available 
for the full sample. Variables of Level 2 (WAL and WAC) consider the factors of length, 
the coupon rate of the whole ABS deal and are available for a sub-sample of the full 
sample. The variable of Level 3 indicates the risk protection offered by the issuers to 
the specific tranches. Regressions are run separately controlling different levels of 
variables (equivalent to different values of p shown in Equation (3-2)) and the 










Dependent Variable Ln(Spread) Ln(Spread) 
The logarithm of yield of the Asset-backed 
security (MBS or non-MBS) relative to the 
benchmark yield. Spread is negatively 
correlated to the issuance price. A higher 




Par amount 𝐶1 The size of the tranche 




The seniority number of the tranche in the 
whole deal: a smaller number indicates a 
higher seniority which means a higher priority 
to claim the interest/principal payment among 
all of the tranches in the deal. 
Length 𝐶4 
The pre-determined life of the security, the 
length between the maturity date and 
issuance date. 
Issuer’s size 𝐶5 
Ratio of the sum of ABS issuance volume 
issued by the issuer to the sum of ABS 
issuance volume issued by all the issuers in 
the whole dataset. This index indicates the 
market share of the ABS issuer: a higher 




A series of dummy variables indicating the 
type of assets backing the Asset-backed 
security. For MBS, key types of assets 
include ‘commercial mortgage’, ‘residential 
mortgage’ and ‘wholesale mortgage’; for non-
MBS, key types of assets include ‘CDO’, 
‘CLO’, ‘student loans’, ‘auto loan receivables’, 
‘credit card receivables’ etc. 
Level 2 
WAL 𝐶7 Weighted average life 
WAC 𝐶8 Weighted average coupon rate 
Level 3 Credit support 𝐶9 
Original credit support percentage for an ABS 
class/tranche from other subordinate classes 
in the same ABS deal. 
Region Country 𝐶10 
A series of dummy variables indicating the 
country where the security was issued. The 
codes used are: 
KY-Cayman Islands  
US-United States 









It indicates how many CRAs among the 
Moody’s, Standard & Pools, Fitch and DBRS 
offer ratings to the tranche. This variable 
indicates the rating-industry competition 






Transform the letter-format rating to number-
format based on a formula shown in Table 3-
3. Calculate the average rating of all the 
ratings the security receive. 




Equal to 1 if the tranche was issued during 
the financial crisis period (Sep.1st, 2007-




Equal to 1 if the tranche was issued after the 
financial crisis period (after Dec.31st, 2009), 
to 0 otherwise. 
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dummy variable in 
Equations (3) and (4) 
Aaa AAA 1 N/A (Benchmark 
notch) 
Aa1 AA+ 2 𝐿𝑅1 
Aa2 AA 3 𝐿𝑅2 
Aa3 AA- 4 𝐿𝑅3 
A1 A+ 5 𝐿𝑅4 
A2 A 6 𝐿𝑅5 
A3 A- 7 𝐿𝑅6 
Baa1 BBB+ 8 𝐿𝑅7 
Baa2 BBB 9 𝐿𝑅8 
Baa3 BBB- 10 𝐿𝑅9 
Ba1 BB+ 11 𝐿𝑅10 
Ba2 BB 12 𝐿𝑅11 
Ba3 BB- 13 𝐿𝑅12 
B1 B+ 14 𝐿𝑅13 
B2 B 15 𝐿𝑅14 
B3 B- 16 𝐿𝑅15 
Caa1 CCC+ 17 𝐿𝑅16 
Caa2 CCC 18 𝐿𝑅17 
Caa3 CCC- 19 𝐿𝑅18 
Ca CC 20 𝐿𝑅19 
 
Equation (3-1) is linked to Hypothesis 3-1a: 𝛽3−1,1 indicates the association between 
ratings and the issuance spread: a significant positive 𝛽1supports Hypothesis 3-1a by 
showing a positive association between a lower rating (equal to a higher 𝑁𝑅𝑖) and a 
lower price (equal to a higher ln(𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖) ) when controlling for all of the ABS 
characteristics. This implies that even when investors see the open information on 
ABS characteristics, they still offer lower prices to purchase an ABS if CRAs rate that 
ABS at a lower rating degree.  
𝛽3−1,2 is related to the competition among the different CRAs on the issuance spread. 
Becker and Milbourn (2008 and 2011) and Dittrich (2007) discuss the relationship 
between rating-industry competition and rating quality as well as issuer preference. 
Moreover, regulators are trying to enhance the competition of the rating industry (the 
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US Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 2006 and EU CRA Regulation 2009). Therefore, 
I add competition-related independent variables to control the effects of intra-industry 
competition on issuers’ attitudes.  
Equation (3-2) is designed for hypothesis 3-2a: 𝛽3−2,1 and 𝛽3−2,2 indicate same items 
as 𝛽3−1,1 and 𝛽3−1,2in Equation (1). 𝛽3−2,3 and 𝛽3−2,4 indicate the change of issuance 
spread during and after the financial crisis compared to the pre-crisis period, 
𝛽3−2,5 and 𝛽3−2,6 indicate the change of the association between ratings and issuance 
prices during and after the financial crisis compared to pre-crisis period. A negative 
𝛽3−2,6 enhances hypothesis 3-2a by indicating a lower 𝛽3−2,1 after the financial crisis 
than before. A negative 𝛽3−2,6 means that such an association becomes weaker after 
the crisis.  
3.3.2.2 Secondary market (Hypotheses 3-1b and 3-2b) 
Assumption: liquidity 
The pre-assumption for secondary market tests is that the liquidity is not extremely 
low, as this may impact the degree of activity of market prices of ABS.  
To identify the market liquidity, I use a commonly-used method to calculate the 
proportional bid-offer spread (Glosten & Milgrom, 1985; Huberman & Halka, 2011; 
Cui et al.,2018): 
𝑠 =
Offer Price − Bid Price
Mid_market Price
, 
where Mid-market price is the halfway (average) between the bid and the offer price. 
A higher value of s implies a lower degree of liquidity.  
Due to the limited accessibility of data, I only obtain bid and offer price information 
starting at March 2011. Therefore, the liquidity levels of the ABS market in the pre-
crisis period cannot be estimated. I am able to only find previous papers which 
describe the post-crisis liquidity of ABS market (Friewald et al., 2015; Friewald et al., 
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2017). Therefore, I have to ignore the pre-crisis ABS liquidity and only test the post-
crisis period.  
I collect the daily offer and bid prices of 90 ABS securities (40 MBS and 50 non-MBS) 
in the time period between 11/02/2011 and 01/09/2015, calculate the proportional bid-
offer spreads, take the weighted average of all MBS and non-MBS securities 
(weighted by asset volume of the ABS), and draw a figure showing the daily variation 
of the weighted means (shown in Figure 3-1). 
Figure 3-1 Daily weighted mean (Wmean) of proportional bid-ask spreads for ABS (MBS and 
Non-MBS) 
 
Two conclusions can be drawn for the assumption test:  
1)  Non-MBS has a higher liquidity level than MBS. This may reflect a shortage of 
the MBS market after the financial crisis due to the collapse of the US mortgage 
market starting in 2007. However, the proportional bid-ask spreads of MBS have 
decreased (an increased level of liquidity) since the beginning of my testing window 
(2011), which can be viewed as a recovery process of the MBS market liquidity. 
2) In terms of the absolute levels of the proportional bid-ask spreads, neither types 
of ABS have extremely low liquidity: even for MBS which has relatively low liquidity, 
the values of spreads are never higher than 5% and non-MBS spreads are never 
higher than 1%. However, it is not easy to determine a strict threshold of bid-offer 











or not. Therefore, the main shortcoming of this test is that I cannot give a clear 
judgement whether the market is liquid or not. 
Main test 
In contrast to an issuance dataset which contains static cross-section data, a 
transaction dataset is a panel one consisting of several security IDs, each of which 
has a daily time series of transaction prices. To test the price shock of negative rating 
announcements on transaction prices of ABS, as well as the change of shock degree 
after the financial crisis, I use fixed-effect panel data regressions, regressing price 
returns on event-dummy, post-crisis dummy and their interactions.  
        𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼3−3,𝑖 + 𝛽3−3,1 × 𝑑𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢3−3,𝑖,𝑡                             (3 − 3) 
     𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼3−4,𝑖 + 𝛽3−4,1 × 𝑑𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3−4,2 × 𝑑𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿3−4 × (𝑑𝑃𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑑𝐸𝑖,𝑡)
+ 𝑢3−4,𝑖,𝑡    (3 − 4) 
The dependent variable, 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 refers to the price return of the ABS security i at 
time t6. 𝑑𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the event-dummy which is equal to 1 if day t is within the pre-defined 
time windows7 (1 day, 3 days or 5 days) after a negative rating event occurs. 𝑑𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is 
the period dummy which is equal to 1 if the day t is in the post-crisis period (after Sep 
15th, 2007) and 0 otherwise. 𝑑𝑃𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑑𝐸𝑖,𝑡  is the interaction term, 𝛼𝑖   refers to the 
unobserved time-invariant individual effect and 𝑢𝑖,𝑡  represents the error term.  
I control rating levels of ABS in Equations (3-3) and (3-4) to rule out the possibility that 
a downgrade of the same number of tranches has a different impact when the initial 




, 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 is the reported price of security i at day t and 𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 is the reported 
price of security i at one day before t. 
7 Testing time windows are equal to 1, 3 or 5 respectively.  
(-n,0): returns in the corresponding columns are calculated as the price difference between the 
EXACT day of announcement and the average of n days BEFORE the rating event; 
(0,+n): returns in the corresponding columns are calculated as the price difference between 
the average of n days AFTER the rating events and the EXACT day of announcement; 
(-n, +n):  returns in the corresponding columns are calculated as the price difference between 
the average of n days AFTER the rating event and the average of n days BEFORE the rating 
event; 
The t-test is for returns of all negative/positive events in each time window.  
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ratings are different. In addition, year-fixed-effects are also controlled to consider 
different market conditions in different years.  
To enhance the results, I cluster standard errors by three levels respectively, security 
level, year level and security-year level (two-way clustering). The two-way clustered 
standard errors are adjusted according to the technique provided by Ma (2014). 
Equation (3-3) tests Hypothesis 3-1b by testing whether the returns react negatively 
to negative rating announcements. A significantly negative  𝛽3−3,1  would support 
Hypothesis 3-1b by showing that compared with normal days without rating 
announcements, prices of ABS significantly decrease within a certain window after 
the release of negative rating announcements. 
Equation (3-4) tests hypothesis 3-2b by checking whether estimated 𝛿3−4 is 
significantly positive. The estimator 𝛿 can be interpreted as Equation (3-5).  
𝛿3−4 = (𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛1,1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛1,2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) − (𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛2,1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛2,2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )         (3 − 5),  
where 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛1,1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ =Average return within the pre-defined time windows after a rating 
event (for the post-crisis period); 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛1,2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ =Average return beyond the pre-defined 
time windows after a rating event (for the post-crisis period); 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛2,1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ =Average return 
within the pre-defined time windows after a rating event (for the pre-crisis period) and 
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛2,2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ =Average return beyond the pre-defined time windows after a rating event 
(for the pre-crisis period).   
The first item in brackets refers to the rating events’ shock after the crisis. The second 
item in brackets refers to the rating events’ shock before the crisis. Therefore, 𝛿3−4 is 
an estimate of the difference between those two shocks, indicating the change of the 
shock of the events on market returns after the crisis compared with the pre-crisis 
period. As I state in Equation (3-3), negative rating announcements are associated 
with negative price returns; a positive 𝛿3−4 then would imply a negative price decrease 
but with a smaller size after the financial crisis, supporting hypothesis 3-2b.  
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Survivorship bias8 is a non-negligible factor that may invalidate the results of empirical 
tests for panel data (Elton et al., 1996). In the context of my analysis, potential 
survivorship bias is due to the expiration of some ABS before the financial crisis. 
Those expired ABS did not perform after the financial crisis so I cannot observe or 
take into account their price reactions to negative rating announcements in my tests.  
However, I assume that the expiration of ABS does not cause survivorship bias 
because their maturity is independent of both the financial crisis and the price 
reactions to negative rating announcements.  
For all the 72 ABS analyzed, 22 expired before the financial crisis (before September 
2007); all of these ended due to natural expiration based on ABS contracts and not 
default. Furthermore, all 22 ABS were issued before the financial crisis (from October 
1992 to June 2003). According to the contracts, maturities were all determined when 
the ABS were issued. Thus, the expiration dates were determined before the financial 
crisis and are therefore independent of the financial crisis. In addition, since the 
issuers could not ‘foresee’ the occurrence of negative rating announcements about 
their ABS and take that into account when they set expiration dates at the issuance 
stage, the expiration dates are independent with the rating announcements. Therefore, 
I assume a random expiration of the ABS regarding the financial crisis and rating 
announcements. Random expirations do not cause survivorship bias because if the 
expirations are not related to the financial crisis or rating downgrades then it is 
reasonable to state that if those expired ABS had not expired before the financial crisis, 
their performances following the credit downgrades would not have been significantly 
different from other ABS. Thus, I assume that there is no survivorship bias in my study.   
                                                          
8 Survivorship bias refers to the bias caused by only selecting items which have survived in 




I conduct my empirical analysis using ABS data for issuance stage and transaction 
stage. 
The issuance dataset is collected from the Bloomberg database and Moody’s website. 
Firstly, I go to the Moody’s website (https://www.moodys.com/) to download all the 
issuance reports for newly-issued ABS. By looking up the reports manually, I record 
the titles and issuance dates for each of the rated ABS. Next, I manually match the 
titles of ABS with the Bloomberg IDs using Bloomberg database. Lastly, I use the 
Bloomberg IDs to collect information on ABSs’ fundamentals, risk characteristics and 
issuance ratings given by other main CRAs (Standard & Poors, Fitch and DBRS). 
Data from these sources are merged into a unique sample containing variables shown 
in Table 3-2. All of the tranches in this dataset were issued in the period between 
August 2002 and January 2015 and only the floating-rate tranches are included in the 
dataset as I do not have access to the benchmark used to estimate the fixed-rate 
tranches (Fabozzi and Vink, 2012). A total of 24,458 tranches (7,381 MBS tranches 
and 17,077 non-MBS tranches) from 5,702 ABS deals9 (1,484 MBS deals and 4,218 
non-MBS deals) are in my sample. I separate the MBS from the non-MBS and conduct 
every analysis in both the MBS data and the non-MBS data respectively.  
Regarding the distribution of tranche/deal numbers in three periods10, two features 
can be observed here, 1) there are more pre-crisis issued tranches/deals than during-
crisis and post-crisis ones; 2) there are significantly more non-MBS tranches/deals 
than MBS ones.  
I calculate the descriptive statistics of all the variables in three periods respectively 
and describe some pertinent details (Tables are shown in the Appendix 3-1). The 
                                                          
9 There are a couple of tranches in each of the deals. For each tranche, a seniority number is 
set to indicate the payment collecting sequence. The regression analysis is conducted on the 
tranche basis (not on a deal basis). 
10 Details are available upon requests. 
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explained variable, issuance spread significantly increases after the financial crisis 
from 4.15% to 5.31% for non-MBS and from 3.88% to 5.05% for MBS (equivalent to 
a price decrease) but the average ratings of those securities issued after the crisis are 
even more positive than in the pre-crisis period (indicated by a fall in NR (Number-
format Average rating) from 3.72 to 2.73 for non-MBS and from 4.24 to 3.10 for MBS). 
This phenomenon seems contradictory: the issuance prices do not recover to pre-
crisis level when the market recovers although the rating levels recover at the same 
time. However, if I return to my topic, investors’ reaction to the credit ratings before 
and after the financial crisis, this seemingly ‘contradictory’ phenomenon should be 
interpreted as preliminary evidence for the statement that market reaction to issuance 
ratings of ABS (including MBS) is weaker after the financial crisis. Even if the CRAs 
convey their confidence in the quality of ABS during the recovery period, the issuance 
prices remain at a low level, which indicates that the issuers do not accept the positive 
signal from the CRAs. 
The transaction price dataset is collected from Thomson Reuters Datastream and the 
information on rating changes/levels is hand-collected from Moody’s website. I merge 
data from these two sources into a unique sample.  
The sample covers time series between Feb 2001 and Feb 201611 (daily) and 72 ABS 
securities12. During this period, 894 rating events on these securities are identified. 
Due to the  
                                                          
11 The reason for selecting Feb 2001 as the starting point is to balance the time periods before 
and after the crisis (around seven years before the crisis, 2001-2007 and seven years after 
the crisis, 2009-2016). 
12 It is obvious that the number of ABS deals involved in the transaction dataset is much smaller 
than those involved in issuance dataset. The reason is that compared to all the ABS rated by 
CRAs in the issuance stage, far fewer ABS receive at least one rating change announcement 
during the transaction stage. To test the price reaction of ABS to rating events, I only focus on 
those ABS with rating changes in the testing time period. That is why the number of ABS in 
the testing sample drops significantly in the transaction-period analysis. 
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fact that rating events in the secondary market are relatively rare compared to rating 
offering actions for the primary market, the number of rating events and the tranches 
involved in these events is smaller than the issuance dataset. Therefore, MBS and 
non-MBS are analyzed together in this part of the study.  
3.5 Empirical results and robustness tests 
In this section, I display the empirical results and robustness test results for the 
primary and the secondary markets.  
3.5.1 Empirical results  
3.5.5.1 Issuance dataset 
For each equation, (3-1) and (3-2), I run two regressions on the MBS sample and the 
non-MBS sample respectively. The regression results are shown in Table 3-4. The 
regressions designed for Equation (3-1) (see Columns A and C in Table 3-4) generate 
a result enhancing Hypothesis 3-1a by showing significantly positive estimations on 
the variable NR (𝛽1,1 in Equation (3-1) and the results are consistent regardless of 
which combination of control variables are taken into consideration). The figures 
(considering all the control variables) are 0.07 for non-MBS and 0.17 for MBS dataset. 
They can be interpreted in the following way: after I keep the other risk characteristics 
constant, if the average rating given by CRAs goes down by one notch (for example, 
from Ba3 to Ba2), the issuance spread increases by 18.5% (7.3%)13 for (non-) MBS 
dataset, which is equivalent to a drop in the issuance prices. This shows that, 
regardless of the observed information collected from ABS issuance report, investors 
‘follow’ CRAs by demanding a lower purchasing price after seeing a lower rating notch 
provided by CRAs.  
                                                          
13 The figures of the spread’s increase are calculated from the estimated coefficients 𝛽1 
following the equation: Spread increase proportion=exp(𝛽1)-1 
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For the results of Equation (3-2), a positive 𝛽3−2,4  implies that ABS spreads 
significantly increase after the financial crisis (meaning a lower price). This can be 
attributed either to a negative trend of the ABS market after the crisis or a higher risk-
adverse of investors who require higher returns (spreads) for an ABS tranche with 
same characteristics in the post-crisis period.  
The negative 𝛽3−2,6  enhances Hypothesis 3-2a which shows a weaker market 
reaction to credit ratings in the primary market after the financial crisis. The figures 
(controlling all the control variables) are -0.14 for both the non-MBS dataset and the 
MBS dataset. They can be interpreted as follows: for the (non-) MBS dataset, before 
the financial crisis, 𝛽3−2,1 is 0.19 (0.17) and after the financial crisis, that coefficient 
decreases to 𝛽3−2,1+𝛽3−2,6=0.19-0.14=0.05 (0.17-0.14=0.03). Equivalently, before the 
crisis, one notch of rating uplift is associated with 20.9% (18.5%) uplift of issuance 
spread but after the crisis, it is only associated with 5.1% (3.0%) uplift of issuance 
spread. Such a fall of corresponding spread uplift supports Hypothesis 3-2a. It offers 
evidence that after the crisis, although investors still react to the ratings offered by 
CRAs to assess the qualities of ABS, the extent of this reaction has been significantly 
reduced.  
The situation of during-crisis estimators (𝛽3−2,3 and 𝛽3−2,5) is similar to that of post-
crisis estimators, showing a weaker association between ratings and spread during 
the financial crisis period.  
Furthermore, the coefficient 𝛽3−2,2, which is linked to intra-industry competition among 
CRAs is negative only for the non-MBS dataset and not consistent using different 
combinations of control variables. It implies that there is only weak evidence to show 
that investors price a non-MBS security higher (equivalent to a lower issuance spread) 
if CRAs compete more severely to rate that security (reflected by a larger number of 
CRAs rating it). In other words, investors ‘trust’ an ABS more if it is in a more 
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competitive rating background. Such association does not exist in MBS cases. One 
possible reason is that the variation of the number of CRAs rating MBS is not that 
significant (most of the MBS are rated by all the three CRAs in my sample) so 
investors do not observe a significant diversity of industry competition levels on which 
they can base a decision whether to invest in the MBS security. Although some 
previous research examines the issue of CRA intra-industry competition in terms of 
rating quality and issuer preference (Becker and Milbourn, 2008; Dittrich, 2007), to my 
knowledge, my research is the first to extend the research on the intra-industry 
competition to the field of market reaction.  
Regarding the control variables, most of the estimated coefficients are consistent in 
MBS and non-MBS datasets and two of them are consistent with the results drawn by 
Fabozzi and Vink (2012). To save space, I do not display the specific values of those 
estimators but show the signs of them and their intuitions as follows (details of 
estimates on control variables are shown in Appendix 3-3): 
o Par-amount: consistently negative coefficients imply that investors price an 
ABS higher if it has a larger issuance volume. 
o Coupon rate: consistently positive coefficients imply that investors price an 
ABS lower if it has a larger coupon rate. 
o WAL: consistently positive coefficients imply that investors price an ABS lower 
if it has a longer weighted average length. 
o Issuer size: consistently positive coefficients imply that investors price an ABS 
lower if its issuer owns a larger market share. 
o Credit support: consistently negative coefficients imply that investors price an 
ABS higher if that ABS has a higher degree of credit support from the issuer. 
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Table 3-2 Regression result of Equations (3-1) and (3-2) 
This table shows the results of Equations (3-1) and (3-2). The dependent variable is logarithm of issuance spread. Number-format Average rating (NR) is the 
transformed number-format credit rating level indicator based on a formula shown in Table 3-3. Number of CRAs rating the security (N) indicates how many CRAs 
among the Moody’s, Standard & Pools, Fitch and DBRS offer ratings to the tranche. during_crisis (DC) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the tranche was issued 
during the financial crisis period (Sep.1st, 2007-Dec.31st, 2009), to 0 otherwise. post_crisis (PC) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the tranche was issued after the 
financial crisis period (after Dec.31st, 2009), to 0 otherwise. 
The three levels of control variables are defined in Table 3-2. 
Regressions are estimated using OLS method.  
***the coefficient is significant at 1% level 
**the coefficient is significant at 5% level 
*the coefficient is significant at 10% level 
The figures in the bracket show the corresponding t-statistic 
To deal with the heteroscedasticity issue, parallel regressions are run clustering standard errors by three levels respectively: collateral type, issuance year and 
issuance country. The results do not change significantly. 
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Country Control Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Control Level 1 Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Control Level 2 Yes Yes No  Yes Yes No  Yes Yes No  Yes Yes No 
Control Level 3 Yes No No  Yes No No  Yes No No  Yes No No 
N 427 1210 16373  427 1210 16373  2478 3246 7277  2478 3246 7277 
Adj. R2 76.08% 60.66% 75.87%  81.15% 67.73% 79.21%  68.94% 64.65% 62.20%  72.81% 69.55% 67.18% 
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3.5.1.2 Transaction dataset   
The results of Equations (3-3) and (3-4) are shown in Table 3-5. For each regression, 
three time-windows (1-day, 3-day and 5-day) are utilized to measure the length of 
observation on rating announcement dummies. 
For Equation (3-3), designed to test Hypothesis 3-1b, coefficients on event-dummies 
𝑑𝐸𝑖,𝑡, 𝛽3−3,1s are significantly negative whatever the observing time-windows. This 
supports Hypothesis 3-1b by showing that compared with normal days, margin-event 
days see negative price returns (reflected by a significant price fall).   
When considering the absolute values of those negative coefficients among the three 
windows, I find a negative correlation between absolute values and lengths of time 
windows (0.38 for the 1-day window, 0.21 for the 3-day and the 5-day window). This 
can be understood as evidence of recovery-effects of credit rating announcements: 
after a negative announcement is released to the market by CRAs, investors 
immediately respond to it by shorting the security at once, then later when the market 
calms down, the prices take a few days to return to a relatively rational level.  
For Equation (3-4) (Hypothesis 3-2b), the coefficients on interaction terms 𝑑𝑃𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑑𝐸𝑖,𝑡, 
𝛿s are significantly positive whatever the observing time-windows are. This supports 
the statement of Hypothesis 3-2b by showing a smaller price decrease following 
negative rating announcements after the financial crisis compared to the pre-crisis 
period.  
3.5.2 Robustness tests 
Six robustness tests are conducted to enhance the creditworthiness of my empirical 
results. The first two tests are designed for the issuance dataset section and the 
remaining four are designed for the secondary market dataset. 
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3.5.2.1 Issuance dataset section robustness tests 
There are two robustness tests for the primary market data. Robustness test 1 
excludes AAA-tranches and Robustness test 2 transforms the number-format rating 
indicator (NR) into 20 letter-format rating indicators (LR).  
Robustness test 1:  Test of non-AAA tranches  
In the structured finance market, the regulatory policies for AAA-rated ABSs are 
different from those for non AAA-rated ones (Griffin et al. 2011). In addition, AAA-
rated ABS comprise more than 80% of all ABS (shown in Table 3-6). Therefore, it may 
be that the significant estimated coefficients in Equations (3-1) and (3-2) are derived 
mainly from different situations between AAA tranches and non-AAA ones but not 
from all tranche variations. To eliminate the effects of AAA tranches, I exclude them 
from the datasets and re-run Equations (3-1) and (3-2) to demonstrate results in non-
AAA securities.   
Table 3-3 Regression result of Equations (3-3) and (3-4) 
This table shows the regression results of Equation (3-3) and Equation (3-4). The dependent variable is 
daily price return (price at exact day minus price at one day before). Regressions are estimated using 
fixed-effect panel method. dE is equal to 1 if the observation happens in certain days (1, 3 or 5) after a 
negative rating event happens and 0 otherwise. dP is equal to 1 if the observation happens after Sep 
15th 2007 and 0 otherwise. ***the coefficient is significant at 1% level;**the coefficient is significant at 
5% level; *the coefficient is significant at 10% level. The figures in the bracket show the corresponding 
t-statistic. 
 
  Time windows 
  1 day 3 days 5 days 
Variables Coefficient 
Descriptor 
Eq (3) Eq (4) Eq (3) Eq (4) Eq (3) Eq (4) 






























 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rating-level 
Control 
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Index Return 
Control 
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
T  3914 3914 3914 3914 3914 3914 
N  72 72 72 72 72 72 




Table 3-4 Volume proportion of AAA and non-AAA tranches 
 MBS dataset Non-MBS dataset 
Proportion of AAA tranches 
volume 
82.45% 80.72% 




To save space, I have put the updated regression results in the Appendix (Appendix 
3-4). I find that for both the MBS sample and non-MBS sample, signs of all key 
variables in robustness test results are consistent with those in my original tests. The 
result shows that the (non-) ABS market reaction to credit ratings is significant even 
when I exclude top-rated tranches.  
Robustness test 2: Substituting dummy variables for number-format variables to 
indicate credit rating notches 
One potential shortcoming of Equations (3-1) and (3-2) is the transformation of letter-
format ratings to number-format ratings. Such linear transformation is based on the 
assumption that the rating notch implication is linearly distributed according to the 
CRAs’ opinion (for example, the transformation assumes that the difference in the 
CRAs’ rating opinion difference between AAA and AA is similar to that difference 
between AA and A, A and BBB etc.). This assumption may not be the case in the 
market. Moreover, such linear transformation uses one variable representing all of the 
21 rating notches and ignores how each of these notches influences the issuance 
spread. Therefore, in the robustness test 2, I use 20 dummy variables (LR in Table 3), 
substituting the number-format rating variable (NR) and setting top rating AAA as the 
benchmark. The details of the transformation from number-format ratings to letter-
format ratings (dummies) are shown in Table 3-3 and the new regression equations 
are shown in Equations (3-6) and (3-7). 
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ln(𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖) = 𝛼3−6,𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽3−6,𝑚𝐿𝑅𝑚,𝑖
20
𝑚=1
+ 𝛽3−6,21𝑁𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽3−6,(𝑝+20)𝐶𝑝𝑖 +
𝑃
𝑝=1
𝑖           (3
− 6)            
ln(𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖) = 𝛼3−7,𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽3−7,𝑚𝐿𝑅𝑚,𝑖
20
𝑚=1








+ ∑ 𝛽3−7,(𝑝+63)𝐶𝑝𝑖 +
𝑃
𝑝=1
𝑖                    (3 − 7) 
Here is the interpretation of 𝛽3−6,1 (𝛽3−7,1) to 𝛽3−6,20 ( 𝛽3−7,20 ) in Equations (3-6) and 
(3-7). Each 𝛽 (for example, 𝛽3−6,1 or  𝛽3−7,1) refers to the spread difference of the 
corresponding rating notch (for example, AA) compared to AAA rating, the benchmark 
notch after controlling the tranche characteristics. The interpretation of 𝛽3−7,24  to 
𝛽3−7,43  and 𝛽3−7,44  to 𝛽3−7,63  in Equation (3-7) is similar to the previous group of 
coefficients: they refer to the change of the spread difference of the corresponding 
rating notch (for example, AA) compared to the AAA rating, the benchmark notch 
before and during/after the financial crisis when controlling for the tranche 
characteristics.  
I plot the coefficients of Equation (3-6) regarding different rating notches in Figure 3-
2 and Figure 3-3 for non-MBS and MBS samples respectively (The coefficients for 
some rating notches are missing due to no securities being rated to those notches in 
the dataset).  
Most of the coefficients on a series of notch dummies (from AA-dummy to C-dummy) 
are positive, which is consistent with positive 𝛽1  in Equation (3-1). Positive LR 
coefficients can be interpreted in the following way: compared with benchmark notch 
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(AAA), other notches are correlated to higher issuance spread (lower prices). They 
collectively indicate a market reaction to issuance ratings provided by CRAs.  
For both MBS and non-MBS lines, a rising trend of dummy coefficient values with 
decreasing rating notches (increasing NR equivalently) is observed in the Figure 3-2 
and Figure 3-3. This means that the lower the rating, the greater the issuance spread 
difference between the corresponding rating and the benchmark (AAA) rating. This is 
consistent with Hypothesis 3-1a, according to which lower ratings are associated with 
higher spread (lower prices). 
Figures 3-4, 3-5, 3-6 and 3-7 show coefficients of Equation (3-7). In Figure 3-4 and 
Figure 3-5, I display details of those coefficients on the interaction terms between 
during-crisis dummy and dummies indicating different rating notches. In Figure 3-6 
and Figure 3-7, I show the coefficients on the interaction terms between post-crisis 
dummy and dummies indicating different rating notches.  
Most of the coefficients on the interaction terms between rating-dummies and post 
(during)-crisis dummy are negative, which is consistent with negative 𝛽3−6 (𝛽3−5) in 
Equation (3-2). They can be interpreted as average differences of 𝛽3−1 after (during) 
the financial crisis compared with before the crisis. Thus, negative coefficients indicate 
that the size of 𝛽3−1 decreases after (during) the crisis, a possible reflection of the 
decreased market reaction to CRAs.  
It can also be observed in the figures that the sizes of negative coefficients (in Figures 
3-4 to 3-7) are more significant in the limit area between investment and non-
investment grades than in other areas, particularly Baa1 to Ba3 grades. Since 
investors are sensitive to ratings near the boundary between investment and non-
investment grades, large negative coefficients indicate that the market reaction to 
credit ratings decreases significantly in this sensitive area. 
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Figure 3-2 Regression coefficients in Equation 3-6 (Non-MBS) 
This figure demonstrates the regression coefficients on letter-format rating indicator (LRs) dummies in 
Equation (3-6) for the non-MBS dataset. The horizontal axis shows the LR in Equation (3-6) and the 
vertical axis shows the corresponding regression coefficients on the LR. Lines with different format 
represent the results of different combinations of control variables. The coefficients for some rating 
notches are missing due to no securities being rated to those notches in the dataset 
 
 
Figure 3-3 Regression coefficients in Equation 3-6 (MBS) 
This figure demonstrates the regression coefficients on letter-format rating indicator (LRs) dummies in 
Equation (3-6) for the MBS dataset. The horizontal axis shows the LR in Equation (3-6) and the vertical 
axis shows the corresponding regression coefficients on the LR. Lines with different format represent the 
results of different combinations of control variables. The coefficients for some rating notches are missing 
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Figure 3-4 Regression coefficients (during crisis) in Equation 3-7 (Non-MBS) 
This figure demonstrates the regression coefficients on interaction terms between letter-format rating 
indicator (LR) dummies and during-crisis dummy in Equation (3-7) for the non-MBS dataset. The 
horizontal axis shows the LR in Equation (3-7) and the vertical axis shows the corresponding regression 
coefficients on the interaction terms between the LR and post-crisis dummy. Lines with different format 
represent the results of different combinations of control variables. The coefficients for some rating 
notches are missing due to no securities being rated to those notches in the dataset. 
 
Figure 3-5 Regression coefficients (during crisis) in Equation 3-7 (MBS) 
This figure demonstrates the regression coefficients on interaction terms between letter-format rating 
indicator (LR) dummies and during-crisis dummy in Equation (3-7) for the MBS dataset. The horizontal 
axis shows the LR in Equation (3-7) and the vertical axis shows the corresponding regression coefficients 
on the interaction terms between the LR and post-crisis dummy. Lines with different format represent the 
results of different combinations of control variables. The coefficients for some rating notches are missing 

























Figure 3-6 Regression coefficients (post crisis) in Equation 3-7 (Non-MBS) 
This figure demonstrates the regression coefficients on interaction terms between letter-format rating 
indicator (LR) dummies and post-crisis dummy in Equation (3-7) for the non-MBS dataset. The horizontal 
axis shows the LR in Equation (3-7) and the vertical axis shows the corresponding regression coefficients 
on the interaction terms between the LR and post-crisis dummy. Lines with different format represent the 
results of different combinations of control variables. The coefficients for some rating notches are missing 
due to no securities being rated to those notches in the dataset. 
 
 
Figure 3-7 Regression coefficients (post crisis) in Equation 3-7 (MBS) 
This figure demonstrates the regression coefficients on interaction terms between letter-format rating 
indicator (LR) dummies and post-crisis dummy in Equation (3-7) for the MBS dataset. The horizontal axis 
shows the LR in Equation (3-7) and the vertical axis shows the corresponding regression coefficients on 
the interaction terms between the LR and post-crisis dummy. Lines with different format represent the 
results of different combinations of control variables. The coefficients for some rating notches are missing 
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3.5.2.2 Transaction dataset section robustness tests 
For the second part of my robustness check, four tests are conducted: re-classifying 
pre-crisis and post-crisis observations, replacing 𝑑𝐸𝑖,𝑡 by 𝐶𝐷𝑖,𝑡, excluding ‘anticipated’ 
actual downgrades and ruling out market factors. 
Robustness test 3: Boundaries between pre-crisis and post-crisis periods 
One of the key variables in Equation (3-4) is 𝑑𝑃𝑖,𝑡which indicates whether the credit 
rating announcements were released before or after the financial crisis. Obviously, 
the definition of when the 2007/2008 global financial crisis starts determines the 
setting of 𝑑𝑃𝑖,𝑡. In the baseline model I set September 2007 as the assumed boundary. 
This is consistent with the fact that the sub-prime crisis is recognized as having started 
in the summer of 2007 (Orlowski, 2008) as well as the fact that the Federal Reserve 
started to take action in response to the crisis in September 2007 (Cecchetti, 2009). 
However, there are some stages for the financial crisis to emerge, develop and 
deteriorate and the key dates of the stages range from 2007 to 2010 (Elliott, 2011). 
Therefore, I re-set 𝑑𝑃𝑖,𝑡 by changing the boundary to September 2008 and other later 
time points to check whether the results are significantly reversed. 
For Equation (3-4), I re-define 𝑑𝑃𝑖,𝑡 by resetting the boundaries of pre-and post-crisis 
periods. The pre-set boundary is September 2007 while other boundaries are set once 
every two months ranging from September 2008 (Lehman Brothers’ fall) to the end of 
2009. To save space, I have put the regression details for different boundary settings 
in the Appendix (Appendix 3-5). The coefficient of interest, 𝛿, remains significant if the 
boundary is set between September 2008 and March 2009. Beyond the ‘significant 
area’ (from May 2009 to November 2009), 𝛿 becomes insignificant. In sum, it shows 
that my result is robust if I view any point in the period 2007.09-2009.03 as the 
boundary between pre-and post-crisis periods. This finding accords with common 
sense that the global financial crisis occurs before March 2009. 
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Robustness test 4: Substituting ‘rating-change degree’ for ‘event dummy’ to indicate 
effects of rating announcements     
In Equations (3-3) and (3-4), I use  𝑑𝐸𝑖,𝑡 , a dummy variable to discriminate 
observations around the rating announcements from normal observations without the 
effects of rating announcements. However, such a setting only considers the 
occurrence of those announcements but does not imply the notch degrees involved 
in the announcements. In other words, the event-dummy indication assumes equal 
effects of different downgrade degrees and even ‘possible downgrade’, a warning 
signal, but with no actual downgrade. To address potential bias caused by the event-
dummy setting, I re-run Equations (3-3) and (3-4), replacing 𝑑𝐸𝑖,𝑡 with 𝐶𝐷𝑖,𝑡 (short for 
‘Change Degree’) indicating by how many notches they were downgraded by the 
rating announcements. The updated equations are shown in (3-8) and (9): 
 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼3−8,𝑖 + 𝛽3−8,1 × 𝐶𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡                                (3 − 8)      
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼3−9,𝑖 + 𝛽3−9,1 × 𝐶𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3−9,2 × 𝑑𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿3−9 × (𝑑𝑃𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐶𝐷𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡      (3
− 9) 
𝛽3−8,1 and 𝛽3−9,1both Equations (3-8) and (3-9) indicate how much the average price 
return change is, following one notch of rating downgrade from Moody’s. Further, 𝛿3−9 
in Equation (3-9) indicates the average change of the degree of 𝛽3−9,1  after the 
financial crisis compared with the pre-crisis period. 
The cost of replacing 𝑑𝐸𝑖,𝑡  with 𝐶𝐷𝑖,𝑡  is that the latter can only identify ‘actual 
downgrades’ but not ‘possible downgrades’ because with a ‘possible downgrade 
announcement’, CRAs do not in fact downgrade the security thus the degree of 𝐶𝐷𝑖,𝑡  is 
0 (but  𝑑𝐸𝑖,𝑡 for the same announcement is 1 but not 0). Therefore, with 𝐶𝐷𝑖,𝑡  the 




Replacing 𝑑𝐸𝑖,𝑡 by 𝐶𝐷𝑖,𝑡, I run Equations (3-8) and (3-9). To save space the regression 
tables are put in the Appendix (Appendix 3-6). In Equation (3-8), the estimated 
coefficients on 𝐶𝐷𝑖,𝑡 (𝛽3−8,1) are negative except for the shortest window (1 day). They 
imply that the more notches CRAs downgrade, the larger is the size of the falloff in 
that ABS’s price. It indicates that when making decisions on buying or selling an ABS, 
investors consider not only whether it is downgraded but also by how many notches 
it is downgraded. This finding enhances the conclusion regarding Hypothesis 3-2a. In 
Equation (3-9), estimated coefficients on interaction terms (𝛿3−9) are positive, which 
is equivalent to a lower absolute value of post-crisis 𝛽3−9,1. It shows that the degree 
of  𝐶𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ’s effects on price returns is weaker after the crisis, consistent with the 
statement of Hypothesis 3-2b. However, the negative signs are not consistently 
significant in Equation (3-9), which contradicts the results of Equation (3-4). The 
reason may be that replacing dE by CD reduces the number of events in the testing 
sample, particularly in the post-crisis sample. 
Robustness test 5: Considering anticipated downgrade announcements  
Creighton et al. (2007) state that an actual downgrade announcement should be 
categorized as ‘anticipated’ if it comes following a possible downgrade announcement. 
If a possible downgrade announcement is released on a certain security, it shows a 
negative signal from CRAs that they may downgrade it at some time in a near future. 
Investors have a different understanding of the security if they receive such signals 
than if there are no downgrade warnings. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that 
when an actual downgrade comes, investors have already prepared for, or 
‘anticipated’ that bad news and may have different strategies from those adopted in 
normal downgrades.  
I regard actual downgrade announcements which are released within a 3-month time 
after a possible downgrade announcement as ‘anticipated’ and others as 
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‘unanticipated’. I then run the Equations (3-10) and (3-11) to enhance Equations (3-3) 
and (3-4) respectively. 
                   𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛼3−10,𝑖 + 𝛽3−10,1 × 𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3−10,2 × 𝑈𝐷𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡                          (3
− 10) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼3−11,𝑖 + 𝛽3−11,1 × 𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3−11,2 × 𝑈𝐷𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3−11,3 × 𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿3−11,1
× (𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛿3−11,2 × (𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑈𝐷𝐸𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡    (3 − 11) 
𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖,𝑡 (anticipated dE) is a dummy equal to 1 if at the day t, the security i is within the 
pre-defined time windows (1 day, 3 days or 5 days) after an anticipated negative rating 
event occurs and 0 otherwise. 𝑈𝐷𝐸𝑖,𝑡 (unanticipated dE) is a dummy equal to 1 if on 
the day t, the security i is within the pre-defined time windows (1 day, 3 days or 5 days) 
after an unanticipated negative rating event occurs and 0 otherwise.  
Results for the re-run regressions considering anticipated downgrades are shown in 
the Appendix (Appendix 3-7). Coefficients on UDE ( 𝛽3−10,2 and 𝛽3−11,2 ) are 
significantly negative and those on the interaction terms between dP and UDE (𝛿3−11,2) 
are significantly positive. This is consistent with the result of Equations (3-3) and (3-
4). However, I find insignificant estimators on ADE (𝛽3−10,1and 𝛽3−11,1) as well as 
corresponding interaction term ( 𝛿3−11,1) , showing that if a negative rating 
announcement is anticipated, the impact of this announcement on the market is not 
significant. This finding shows that the results obtained in the main tests are only valid 
if the rating downgrades are unanticipated. This is consistent with the results drawn 
by Creighton et al.’s (2007) who argue that the impact of anticipated rating revisions 
is normally significantly lower than that of unanticipated ones. 
Robustness test 6: Eliminating the effects of the market 
The dependent variable 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is the absolute price returns without consideration 
of market effects. However, the price variations of ABS are a reaction of the 
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combination of market variation and non-market variation (for example, the rating 
factor). Therefore, a significant price return reaction to negative announcements may 
be attributed to the market factor but not the announcements themselves.  
To eliminate the market effects, I replace the dependent variable with three other 
indices which take market factor into account. Index 2 and Index 3 are introduced by 
Brooks et al (2004). 
Index 1: Pure daily return excluding market return: (𝑝𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1) – (𝑀𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1)  (𝑀𝑡 
is the Barclays ABS market index on day t).  
Index 2: Abnormal return. This is the residuals from the regression of price returns 
with market returns and indicates how the price at day t deviates from its expected 
price estimated by market index. The Abnormal Return, 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is created according the 
following steps: 
o For each rating event (assuming happening at day 0), run a regression of 
security return 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖 on market return 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑚 for the previous 100-
day observations before that event: 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 × 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑚,𝑡 +   (t from -100 to 0) 
o Using the estimated 𝛽 (if 𝛽 is not significant in the regression, that 
observation is deleted) , estimated 𝛼, and the real market return 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑚,𝑡  to calculate estimated return before and after the event, 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡: 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡̂ = ?̂? + ?̂? × 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑚,𝑡  (t from -100 to +5) 
o Calculate ‘AR’ as the difference between the real security’s return and 
the estimated one: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡̂ , (t from -100 to +5) 
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Index 3: Standardized abnormal return: a revised version of AR by standardizing it. 
𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is calculated as following: 
o For each rating event, collect the estimated residual terms (equal to AR): 
?̂? = 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 − ?̂? − ?̂? × 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑚,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡̂  
o Calculate the variance of residual terms 𝜎2( ̂) =
1
103
× ∑ ( ?̂?
2)+5𝑡=−100  




Updated regression results are shown in the Appendix (Appendix 3-8). I find similar 
results with the original regressions of Equations (3-3) and (3-4). 𝛽3−12,1and 𝛽3−13,1is 
significantly negative and 𝛿3−13 is significantly positive, no matter which index and 
which time window I use. A recovery effect can also be observed for each index 
(longer time windows, smaller size of 𝛽3−13,1). 
In sum, my result for the secondary market dataset passes all four robustness tests 
despite some minor variations. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This paper is an empirical study on the ABS market reaction to credit ratings. Two 
hypotheses are proposed. One posits the existence of ABS market reaction to the 
opinions provided by CRAs and the other proposes that such reaction has weakened 
since the global financial crisis. For each hypothesis, there are two sub-hypotheses, 
focusing separately on data from the primary and secondary markets. Assumptions 
about the rating implication stability on the primary market and the liquidity stability of 
the secondary market are tested and supported. I collect unique samples for both 
markets, using the market information from Bloomberg and the Thomson Database 
as well as the rating information from Moody’s official website. The approach to 
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studying primary (secondary) market data is cross-sectional (panel) regression 
analysis.  
By the data analyses, I find evidence to support both hypotheses. The empirical 
results are compatible to the existence of market reactions to credit ratings 
(Hypothesis 3-1) by showing that initial ratings impact ABS issuance spread (prices) 
and that negative rating announcements from CRAs have an immediate shock on 
ABS transaction prices. In addition, the empirical results demonstrate a weaker 
reaction in the post-crisis period through a weaker relationship between ABS issuance 
spread (transaction prices) and the initial ratings (rating announcements) from CRAs 
(Hypothesis 3-2). Moreover, other related results are observed, such as the 
relationship between intra-industry competition of CRAs and investors’ confidence on 
ratings and investors’ ‘recovery-effects’ of their reactions to negative rating 
announcements.  
Several robustness tests are conducted to ensure the consistency of the above 
empirical results. Those checks include the following areas: excluding top-rated 
tranches, using 20 dummies to indicate rating notches, changing definitions on when 
the financial crisis started, studying the changes in degrees of ratings announced by 
CRAs, keeping only unanticipated rating events and eliminating the market factors 
from price returns. 
I briefly discuss the possible theoretical reasons behind those observed empirical 
results. The reaction of ABS investors to ratings provided by CRAs can be attributed 
to the complexity of structured finance products, rating-based regulations and the 
CRAs’ long-term reputations. The trend of weaker reaction can be explained by the 
chaos of the structured finance market due to the financial crisis, regulators’ efforts to 
remove credit ratings from regulatory activities (Dodd-Frank Act) and the damage 
done to the reputation of CRAs due to their poor performances in the crisis. However, 
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this paper does not offer a detailed discussion on these theoretical reasons and leaves 
this gap for further research.  
My research in this chapter cannot fully tease out all the changed factors before and 
after the financial crisis and exclude them from the analysis of credit rating reforms. 
Specifically, the same rating notch may have implied different risks since the crisis 
and the ABS secondary market liquidity may have been seriously fallen since the crisis. 
Although I did some tests to respond these two criticism, the evidence is not strong 
enough to tackle these two questions. 
Last but not least, the data analysis results should be interpreted in the way of 
‘association’ between ratings and ABS prices rather than ‘causal relationship’ from 
ratings to ABS prices (See Hypothesis 3-1). In other words, although the results 
cannot reject the statement that ABS prices are affected by credit ratings, it cannot be 
fully proved by my analysis. In addition, the methods used in this chapter only 
investigate whether the rating-price link has diminished after the crisis but cannot 





4 Chapter IV: Is solicitation status related to rating 
conservatism and rating quality? 
“This salient conflict of interest permeates all levels of employment, from entry-level 
analyst to the chairman and chief executive officer of Moody's corporation.” 
-- William Harrington, former executive of Moody’s, 2011 
4.1 Introduction 
The conflict of interests is a widely-discussed topic in the field of credit ratings. From 
an international perspective, the rating industry presents a feature of oligopoly (by ‘Big 
Three’ agencies: Moody’s, S&P and Fitch) and hence it is commonly criticized, as the 
Big Three CRAs would have the motivation to make extra profits by taking advantage 
of their oligopolistic position. 
The center of the topic of conflict of interests is the rating service fee.  The rating fee 
payment model and its relation to rating performances are regarded among the key 
measures of conflict of interest (Fulghieri et al., 2013; Kashyap and Kovrijnykh, 2015). 
All the Big Three CRAs follow the ‘issuer-paid’ model of rating service collection. In 
this model, firms who would like to issue debt/equity should pay all the service fees to 
credit rating agencies to request agencies to issue ratings for them. Some criticism is 
raised about whether such a payment model may allow the CRAs who act as 
oligopolists to ‘sell’ their rating services to issuers. In other words, in the framework of 
the issuer-paid model, credit rating agencies have the incentives to issue over-
optimistic ratings for those firms who purchase their rating services. Previous literature 
has two points of penetrations for the study of conflict of interests in terms of rating 
payment model: special cases of CRAs with an ‘investor-paid’ model and the regime 
of the ratings by ‘issuer-paid’ CRAs. 
Some innovative rating agencies, apart from the Big Three, follow the ‘investor-paid’ 
model where the investors who are interested in the rated firms’ performances 
subscribe to the rating reports issued by the rating agencies. Among the 9 NRSRO 
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CRAs, one agency called Egan-Jones Rating Company applies the investor-paid 
business model. Some small CRAs also follow this new payment model, such as 
Chengxin Credit Management Co (China), Universal Credit Ratings Group (China) 
and RusRatings (Russia). The reason that investor-paid CRAs are established is 
mainly to ‘defeat’ traditional big CRAs by ‘support(ing) the funding ecosystem which 
has so severely broken down’ and by preventing the serious ‘rating shopping’ before 
the 2008 financial crisis (Sean Egan, founder of Egan-Jones Rating Company, 2008).  
In terms of scholars’ views, conflict of interests is examined by investigating the ratings 
given by agencies of both models (Cornaggia and Cornaggia, 2013; Bonsall IV, 2014; 
Xia, 2014).  However, research on the impact of payment model on credit rating 
agencies is restricted by the fact that the comparison has to be made between 
different rating agencies so the results of the comparison may be driven by the 
unobservable characteristics gap between the agencies. In this paper, I study the topic 
of conflict of interests from another perspective: the unsolicited rating regime. This 
regime is applied by the Big Three agencies as an essential supplemental service: 
different from the majority of cases where the agency collects fees from rated firms, 
the agency selects for rating some of the firms who neither request the agency for 
rating services nor pay any fees to it. Whether CRAs follow the double standard in 
issuing ratings for firms who pay them or not is viewed as an indicator of conflict of 
interest. Literature has identified that generally credit rating agencies issue more 
conservative ratings for unsolicited rating recipients who do not request or pay for the 
rating services (Byoun and Shin, 2002; Poon, 2003; Poon et al., 2009; Bannier et al., 
2009). However, this finding does not necessarily prove that there exists a conflict of 
interest unless evidence is provided to show that the more conservative ratings issued 
for unsolicited rating recipients are biased. 
To answer the question about whether the conservatism for unsolicited ratings is 
biased, scholars raise two contrary hypotheses (Byoun et al., 2014): the strategic 
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behavior hypothesis and the self-selection hypothesis. The former hypothesis states 
that the more conservative unsolicited ratings are biased and reflect a strategic 
behavior of rating agencies who offer over-optimistic ratings for those firms paying 
them in order to either compensate the firms who buy their services or blackmail the 
firms who do not pay. The contrasting hypothesis, self-selection hypothesis, states 
that it is the firms who select not to purchase rating services from rating agencies 
because of their concerns about weak firm characteristics which have not been 
observed by the market, but may be made public to the market once the firms opt to 
be rated. Rating agencies capture this self-selection incentive of the firms and rate 
them without being paid in order to provide transparency to market participants. To 
reflect the conservatism towards the weak characteristics of unsolicited rating 
recipients, rating agencies generally issue relatively lower ratings for those firms than 
for normal (solicited) rated firms.  
In this paper, I focus on the Moody’s rating data and provide empirical evidence to 
enhance the hypothesis of self-selection by showing two facts: 1) the rating levels by 
Moody’s issued to firms who do not request solicited rating services are more 
conservative than those issued to firms who request the solicited rating services; 2) 
the rating quality of both types of ratings do not have significant difference. The first 
finding provides a necessary condition for the self-selection hypothesis and 
demonstrates that rating agencies observe firms’ self-selection incentives and rate 
them lower. The second finding provides a sufficient condition for the hypothesis and 
shows that those lower unsolicited ratings are not biased but have the same rating 
quality of solicited ones, reflected by same default risk predictability and same rating 
action timeliness.  
The research in this paper contributes to the literature from the following perspectives. 
1) I supplement the comparison between Moody’s solicited and unsolicited ratings, by 
not only taking rating levels into consideration but also testing the ex-post 
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measurement of rating quality of the two types of ratings. The rating level is only an 
ex-ante forecast of firms’ risk of default and cannot reach the self-selection hypothesis 
without the finding of no significant gaps of ex-post measures of the quality between 
unsolicited and solicited ratings.  In this paper, I apply the ex-post measure to assess 
how Moody’s ratings ‘predict’ the reality and how timely the rating actions are to reflect 
the ‘rating quality’. 
2) For the test of rating level gaps between solicited and unsolicited ratings, I 
supplement the comparison of two types of ratings issued by Moody’s by introducing 
rating gaps between Moody’s and the other two big CRAs (S&P and Fitch). To 
examine the impact of solicitation status on rating levels, the literature focuses on the 
ratings issued by a single rating agency, splits those ratings based on the solicitation 
status and compares those two groups of ratings (Byoun and Shin, 2002; Poon, 2003; 
Poon and Firth, 2005; Bannier et al., 2008; Poon et al., 2009; Bannier et al, 2009; 
Byoun et al., 2014). To enhance these analyses, I introduce a ‘difference-in-difference’ 
method to imply solicitation’s impact: the first layer of difference which is between 
Moody’s and S&P/Fitch rating levels while the second layer captures whether 
Moody’s-S&P/Fitch rating gaps vary with different solicitation statues. The introduction 
of D-i-D analysis extends the scope of investigation of ‘absolute rating level’ (the exact 
rating level) gaps by studying the ‘relative rating level’ (rating gaps between Moody’s 
and the other two agencies) gaps. Both the single-agency test and multi-agency test 
show persistent results that unsolicited ratings of Moody’s are lower than solicited 
ones.  
3) I amend the scope of ex-post measures of rating quality, using Distance to Default 
(DTD) and rating timeliness.  
DTD is applied to indicate the predictability of Moody’s ratings in terms of the actual 
variation of default risk following ratings in different levels. I show evidence of an 
absence of the impact of solicitation status on DTD predictability (essential to prove 
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the self-selection hypothesis) by two findings, as follows. 1) Ratings at same levels 
are followed by statistically similar DTD performances regardless of the solicitation 
status of the rated firms; 2) I use solicited ratings and fundamental information of 
corresponding firms to model the actual DTD, obtain coefficients on rating levels (with 
other fundamental variables), apply those coefficients to actual unsolicited rating 
levels and fundamentals to calculate the predicted DTD, and find no significant gap 
between the predicted and observed DTDs of unsolicited ratings.  
The information on the lead-lag relationship between rating agencies’ actions is 
collected and analyzed to reflect timeliness of Moody’s unsolicited/solicited ratings, 
which is another measure of the rating quality (Berwart et al., 2016). Moody’s rating 
actions which occur no more than 90 days before (after) S&P/Fitch take actions are 
defined as ‘lead’ (‘lag’). I measure the speed of rating actions by considering the 
ratio/likelihood of ‘lead’ or ‘lag’ actions of Moody’s out of all observed actions. By 
comparing unsolicited and solicited ratings, I find no significantly different rating 
timeliness, except some very weak evidence of a lower rating quality of unsolicited 
ratings.  
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 4.2, I describe the background of 
unsolicited rating regime of Moody’s, demonstrate the motivation of the study on 
unsolicited ratings and raise the self-selection hypothesis of conservative unsolicited 
and present the related literature. Section 4.3 is a theoretical model to provide a 
background of empirical tests and a presentation of the main hypotheses. Section 4.4 
describes the data source, data matching scheme, and the setting of some essential 
variables. In Section 4.5, a series of empirical analysis methods are applied to test 
the self-selection hypotheses and Section 4.6 concludes this paper. 
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4.2   Background and literature review  
4.2.1 Background 
Historically, Moody’s has issued unsolicited ratings since its establishment in 1909. 
However, it started publicly announcing the identification of unsolicited firms in 1999. 
Despite the frequent complaints and investigations (Jefferson County case, 1983; US 
Justice Department case, 1996; Hannover Re case, 2004), Moody’s claims that the 
activity of issuing unsolicited ratings is intended ‘to provide greater transparency to 
market participants’ and the rating agency ‘reserves the right’ to issue them ‘not at the 
request of the rated equity and /or its agents’ (Moody’s, 2018).  
Different from traditional solicited ratings, unsolicited ones have two unique features: 
fee payment and information access. Moody’s does not collect the list fee from rated 
firms for the issuance of unsolicited ratings and does not have access to internal 
information of rated firms by negotiation.  
Moody’s does not publicly list any factors related to profits (the center of the criticism 
of conflict of interest) as criteria to select firms for whom they issue unsolicited ratings. 
The criteria they list are: benefits to market participants, issuers’ size, the issuance 
time of the issuers and relevance to other firms Moody’s rates.  
In terms of the information access, in Moody’s documents (Moody’s, 2018) it says 
‘(the) publication of an unsolicited credit rating will be conditioned, among other factors, 
on its determination that sufficient information is available to allow MIS14 to assign and 
maintain the credit rating’. On the other hand, it also states that ‘a rated entity does 
not have the ability to decline publication of an unsolicited credit rating’, which implies 
that there is no negotiation between the rated firm and Moody’s. Due to the absence 
of negotiation, Moody’s should not have access to internal information of the rated 
firms guaranteed by formal commercial contracts.  
                                                          
14 MIS: short for ‘Moody’s Investors Service’ 
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Although Moody’s claims that it ‘does not distinguish between solicited and unsolicited 
credit ratings with respect to its credit rating methodologies’ to show its fairness and 
absence of bias to the market, the bias of unsolicited ratings related to the fee payment 
and the lack of internal information are discussed and concerned by both regulators 
and scholars.  
Regulators were skeptical about the issuance of unsolicited ratings due to the 
payment, which may incur the conflict of interests, and to the lack of information 
access. However, in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, regulators have 
tended to change their attitudes towards unsolicited ratings and become friendlier. In 
a policy document issued by SEC regarding credit rating agencies (SEC, 2009), the 
Commission states that it ‘preliminarily believes’ CRAs registered as NRSROs 
(including Moody’s) to have sufficient ability to collect non-public information even in 
the activity of unsolicited rating issuance. Moreover, the Commission regards the 
mechanism of unsolicited rating issuance as a suggestive way of increasing the 
competition and pushing rating agencies to be more proficient (SEC, 2009). 
There are two streams of academic research which investigate the gap between 
solicited and unsolicited ratings. One stream focuses on the comparison of levels of 
unsolicited and solicited ratings to study whether solicited ratings are higher than for 
unsolicited ones. The majority of literature finds evidence to show that it is the solicited 
ratings which are more likely to be higher (Byoun and Shin, 2002; Poon, 2003; Poon 
et al., 2009). However, previous literature only compares the rating levels for different 
rated firms offered by one rating agency (either S&P or Fitch) to prove that unsolicited 
ratings are associated with a lower rating level. In this paper, I introduce the split of 
ratings offered for a firm, but by different rating agencies to enhance my conclusions.  
Another stream of research concerns the reason for lower unsolicited ratings by 
exploring the ex-post measures of performances of firms who receive both types of 
ratings. Two contrary hypotheses are discussed by the literature (Byoun et al., 2014): 
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 Strategy hypothesis 
 Self-selection hypothesis 
For the strategy hypothesis, the lower unsolicited ratings are viewed as biased 
because a significant gap is observed between the ex-post performance measures of 
the recipients of unsolicited and solicited ratings, given the same rating levels. For 
example, if the ex-post performances of unsolicited rating recipients are better than 
their peers given the same level of ex-ante ratings, this indicates that rating agencies 
‘under-estimate’ the quality of unsolicited rating recipients by offering unreasonably 
lower ratings to them which are not corroborated by ex-post performances. In other 
words, it is the strategy of rating agencies to issue lower unsolicited ratings 
systemically. The incentives of rating agencies to offer biased unsolicited ratings are 
summarized in different aspects: 1) ‘blackmail’ effect, which is used by rating agencies 
to ‘blackmail’ other firms to purchase rating services from them to avoid being offered 
unsolicited ratings (Fulghieri, 2013); 2) upward bias due to being paid, which means 
that rating agencies cater to their customers by inflating their ratings (Poon, 2003; 
Poon and Firth, 2005) and; 3) information access: rating agencies do not have access 
to internal information of rated firms so they prefer offering more conservative ratings 
to them to be safe (Bannier et al., 2009).  
The literature has widely discussed the strategy hypothesis in the context of conflicts 
of interests. The existence of a strategic selection of unsolicited ratings by CRAs is a 
negative signal of their reputation because it implies that the CRAs issue unfair ratings 
to those firms who do not pay them. However, some scholars (Bannier et al., 2008) 
discuss the alternative hypothesis, self-selection, which is investigated in this paper.  
For the self-selection hypothesis, although unsolicited ratings are lower than solicited 
ones, they are not regarded as biased. Due to the information asymmetry between 
firms and investors, firms always know more information about themselves than 
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investors. However, firms’ selection of whether or not to solicit the rating services can 
be observed as a way to infer the actual condition of firms which is not released to the 
investors. Weak firms select not to solicit the rating services because they know that 
the rating information released by rating agencies would not be favorable in terms of 
their aim to attract investors. The rating agencies capture the fact that those firms do 
not request their rating services and take it as a negative factor when deciding the 
unsolicited rating levels for the firms. Therefore, rating agencies tend to rate 
unsolicited rating recipients at a lower level than solicited rating recipients.  
If the self-selection hypothesis holds, two phenomena should be observed: 1) rating 
levels for unsolicited cases should be more conservative than for solicited cases, 
which reflects rating agencies’ reaction to the self-selection incentives of firms and 2) 
ratings should provide information to the market even though they are unsolicited (the 
rating quality should be as good as that of solicited ratings).  
4.2.2 Literature review 
4.2.2.1 Rating Bias 
To study the rating bias which is associated with the fee payments, the existing 
literature mainly focuses on two streams of research: the solicitation and its impact on 
rating levels and the rating gaps between investor-paid agencies and issuer-paid 
agencies. In addition, other studies discuss the rating split provided by different rating 
agencies to imply rating bias.  
Solicitation 
From the theoretical perspective, some scholars analyze the roles of unsolicited 
ratings in the rating market. Fulghieri et al. (2013) establish a game-theory model to 
study the behavior of rating agencies who issue unsolicited ratings, investors who 
observe past performances of issuers as an evolution of rating quality of rating 
agencies, and the issuers whose incentive is to obtain favored ratings by rating 
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agencies. In the equilibrium, both the strategic behavior hypothesis and the self-
selection hypothesis are supported.  
A series of empirical papers discuss the effect of solicitation on the level of credit 
ratings. The majority of them support the hypothesis of strategic behavior. (Byoun and 
Shin, 2002; Poon, 2003; Poon and Firth, 2005; Poon et al., 2009; Bannier et al, 2009; 
Byoun et al., 2014). 
Opposite to the aforementioned papers, others support the hypothesis of ‘self-
selection’ which implies that the performances of recipients of unsolicited and solicited 
ratings should not be significantly different. Poon (2003) shows weak evidence of that 
by finding that firms receiving unsolicited ratings are more likely to perform poorly than 
those receiving solicited ratings. Bannier et al (2008) use non-US firms and their 
ratings by S&P and find that, except banking sector, for all the other firms, ex-post 
default performances are not related to the status of solicitation.  
Besides these two strands of research, some papers mention the market reaction of 
the rating solicitation. Behr and Guttler (2008) test the stock reactions of the 
announcements of solicitation and conclude that, even though unsolicited ratings are 
based on only the public information, they still impact the stock market to some extents. 
Byoun and Shin (2002) and Han et al. (2013) find similar results for the bond yield 
cases. Klusak et al., 2017 use the disclosure of sovereign rating solicitation status as 
a shock to study its market impact. Payment Model 
Another strand of research investigates the rating bias related to the application of 
issuer-paid and investor-paid models. Kashyap and Kovrijnykh (2015) establish a 
game-theory model. Jiang et al. (2012) study the impact of the S&P’ s introduction of 
issuer-paid model in the1970s on its rating levels and find that ‘the issuer-pay model 
leads to higher ratings’. Their research is extended by Bonsall IV (2014) who finds 
that the implication of issuer-paid models for credit ratings is associated with more 
optimistic ratings whose predictability is also higher. Except for those papers which 
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focus on only big CRAs in different periods, others compare the performances 
between big issuer-paid agencies and small innovative investor-paid agencies 
(Cornaggia and Cornaggia, 2013). Xia (2014) finds that, after EJR (a small investor-
paid CRA) enters the market, the information quality of credit ratings provided by S&P 
has been increased significantly. 
Split ratings and lead-lag relationship among CRAs 
Split ratings and lead-lag relationship are both for the comparison among CRAs. Split 
ratings refer the phenomenon that different CRAs offer different ratings for a firm or 
security. In this chapter I make use of split ratings and examine the gap of ratings 
between Moody’s (the experiment group) and S&P/Fitch (the control group) to show 
the lower ratings of unsolicited ratings. Lead-lag ratings refer to the phenomenon that 
some CRAs take rating actions (downgrades, upgrades, outlook, watch list) 
systematically lower or faster than other CRAs. In this chapter, I take advantage of 
the lead-lag relationship as a measure of rating quality.  
The usage of split ratings and lead-lag analysishas been applied by many scholars. 
Güttler (2011) shows timelier rating announcements and Moody’s is more likely to 
follow S&P. This result is consistent with the work by Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2010-
b) which includes five agencies (Big Three and two local CRAs in Japan) and 
observing different lead-lag relationships for upgrade and downgrade cases. Besides 
rating changes, Bowe and Larik (2014) find evidence from US corporation ratings to 
show specific firm characteristics affect the likelihood of receiving different ratings 
given by different CRAs. They also find that Moody’s is more likely to issue ratings 
with lower levels than S&P.  
4.2.2.2 Rating Quality 
The ex-post measurement of the rating quality is an essential component in my 
analysis. Theoretical papers measure the rating quality in the context of the economic 
128 
 
cycle (Bar-Isaac and Shapiro, 2013) while other papers focus on the measurement of 
the rating quality.  
Three categories of rating quality measures are applied in the empirical papers, 
relative timeliness comparison, the degree of information content, and predictive 
power of default.  
A number of papers view the timeliness (i.e lead-lag relationship among different 
CRAs) as a relative measure of the rating quality (Güttler, 2011; Berwart et al., 2016).  
A rating agency is viewed as ‘better’ if it makes actions prior to its peers. Another type 
of quality measure concerns how much information the ratings provide. To define the 
information, scholars use different indices, such as stock returns (Behr and Guttler, 
2008; Byoun et al., 2014; Bruno et al., 2015) and bond yields (Han, 2013; Bruno et 
al., 2015). Moreover, the power of ratings to forecast firms’ defaults is regarded as an 
alternative measure of rating quality by many researchers. Becker and Milbourn (2011) 
use the default events within a three-year window following credit rating actions to 
measure the rating quality. Baghai and Becker (2018) analyze the default rates of 
firms rated at each of the rating levels to imply the predictability of rating agencies. 
Hilscher and Wilson (2016) update the traditional measurement of the probability of 
default estimation by applying a concept of ‘failure score’, by which a series of 
fundamentals, with or without rating factors are applied to estimate the default events. 
The rating quality is reflected by a comparison between the baseline score which is 
established only by fundamentals and the supplemental score which is established 
not only by fundamentals but adding credit ratings.  
In this paper I apply default risk predictability and rating timeliness as indicators of the 
rating quality. Ratings are issued by CRAs to estimate firms’ default risk, therefore, 
the predictability of default, by its nature, should be considered as an indicator to 
reflect the rating quality. As for the timeliness, it can be intuitively measured by the 
lead-lag relationship between one rating agency and another. The reason that I do 
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not use information contents as an indicator is that one of the essential components 
to measure the information contents is stock returns and some of the firms who 
receive unsolicited ratings by Moody’s are not listed on the secondary market. 
4.3 Theoretical model and hypotheses 
4.3.1 Theoretical model 
In order to illustrate the self-selection hypothesis from a theoretical perspective, I build 
a simplified theoretical model to reflect how rating agencies react to firms’ self-
selection of soliciting rating services and how ratings provide information for the 
market. In the simplified model, the definition of abbreviations is shown as follows. 
SL shows the solicitation status; SL=1 means that the rating is solicited and SL=0 
means that the rating is unsolicited. 
S shows the actual status of the firm. In this model I assume that there are only two 
statuses of firms: Good (G) and Bad (B). 
CA shows the rating given by rating agencies to the firm. I simplify the model by only 
assuming two rating notches, 1 and 0. CA=1 indicates that the rating is high and CA=0 
indicates that the rating is low.  
Furthermore, I assume the given parameters as follows.  
𝜃 = 𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐺) 
𝜏1 = 𝑃(𝑆𝐿 = 1|𝑆 = 𝐺)  
𝜏2 = 𝑃(𝑆𝐿 = 1|𝑆 = 𝐵) 
𝑝1 = 𝑃(𝐶𝐴 = 1|𝑆𝐿 = 1) 
𝑝2 = 𝑃(𝐶𝐴 = 1|𝑆𝐿 = 0) 
P() denotes the probability of the event shown in the bracket; 𝜃 is the actual quality of 
firms, which is not observable to investors or rating agencies but only to firms 
themselves. 𝜏1, 𝜏2 indicate the firms’ decision of whether to solicit the rating services. 
𝑝1 𝑝2 show the rating agencies’ decision of whether to give lower ratings to the rated 
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firm according to the solicitation status. All the five probabilities are always larger than 
zero and smaller than one.  
To justify the decisions of rating agencies who issue lower ratings for unsoliciting firms 
(𝑝1 >𝑝2), firstly, I stand on the position of rating agencies to infer the actual firm quality 
according to the solicitation status (for convenience I assume that only the information 
of solicitation status can be obtained by rating agencies).  
The aim of credit agencies in this model is to infer the actual probability of the firm to 
be good or bad based on the observation of firms’ solicitation. Specifically, rating 
agencies observe the solicitation status (SL) as either G or B. If the observation is 
SL=1, rating agencies have the information of conditional probability of S=G as 







The difference between the conditional probability and unconditional probability with 
no observation of solicitation status is: 
𝑃(S = G|SL = 1) − 𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐺) =
𝜃𝜏1
𝜃𝜏1 + (1 − 𝜃)𝜏2
− 𝜃 =
𝜃(1 − 𝜃)(𝜏1 − 𝜏2)
𝜃𝜏1 + (1 − 𝜃)𝜏2
      (4.2.1) 
 If the observation is SL=0, rating agencies have the information of conditional 







The difference between the conditional probability and unconditional probability with 
no observation of solicitation status is: 
𝑃(S = B|SL = 0) − 𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐵) =
(1 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝜏2)
(1 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝜏2) + 𝜃(1 − 𝜏1)
− (1 − 𝜃)
=
𝜃(1 − 𝜃)(𝜏1 − 𝜏2)
(1 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝜏2) + 𝜃(1 − 𝜏1)
                           (4.2.2) 
Exploring Equations (4.2.1) and (4.2.2), I find that denominators in both algebraic 
fractions are always positive and hence the signs of them depend on those of 
numerators. For numerators, the fraction 𝜃(1 − 𝜃) is always positive. Therefore, the 
signs of both results in Equations (4.2.1) and (4.2.2) depend on the sign of (𝜏1 − 𝜏2). 
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Now I introduce the mathematical expression of self-selection of rated firms: 
𝜏1 > 𝜏2               (4.2.3) 
Equation (4.2.3) describes the selection bias: good firms are more likely to solicit the 
rating services than bad firms.  
Under the condition of (4.2.3), the mathematical results of (4.2.1) and (4.2.2) are 
always positive: 
𝑃(S = G|SL = 1) − 𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐺) > 0        (4.2.4) 
𝑃(S = B|SL = 0) − 𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐵) > 0        (4.2.5). 
Equation (4.2.4) shows that if rating agencies observe that the firm requests solicited 
ratings, the probability of it to be a good firm is larger than when no information of 
solicitation status is obtained. Equation (4.2.5) shows that if rating agencies observe 
that the firm does not request solicited ratings, the probability of it to be a bad firm is 
larger than when no information of solicitation status is obtained. Therefore, it is a 
rational decision for rating agencies to rate higher for solicited rating recipients and 
rate lower for unsolicited rating recipients, which can be expressed as  
𝑝1 > 𝑝2          (4.2.6) 
In terms of the degree of 𝑝1 and 𝑝2, technically speaking, if we assume that the credit 
rating agency has knowledge of the parameters 𝜃 , 𝜏1  and 𝜏2 , the technical 







(The inference of this technical assumption is presented in Appendix 4-1.1).  
Equation (4.2.7) demonstrates the rationality assumption (a technical assumption) of 
the CRA: the CRA is able to adjust the ratio of probabilities of giving high ratings to 
recipients between solicited and unsolicited ratings. It is easy to prove that 
𝑝1
𝑝2
 is always 
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larger than 1 (𝑝1 is always larger than 𝑝2): if I subtract the denominator from the 
numerator,  I get the difference as  
𝜏1[𝜃(1 − 𝜏1) + (1 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝜏2)] − (1 − 𝜏1)[𝜏1𝜃 + 𝜏2(1 − 𝜃)]
= (𝜏1 − 𝜏2)(1 − 𝜃)      (4.2.8) 
Recall that (𝜏1 − 𝜏2) > 0 (the assumption of self-selection and 𝜃 is always less than 1, 
so Equation 4.2.8 is positive, which means that Equation 4.2.7 is larger than 1).  
The next assumption I introduce here is the non-bias assumption of the CRA: the CRA 
does not have different attitudes towards the solicited and unsolicited rating recipients. 
In other words, given the actual condition of the rated firm (S=G or B), the opinion 
given by the CRA is not relevant to the solicitation status. 
𝑃(𝐶𝐴 = 1|𝑆 = 𝐺, 𝑆𝐿 = 1) = 𝑃(𝐶𝐴 = 1|𝑆 = 𝐺, 𝑆𝐿 = 0)       (4.2.9) 
𝑃(𝐶𝐴 = 1|𝑆 = 𝐵, 𝑆𝐿 = 1) = 𝑃(𝐶𝐴 = 1|𝑆 = 𝐵, 𝑆𝐿 = 0)       (4.2.10) 
Under the condition of CRA’s rationality (4.2.7) and fairness (4.2.9 and 4.2.10), I 
measure the information provided by the CRA to the market (the investors) by 
calculating the conditional probability of the firm status given the credit rating agencies’ 
opinion (CA) as well as the solicitation status (SL): 
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐺|𝑆𝐿 = 1, 𝐶𝐴 = 1) =
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐺)𝑃(𝑆𝐿 = 1|𝑆 = 𝐺)𝑃(𝐶𝐴 = 1|𝑆 = 𝐺, 𝑆𝐿 = 1)
𝑃(𝑆𝐿 = 1)𝑃(𝐶𝐴 = 1|𝑆𝐿 = 1)
 
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐺|𝑆𝐿 = 0, 𝐶𝐴 = 1) =
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐺)𝑃(𝑆𝐿 = 0|𝑆 = 𝐺)𝑃(𝐶𝐴 = 1|𝑆 = 𝐺, 𝑆𝐿 = 0)
𝑃(𝑆𝐿 = 0)𝑃(𝐶𝐴 = 1|𝑆𝐿 = 0)
 
(The inference of these two equations is also shown in Appendix 4-1.1) 
Given the rationality assumption (4.2.7) and the non-biased assumption (4.2.9 and 
4.2.10), I get the conclusion that  
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐺|𝑆𝐿 = 1, 𝐶𝐴 = 1) = 𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐺|𝑆𝐿 = 0, 𝐶𝐴 = 1)       (4.2.11) 
Equation 4.2.11 shows that the information given by the CRA’s opinion regarding the 
status of the rated firms is not related to the solicitation status: the conditional 
probability that the firm is ‘Good’ is the same whether SL=1 or 0.  
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I further test whether the CRA’s opinion (CA) is informative by calculating the 
difference between the conditional probability of being good and the unconditional 
probability. I measure the rating quality by examining whether ratings provide extra 
information to investors who do not take solicitation status into consideration (un-
informed investors). Un-informed investors do not realize the factor of solicitation 
status but only observe the rating opinion (CA=1 or 0) given by rating agencies. Their 
aim is also to infer the probability of the firm to be good/bad. 
P(S = G|CA = 1) − 𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐺) =
𝜃(1 − 𝜃)(𝑝1 − 𝑝2)(𝜏1 − 𝜏2)
𝜃𝜏1𝑝1 + 𝜃(1 − 𝜏1)𝑝2 + (1 − 𝜃)𝜏2𝑝1 + (1 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝜏2)𝑝2
 (4.2.12) 
(The inference of this equation is shown in Appendix 4-1.2) 
I find that denominators in both algebraic fractions are always positive and hence the 
signs of these depend on those of numerators. For numerators, the fraction 𝜃(1 − 𝜃) 
is always positive. Therefore, the signs of both results in Equations (4.2.7) and (4.2.8) 
depend on the sign of (𝑝1 − 𝑝2)(𝜏1 − 𝜏2). 
According to the assumption stated in (4.2.3) which reflects the self-selection of firms, 
we know that (𝜏1 − 𝜏2) > 0. Furthermore, according to the rational rating agency 
assumption obtained in (4.2.7), we know that (𝑝1 − 𝑝2) > 0. Therefore, under the 
condition of (4.2.3) and (4.2.6), we get 
𝑃(S = G|CA = 1) − 𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐺) > 0        (4.2.13) 
(4.2.13) states that the signal of positive rating given by rating agencies provides extra 
information for investors by showing a higher probability of the firm to be good than 
where no rating information is provided. In other words, the rating is informative for 
the investors. 
Taking the conclusions drawn in (4.2.11) and (4.2.13) into consideration together, I 
find a theoretical background to state that if the CRA is rational and un-biased, the 
quality of its ratings in terms of the predictability of firms’ status is not related to the 
solicitation status and the ratings are informative to the investors.  
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In summary, I obtain three essential conclusions in this theoretical discussion: 
Conclusion 1: The CRA is reasonable to rate lower for unsolicited rating recipients if 
the self-selection assumption holds (Equation 4.2.6). This conclusion is empirically 
tested in Section 4.5.1. 
Conclusion 2: The predictability of ratings is the same regardless of the solicitation 
status (Equation 4.2.11). 
Conclusion 3: The ratings are informative to the market by giving extra information 
about the rated firms (Equations 4.2.13). 
Conclusions 2 and 3 are tested in Section 4.5.2. In order to have empirically testable 
statements, I use the default risk, measured by DTD (Distant to Default) as an 
indicator of firm status and use rating change timeliness as an indicator of the rating 
information degree. 
4.3.2 Hypotheses 
For empirical tests, I raise two sub-hypotheses as follows. 
Hypothesis 4-1: Rating level hypothesis: the ratings provided by Moody’s are lower if 
they are issued as unsolicited ones; 
Hypothesis 4-2: Rating quality hypothesis: the rating of Moody’s is informative 
regarding the future default risk of the rated firms and the rating quality is not 
significantly different between solicited and unsolicited ratings.  
The rest part of this paper is to empirically test these two hypotheses using historical 
records of Moody’s ratings for sample firms.  
For Hypothesis 4-2, an essential factor is the measure of the rating quality. Rating 
quality has been widely discussed in terms of its empirical measurement, including 
the default risk predictability of ratings (Becker and Milbourn, 2011; Baghai and 
Becker, 2018) and rating change timeliness measures (Bannier et al., 2009; Berwart 
et al., 2016).  
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Default predictability is the key indicator of assessing the rating quality because the 
most important role that a credit rating should play is to inform the rated firm’s risk of 
default to market participants. The absence of gaps of default risk predictability 
between unsolicited and solicited ratings implies that given the same level of ratings, 
the ex-post measures of default risk are not significantly different, regardless of the 
solicitation status. Thus, the lower ex-ante unsolicited ratings are reasonable. Firms 
with weak characteristics opt not to purchase the rating services from Moody’s and 
rating agencies identify those firms with weaker performance estimates to offer 
unsolicited ratings to. Moody’s estimates are accurate, reflected by a weaker ex-post 
firm performance who received unsolicited ratings. 
Besides predictability of default, the speed of ratings is another measure of rating 
quality (Cheng and Neamtiu, 2009) because it indicates the CRAs’ ability to capture 
the variation of rated firms’ fundamentals and mirrors the information contents of the 
rating actions. The absence of gaps of rating action timeliness for solicited and 
unsolicited ratings implies that although unsolicited ratings are lower, the speed of 
Moody’s revising them is not impacted by the solicitation status.  
In summary, the self-selection hypothesis can be empirically tested by examining the 
rating quality gap, which is measured by the ratings’ predictability and the rating action 
speed (timeliness). The absence of a weaker rating quality for unsolicited ratings 
shows evidence for self-selection hypothesis. It indicates that; 1) the lack of internal 
information does not undermine the rating quality of unsolicited ratings, 2) the fact that 
no fee is paid by issuers does not motivate rating agencies to offer poorer-quality 
ratings for unsolicited ratings and, 3) the criteria of rating agencies to assign ratings 
are not related to the status of solicitation. By these three conclusions, I may exclude 
the hypothesis of strategic behavior of CRAs, which means that I am not able to find 
evidence to show that CRAs, for whatever reason, strategically under-rate firms who 
do not pay them.  
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The finding of self-selection motivation of Moody’s is favorable for their reputation 
because it fits the aim officially stated by Moody’s of issuing unsolicited ratings, 
‘increasing the market transparency’. Rating agencies recognize those weak firms 
with potential risks which are not yet acknowledged by general investors and issue 
ratings of these ‘risky’ firms to investors, despite their not collecting any service fees 
from rated firms, in order to maintain the market transparency. Moreover, the relatively 
lower ratings provide extra information to the market by releasing a signal to investors 
that those rated firms are more likely to perform worse than their solicited peers.  
4.4 Data 
The data source of historical rating information, fundamental information as well as 
the market-based information is the Bloomberg database. The sample period starts in 
2010 when the record of Moody’s unsolicited ratings started to be disclosed in 
Moody’s online reports and ends in the year 2017 when I started to conduct this study.  
4.4.1 Identification of treatment and control sample firms 
The key portion of ratings analyzed in this paper is the unsolicited rating. The research 
is conducted centered on Moody’s ratings and supplemented by those of S&P and 
Fitch. Therefore, the initial sample (treatment group) consists of firms who do not 
purchase rating services and receive unsolicited ratings from Moody’s. The 
identification of treatment group firms is based on the reports of unsolicited ratings 
which are released quarterly from 2010 (the earliest information available on Moody’s 
website) till 2017. Those unsolicited companies are filtered according to the following 
criteria. 
--deleting companies not listed on the stock market  
--deleting companies with a very small (<2 years) age  
--deleting companies without fundamental information in Bloomberg. 
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After the filter, I have 40 companies with unsolicited ratings offered by Moody’s in the 
sample. 26 of the sample firms are located in the European region and the remaining 
are located in Asia. The majority of the 40 firms (31) are in the banking sector and the 
remaining firms are in other sectors.  
The supplemental sample (control group) consists of firms who purchase rating 
services and receive solicited ratings from Moody’s. In order to only consider the factor 
of solicitation status and avoid the contamination of firms’ fundamental factors (region, 
sector, and size), some initial criteria should be used to select control firms for each 
of the 40 treatment group firms. The criteria are: 1) the control firms receive ratings 
from Moody’s with their solicitations; 2) the control firms are listed on the stock market 
and have valid historical stock prices in the sample period; 3) the control firms are 
classified in the same category (sector) as the treatment firm; 4) the control firms are 
located in the same region (Europe or Asia) as the treatment firm and 5) the market 
capitalization (size) ranking of the control firm in the corresponding region is close to 
that of the treatment firm (the ranking difference is not larger than 20).  
By the criteria above, a total of 167 control firms are selected15. The sector and region 
distribution of the treatment group and the control group is shown in Table 4-1. 





Region   
Europe 26 128 
Non-Europe 14 40 
Sector   
Banking/Finance Sector  31 102 
Others 9 64 
 
                                                          
15 Some of the firms play the role as the control firms for more than one treatment firm.  
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The number of selected firms in the control group is higher than that of firms in the 
treatment group. This is consistent with the fact that Moody’s only issues a very small 
proportion of unsolicited ratings. The region and sector distributions of control group 
firms are more balanced than those of treatment group firms (treatment group firms 
are concentrated in the European region and in the banking/finance sector).  
Even though I use the criteria of region, sector and firm size to initially filter the control 
group firms, such rough filter procedure does not capture the factors of other 
accounting-based fundamentals, such as leverage, profitability, etc. The comparison 
of rating levels without controlling those factors may create biased results. Therefore, 
matching procedures, based on the fundamental variables, should be conducted 
before the comparison of rating levels.  
4.4.2 Fundamentals  
Accounting-based fundamental information of the treatment group firms and control 
group firms is collected and applied in the procedure of matching and regressions in 
order to compare the levels of unsolicited and solicited ratings issued for firms with 
similar characteristics.  
Considering the data access of Bloomberg and the categories of information (size, 
leverage, profitability) which is generally considered by the market to assess the 
quality of firms, I select eight accounting indicators (shown in Table 4-2) to be used in 







Table 4-2 Description of fundamental accounting-based variables 
Category  Variable Description 
Size Total Assets Total amount of the firm’s assets, by USD 
Leverage 
Total Debt to 
Total Asset 
Total amount of debt relative to assets: The higher the ratio, the higher the degree of leverage and 


















The ratio between total investment assets and total assets 
Asset 
Turnover 




The ratio between the sales to the total assets 
 
All accounting data are collected on a quarterly basis. Excluding the missing values, 
I obtain 2315 observations of the firm-quarter pair of fundamental variables for 
unsolicited rating recipients (treatment group) and 7830 observations for the solicited 
rating recipients (control group). The descriptive statistics of these variables is shown 
in Appendix 4-2. 
4.4.3 Matching Scheme (Propensity Score Matching) 
Due to the imbalanced data between the treatment group (40 firms) and the control 
group (167 firms) as well as the fact that initial filter of control group firms does not 
consider other accounting-based variables than firm size, I apply the method of 
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) for each of the treatment group firms to select its 
‘matched control firms’ from the control group. For matching algorithms, normally 
there are two methods: caliper matching (a maximum allowable distance between 
propensity scores is specified) and nearest neighbor matching (matches each 
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treatment group participant with the closest possible untreated group participant). The 
matching mechanism I selected in this chapter is the ‘nearest neighbor with 
replacement’. The reason that I do not use another matching method is that the 
objective is to match each of the banks treatment group with fixed number of banks 
(2, 3 and 4) from the control group. Therefore, using caliper matching may cause a 
problem that different treatment group banks have different numbers of control group 
counterparties.  
The procedure is in two steps:  
1) I run logit regression for all firms: regress the dummy variable indicating whether 
the firm’s rating by Moody’s is unsolicited (=1) or solicited (=0), on fundamental 
variables and region, sector dummies. Using the estimated coefficients and 
information of fundamentals, I calculate a score for each of the sample firms. The 
score indicates the probability of the firm to be categorized as ‘unsolicited’. 
2) For each of the treatment group firms, I select N firms who have the closest scores 
with it, from the control group. Each control group firm is allowed to be picked more 
than once for more than one treatment group. N is taken as 2, 3 and 4 respectively to 
have the flexible ratios between the treatment group sample and the matched control 
sample. The distance of fundamental characteristics between treatment firms and 
selected control firms is larger if the selection of N is larger because by taking a larger 
N I allow more control firms to be selected for each of the treatment firms. The 
numbers of firms and firm-quarter observations of the treatment group and the control 
group for different N are shown in Table 4-3. In all the further analysis shown in 
Section 5, I use four matching schemes to compare the situation for unsolicited and 
solicited cases: three schemes use N from 2 to 4 to select control firms respectively 
and the fourth scheme use all control firms as members in the control group. 
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Table 4-3 Numbers of firms and firm-quarter observations for different PSM matching 
schemes 
N (the number of 
nearest 
neighbors in the 
PSM matching) 
No. of Firms No. of Firm-Quarter Obs 
 Treatment 
Group 
Control Group Treatment 
Group 
Control Group 
2 40 58 2315 2811 
3 40 72 2315 3521 
4 40 87 2315 4712 
 
4.4.4 Distance to Default 
To measure the default risk predictability of Moody’s ratings, I need to measure the 
default risks of firms in the treatment and control groups. Some previous studies use 
actual default events of firms and the relationship between default events and credit 
ratings to reflect the predictability (Becker and Milbourn, 2011; Baghai and Becker, 
2018). However, the actual rating events in my sample are rare. Therefore, I used an 
indicator of Distance to Default (DTD) (Merton, 1974) to measure the default risk of 
sample firms quarterly. In empirical tests, DTD is a very commonly-used tool to proxy 
the credit risk (i.e. probability of default) of firms (Yu, 2005; Blundell-Wignall & Roulet, 
2013; Milne, 2014). 
DTD is calculated as: 
ln (
𝑉
𝐹) + (𝑟 − 0.5σ𝑉
2)/𝑇
σ𝑉√𝑇
              (4.4.1), 
where V: market value of the firm asset; F: book value of the firm debt, which is equal 
to the sum of short-term debt and half of the long-term debt; r: risk-free interest rate; 
σV: volatility of V and T: time horizon. 
V and σV are unobservable and obtained by solving the functions shown in Formula 
(4.4.2) and Formula (4.4.3).  
E=VN(d1)−e−rTFN(d2)   (4.4.2)   
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  and d2= d1-σ𝑉√𝑇 .                 
In Equation (4.4.3), E is the market value of the firm equity; σE is the volatility of E; N() 
indicates the normal distribution function. 
Other components are observable:  
E=stock price × outstanding share (daily); F=current debt+0.5× long-term debt 
(quarterly); σE=yearly standard deviation of E; r=3-month treasury bill rate (collected 
from Bloomberg) and T=0.25 (a quarter is 0.25 year). 
To solve V and σV I use the iterated estimation method by repeatedly setting estimates 
as new observations and solving the equations until the differences between newly-
solved estimates and previously-solved estimates are lower than 0.001. 
A higher DTD indicates a lower risk of default. According to Formula (4.4.1), the higher 
DTD (lower risk) may be derived from one or more factors as follows: a higher entity 
value (V), a lower debt value (F), a higher risk-free rate in the market (r) and a lower 
volatility of entity value (σ𝑉).  
4.5 Methodology and Results 
The empirical analysis is conducted into two parts in order to test the conditions for 
the two sides of the self-selection hypothesis. One part is aimed at examining 
Hypothesis 4-1: unsolicited ratings are more conservative than solicited ones issued 
by Moody’s. The other part is aimed at testing Hypothesis 4-2 by comparing the rating 
quality between unsolicited and solicited ratings.  
4.5.1 Test of Rating Levels between Moody’s Unsolicited and Solicited 
Ratings 
To test whether unsolicited ratings are systemically more conservative than solicited 
ones, I conduct the comparison into two streams: single-agency comparison and 
multi-agency comparison. For the single-agency test, unsolicited and solicited ratings 
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issued by Moody’s are considered and the average rating-level gaps between those 
two types of ratings are identified and tested. Such single-agency tests are widely 
conducted by the literature (for example, Byoun and Shin (2002), Poon et al. (2009)) 
to demonstrate the rating gaps of unsolicited and solicited ratings. To exclude the 
possibility that the seemingly lower levels of unsolicited ratings are due to the 
systematically weaker observable characteristics of unsolicited rating recipients but 
not the reaction of Moody’s to self-selection behavior (unobservable factor) of rated 
firms, I use logit regressions to control the fundamentals. To further improve the 
feasibility of the results, I supplement the single-agency test by conducting a multi-
agency test. The gap of ratings among different big CRAs have been widely used to 
study the rating industry. For example, Livingston et al. (2008) apply the rating gaps 
as an indicator of rating migration. Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2010-a) extended the 
study to the sovereign rating area and study the split sovereign ratings as a factor of 
future rating variations. Vu, H et al. (2017) use the sovereign rating splits to reflect the 
political risks and the transparency of the sovereigns. In this chapter, by a difference-
in-difference analysis, I consider the relative rating gap between Moody’s and the 
other two agencies (S&P and Fitch) to test whether the gap varies if the Moody’s rating 
is unsolicited or not. The inherent assumption is that although the absolute rating 
levels of different CRAs may not be the same, their gap should be the same 
conditional on the same solicitation status. Therefore, the D-i-D estimators which 
show the difference of rating gaps for the solicited rating cases and the unsolicited 
rating cases indicate the effect of solicitation status on the rating conservatism.  
I bear in mind that the test in this section is an empirical reflection of the conclusion 
drawn in the theoretical model (Formula 4.2.6) which shows that under the condition 
of self-selection, it is the accurate decision for rating agencies to rate lower for the 
firms who do not request the solicited rating services. The empirical finding supports 
the results of the theoretical model in Section 4.3.1. Both the empirical and theoretical 
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analyses show that it is not a biased behavior for CRAs to offer lower ratings for firms 
who do not solicit the rating services. 
4.5.1.1 Numeric transformation of rating notches 
In order to quantitatively analyze the ratings, I follow the rule used by Ashcraft et al. 
(2011) and transform the original letter-format rating indicators into numerical 
indicators, from 1, which indicates the highest rating level, to 21, which indicates the 
lowest rating level. Details of the transformation are shown in Table 4-4. 
The letter-format rating indicator system used by Moody’s is different from that used 
by S&P and Fitch. But the total number of rating notches (21) are the same among 
the three agencies. After the transformation, I can not only take the mathematical 
calculation (t-test and logit regression) on Moody’s rating levels but also quantitatively 
compare the rating levels of different rating indicating systems used by different rating 
agencies.  
The frequency distribution of quarterly rating indicators of all the sample firms is shown 
in Figure 4-1. The shape of the figure implies that the distribution of rating levels is 
positively skewed. The majority of the historical ratings concentrate in the range of 
[5,10], which represents the range between Aa1 and Baa3. It is reasonable because 
the firms with ratings higher than Aa1 are regarded as ‘top-rated’ ones who have 
superior features and firms with ratings lower than Baa3 are regarded as ‘non-
investment grade’ ones who may encounter regulatory restrictions by regulators. The 




Table 4-4 Rating indicator transformation 
Rating notch (Moody’s) Rating notch  
(S&P and Fitch) 
Value of number-format 
variable 
Aaa AAA 1 
Aa1 AA+ 2 
Aa2 AA 3 
Aa3 AA- 4 
A1 A+ 5 
A2 A 6 
A3 A- 7 
Baa1 BBB+ 8 
Baa2 BBB 9 
Baa3 BBB- 10 
Ba1 BB+ 11 
Ba2 BB 12 
Ba3 BB- 13 
B1 B+ 14 
B2 B 15 
B3 B- 16 
Caa1 CCC+ 17 
Caa2 CCC 18 
Caa3 CCC- 19 
Ca CC 20 
C C 21 
 
Figure 4-1 Frequency of Quarterly Rating Notches of the data sample 
This figure represents the frequency distribution of quarterly numerical rating indicators of sample firms. 
The rating notches are numerically transformed into the integral format according to the rule that a 




4.5.1.2 Single-Agency Comparison 
The single-agency comparison is only focused on the ratings of sample firms issued 
by Moody’s. A univariate test (will be discussed later) directly compares the 
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numerically transformed rating indicators of the treatment group firms (unsolicited) 
with those of control group (solicited) and a trend of lower ratings (reflected by a higher 
value of transformed rating indicators) of treatment group firms are observed. 
However, this finding is vulnerable because it does not take the current fundamentals 
of the sample firms into account. The lower ratings of treatment firms may be reflecting 
a weaker current fundamental of those firms but not the self-selection behaviors of 
Moody’s who forecasts that the selected unsolicited firms have weaker future 
performances. Therefore, a multi-variate test should be conducted as an essential 
supplementation. Specifically, I run logit regressions of the rating indicators on the key 
variable of solicitation status along with fundamental variables and find a significant 
estimate on the solicitation status variable, which indicates that after controlling 
current fundamentals, the solicitation status of Moody’s ratings is associated with the 
level of ratings given by it.  
Univariate test 
The univariate test is the most intuitive way to compare the rating levels between 
unsolicited and solicited ratings by Moody’s, without considering any other 
fundamental information of sample firms but ratings. The principle is to directly 
compare the average levels of these two types of ratings and calculate the mean and 
standard deviations of the level gap to obtain the t-statistics of the gap. In the analysis 
process, I use the logarithm of the numerical rating indicator to replace the original 
integer-format one to eliminate the potential negative impact of the distribution’s 
skewness on the feasibility of the t-test. I use the quarterly firm-rating pairs to construct 
the dataset for the univariate test. Firms in both the treatment group (unsolicited) and 
the control group (solicited) are selected and the different matching schemes based 
on the PSM method are applied respectively to compare the average value of 
numerically transformed rating indicators. The matching schemes vary according to 
the selection of N (N=2,3, and 4), which is the number of nearest neighbors selected 
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from the control group for each of the treatment firms.  The t-test result is shown in 
Table 4-5.  
Table 4-5 T-test of the difference of average logarithm of ratings between treatment group 
(unsolicited ratings) and control group (solicited ratings) 
The table shows the result of the t-test of the rating gaps between unsolicited ratings and solicited ratings. 
The rating notches are numerically transformed according to Table 4 and taken the format of logarithm. 
Four PSM matching schemes are applied according to different numbers of nearest neighbors in the 
PSM matching. Figures in the brackets demonstrate the t-statistics.  
N (Number of nearest neighbors in the PSM 
matching) 2 3 4 All 
No. of Observations in treatment/control groups 2315/2811 2315/3521 2315/4712 2315/7830 
Average log rating of Treatment Group (Unsolicited) 2.149 2.149 2.149 2.149 
Average log rating of Control Group (Solicited) 2.062 2.053 2.055 2.032 









*** 1% significance level;  **  5% significance level;  *10% significance level  
 
For all the four matching schemes, I find a larger average value of the logarithm of 
rating indicators of unsolicited ratings than solicited ratings. The transformation details 
presented in Table 4-4 show that a higher value of rating indicators is equivalent to a 
lower (more negative) rating level. Therefore, the average unsolicited ratings issued 
by Moody’s are lower (more negative) than solicited ratings. After taking the exponent 
(the reverse of the logarithm) of the figures in the table, I find that the average level of 
unsolicited ratings (exp{2.149}=8.576) is equivalent to the middle point between Baa1 
(8) and Baa2 (9). The average level of solicited ratings depend on the selection of 
matching schemes but all the four figures are close to exp{2.05}=7.768 (equivalent to 
the middle point between A3 (7) and Baa1 (8)). From an intuitive perspective, the 
average level of unsolicited ratings is 1 notch lower than solicited ratings. The t-test 
result shows that the rating difference between those two unsolicited ratings are 
statistically significant at the 1% significance level.   
Besides, the observation of for different PSM matching criteria shows that with the 
PSM matching, the level of difference is lower than if there is no matching and with 
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the rise of the number of matched counterparties, the difference is getting wider. It 
shows that the use of PSM matching is associated with a reduction of bias. Similar 
observations can be found for the following tests (shown in Tables 4-6 and 4-8). 
The results in Table 4-5 provide a preliminary evidence of a lower unsolicited rating. 
However, fundamental variables and other fixed effects (year, quarter, country and 
sector) are not considered in this analysis. Therefore, I run the ordered logit regression 
to control those factors.  
Regression Test 
I use ordered logit regression to compare the rating levels between unsolicited and 
solicited ratings controlling fundamental factors of the firms: 
𝑅∗𝑖 =  𝛽4−1,1𝑈𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 + 𝜸𝑿
′ + 𝑖            (4.5.1) 
The regression is run on the basis of quarterly firm-rating pairs and each i represents 
a pair. The dependent variable, 𝑅∗𝑖 represents the unobservable latent variable which 
defines the thresholds of various alternatives of credit rating levels 𝑅𝑖 , which are 
described in Table 4-4. A higher 𝑅𝑖 represents a lower (more negative) rating. The 
key independent variable on the right side of Equation (4.5.1) is 𝑈𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖, 
which is equal to 1 if the rating of pair i is unsolicited and 0 if the rating is solicited. 
𝛽4−1,1, the corresponding estimates on the dummy variable, captures the impact of 
solicitation status on the rating level. To fit the hypothesis of self-selection, I expect a 
significant positive 𝛽4−1,1  which means that if the ratings are unsolicited 
(𝑈𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 = 1), the rating level should be lower (a higher 𝑅𝑖 and a higher 
𝑅∗𝑖). 𝑿
′ represents a vector containing eight fundamental variables shown in Table 4-
2 as well as the dummy variables defining the year, quarter, country and sector of the 
pair i. 𝜸 is the corresponding estimates on the sector 𝑿′. 
The variables contained in the vector 𝑿′  help the model (4.5.1) to eliminate the 
fundamental variables and other fixed effects in the analysis of solicitation status’s 
149 
 
impact on the rating levels. 𝛽4−1,1 captures the association between solicitation status 
and rating levels assuming that the firms who receive corresponding ratings issued 
by Moody’s have the same level of fundamentals are issued in the same year and 
same quarter, are located in the same country and are run in the same sector.  
For Equation (4.5.1), I assume that the decisions of providing unsolicited ratings for 
selected firms made by CRAs is not related to the current status of control variables 
in 𝑿′ but are only based on the forecast of the firms’ quality. I acknowledge that this 
is a very strong assumption and the violation of this assumption may cause an 
endogeneity problem. To tackle this problem, I use the multi-agency comparison 
(difference-in-difference method) to eliminate the possibility of biased selection of 
providing unsolicited ratings (see 4.5.1.3).  
The empirical result of Equation (4.5.1) is shown in Table 4-6.  As expected, 
regardless of the matching schemes, the estimates on unsolicited dummy 𝛽4−1,1 are 
always significantly positive. The mathematical intuition is that after controlling the 
fundamentals and other fixed effects, if the rating is unsolicited, the rating notch has 
a higher probability of being mapped to a high value of 𝑅∗𝑖 which is defined as the 
threshold of lower (more negative) rating levels. In a word, the status of unsolicited 
ratings is associated with a lower rating level.  
This finding enhances the result of the univariate test by controlling other fundamental 
factors (𝑿′). If I investigate the estimates on those fundamental factors, I find that the 
selected accounting-based fundamentals have a significant association with the rating 
levels issued by Moody’s. It suggests that Moody’s may consider those factors when 
determining which rating notches it would give to the rated firms. Specifically, 
estimates on Total_Debt_to_Total_Asset and Degree_of_Financial_Leverage are 
positive which indicates that Moody’s might see debt ratio as a negative factor for the 
firm. This is natural and reasonable because a higher level of debt ratio (or leverage) 
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is associated with a higher risk of the firms to default on the debt. Estimates on 
Total_Investment_to_Total Assets are also positive. It indicates that Moody’s have 
conservative attitudes to the expansion of firms’ investment scale and regard it as a 
negative indicator of the future default risk. Estimates on Sales_to_Assets, 
Return_on_Assets and Asset_Growth_Rate are negative which means that those 
factors may be viewed by Moody’s as positive indicators of the firm’s default risk. 
Moody’s ratings are higher if the rated firm has a larger current value of sales ratio, 
ROA and asset growth ratio. Besides that, Moody’s rating is not associated with the 
size of the firms (insignificant estimates on Total_Asset). It reflects the effect of the 
initial filter of the control sample firms, with the criterion ‘the market capitalization (size) 
ranking of the control firm in the corresponding region is close to that of the treatment 
firm (the ranking difference is not larger than 20)’. Therefore, the treatment (unsolicited) 
group and control (solicited) group should contain firms with similar sizes so the 
statistical estimates on the firm size are not significant. 
Supplemental test: rating stability 
So far I have shown evidence of lower rating levels of unsolicited ratings. However, 
whether the rating levels of unsolicited and solicited ratings have a different pattern of 
rating changes is not studied. In other words, in this section I will investigate whether 
the gap between those two types of ratings is stable in time and whether one type of 









Table 4-6 Ordered Logistics Regression of rating notches on unsolicited rating dummy 
This table shows the result of ordered logit regression. The regression is run on the basis of quarterly firm-rating pairs. 
Sample firms are the recipients of both unsolicited and solicited firms. Four matching schemes are applied to select 
the control group firms with different number of nearest neighbors. The dependent variable is the unobservable 
variable defining the thresholds of numerically transformed rating-notch indicators. A higher value of the dependent 
variable is equivalent to a lower (more negative) actual rating (details of the transformation are shown in Table 4-4). 
The key independent variable is the unsolicited dummy which is equal to 1 if the corresponding rating is unsolicited 
and 0 if it is solicited. Fundamental variables are described in Table 4-2. Year, quarter, country and sector are 
controlled. The estimation is by MLE method. Figures in the brackets are corresponding Wald-statistics.  
*** 1% significance level; **   5% significance level; *    10% significance level 
 Matching Scheme 
Number of nearest neighbors in 
the PSM matching 
2 3 4 All 




















































































Year Control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter Control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 3912 4443 5131 8595 
AIC 20285.446 22892.729 26201.431 44150.040 
SIC 20599.036 23212.684 26528.584 44502.987 
-2Log 20185.446 22792.729 26101.431 44050.040 
a: the unit of the estimates is ×10-6 
 
The ordered logit regression is also applied to study this issue. The regression model 
is shown in Equation (4.5.2). What distinguishes the test in this equation from that in 
Equation (4.5.1) is the set of dependent variables. In Equation (4.5.1) 𝑅∗𝑖 refers to the 
latent variable linked to the level of ratings while in Equation (4.5.2) 𝑅𝐶∗𝑖 refers to the 
latent variable linked to the quarterly change of rating levels (RC is short for ‘rating 
change’). The change of rating level is measured as the absolute value of the gap 
between the numerically-transformed rating level in the current quarter minus that in 
the previous quarter. Correspondingly, fundamental variables in the vector 𝑿′  are 
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adjusted to the format of quarterly change rather than the absolute values. Besides 
that, I split the cases of rating change into ‘upgrade’ cases and ‘downgrade’ cases 
and regressions are run separately for either of the two cases.  
𝑅𝐶∗𝑖 =  𝛽2,1𝑈𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 + 𝑿
′𝜸 + 𝑖            (4.5.2) 
Regression results are shown in Table 4-7. 
Table 4-7 Ordered Logistics Regression of rating changes on unsolicited rating dummy 
This table shows the result of ordered logit regression. The regression is run on the basis of quarterly 
firm-rating pairs. Sample firms are the recipients of both unsolicited and solicited firms. Four matching 
schemes are applied to select the control group firms with different number of nearest neighbors. The 
dependent variable is the unobservable variable defining the thresholds of quarterly change degree of 
numerically transformed rating-notch indicators. Numerical transformation detail is shown in Table 4-4. 
The quarterly change degree is measured by the absolute value of the gap between the rating in the 
current quarter minus the rating in the previous quarter. The key independent variable is the unsolicited 
dummy which is equal to 1 if the corresponding rating is unsolicited and 0 if it is solicited. Control variables 
are the quarterly change of fundamental variables described in Table 4-2. Year, quarter, country and 
sector are controlled. Upgrade and downgrade cases are analyzed separately. The estimation is by MLE 
method. Figures in the brackets are corresponding Wald-statistics. 
 Matching Scheme 
Number of 
nearest neighbors 
in the PSM 
matching 
2 3 4 All 






















Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 3260 3686 4212 6822 
AIC 929.553 1204.993 998.608 1326.882 1129.466 1531.626 1778.86 2453.40 
SIC 1112.237 1387.677 1184.977 1513.251 1319.837 1721.996 1983.70 2658.24 
-2Log 869.553 1144.993 938.608 1266.882 1069.466 1471.626 1718.86 2393.34 
 
 
Estimates on the unsolicited dummy are insignificant in all cases. It implies that the 
solicitation status does not impact the probability of the firms to be upgraded or 
downgraded. Combining this finding with the result obtained for Equation (4.5.1), I 
conclude that the rating levels of unsolicited ratings are significantly lower than 
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solicited ones and the degrees of variation pattern of both types of ratings are 
statistically the same in terms of the frequency and probability of rating changes. In 
summary, the lower level of unsolicited ratings is persistent and unlikely to be reversed 
because the upgrade and downgrade probabilities are not different for different 
solicitation statues. 
4.5.1.3 Multi-Agency Comparison 
In the logit regression analysis, I try to control the fundamental factors to exclude the 
possibility that the finding that unsolicited ratings are lower is derived from a 
systematically weaker firm characteristics of unsolicited rating recipients. In order to 
exclude all fundamental variables and only consider rating levels, I introduce the 
ratings given to the sample firms but issued by the other two big agencies, S&P and 
Fitch, to compare the relative level gap between Moody’s and the other two’s ratings. 
In principle, the variation of the rating level gap is not related to any fundamental 
information of rated firms but only related to the rating agency and the solicitation 
status.  
The analysis is conducted in the way as follows. Moody’s is regarded as the ‘treatment 
agency’ while either S&P or Fitch is selected as the ‘control agency’. Those firms who 
receive ratings by both the treatment agency and the control agency are kept in the 
sample. After that, I filter out those firms who receive unsolicited ratings by the control 
agency to ensure that all the sample firms have only solicited ratings by the control 
agency and either solicited or unsolicited ratings by the treatment agency.  
There are two layers of differences in the D-i-D analysis. The first layer is the average 
gap between numerically-transformed rating levels issued by the treatment and those 
issued by the control agency. This indicator reflects the gap of rating criterion applied 
by different rating agencies. The second layer of difference is the gap of first-layer 
difference between the firms who receive unsolicited Moody’s ratings (treatment firms) 
154 
 
and those who receive solicited Moody’s ratings (control firms). The D-i-D estimator 
shows whether the rating criterion gap between Moody’s and the other two agencies 
is associated with the solicitation status (Moody’s) of the rated firms.  
I use a hypothesized case as an example to show how the D-i-D estimates are 
established. In this example, the control agency is S&P. For those firms who receive 
unsolicited ratings by Moody’s, the average rating by Moody’s is Baa (corresponding 
transformed indicator, 9) and that by S&P is A- (corresponding transformed indicator, 
7). The difference between Moody’s and S&P ratings is 2 (equal to 9 minus 7). For 
those firms who receive solicited ratings by Moody’s, the average rating by Moody’s 
is A3 (7) and that by S&P is A (6). The difference between Moody’s and S&P rating is 
1 (equal to 7 minus 6). The numbers 2 (equal to 9 minus 7) and 1 (equal to 7 minus 
6) represent the first-layer difference which is the rating criterion gap. Both of them 
are positive which means that Moody’s ratings are more conservative than S&P 
because for the same rated firms, Moody’s always issue lower ratings (a larger 
number is equivalent to a lower rating). If I compare the two numbers (2-1=1>0), I find 
that the D-i-D is positive. By the numbers I find evidence to show that, even though 
both agencies have certain degree of rating reduction (issue more negative ratings) 
for the treatment group firms, the positive D-i-D shows that Moody’s degree of rating 
reduction is greater than S&P. It means that Moody’s is more conservative than S&P 
towards the issuance of ratings for firms who do not solicit their rating service. 
As shown in the hypothesized case, a positive D-i-D estimator is expected to enhance 
the hypothesis of self-selection. The positive estimator shows that compared to the 
control agency, Moody’s issue more conservative ratings (reflected by a higher value 
of the transformed rating indicator) for unsolicited rating recipients.  
The results of the multi-agency test are shown in Table 4-8. 
The significance of D-i-D estimates is reflected by the t-statistics and the 
corresponding p- values.  
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For both the Moody’s-S&P pair analysis and Moody’s-Fitch pair analysis, I find 
significant evidence to show that Moody’s issue more conservative ratings for its 
unsolicited rating recipients. D-i-D estimators are significantly positive, which fits my 
expectation: that compared to the control agency, Moody’s issue more conservative 
ratings (reflected by a higher value of the transformed rating indicator) for unsolicited 
rating recipients.  
Exploring the details on the D-i-D components, I find additional significant evidence. 
The treatment group firms have Moody’s ratings at a lower level than S&P/Fitch 
ratings (reflected by positive values of the gap between Moody’s ratings and 
S&P/Fitch ratings for treatment group). But the control group firms have Moody’s 
ratings at a higher level than S&P/Fitch ratings (reflected by negative values of the 
gap between Moody’s ratings and S&P/Fitch ratings for treatment group). It means 
that the solicitation status reverses the sign of relative gap between Moody’s ratings 
and S&P/Fitch’s ratings: if the firm solicits the rating service from Moody’s, Moody’s 
offer ratings at an average level higher than S&P/Fitch but if the firm does not solicit 
the rating service, Moody’s offer ratings at an average level lower than S&P/Fitch. 




Table 4-8 Multi-agency test of rating levels 
This table shows the result of multi-agency test. S&P and Fitch are respectively set as the control agency to compare the rating levels with Moody’s. Treatment group 
firms are those who receive unsolicited ratings by Moody’s but solicited ratings by the control agency. Control group firms are those who receive solicited ratings by 
both Moody’s and the control agency. The selection of control group firms depends on the selection of matching scheme which requires d ifferent number of nearest 
neighbors to be collected in the PSM matching procedure. Average rating (numerical transformation details are shown in Table 4-4) of Moody’s, the control agency 
and their differences are calculated to show the relative rating criterion gap between Moody’s and the other agency. D-i-D is calculated by differencing the gap of 
Moody’s and control agency’s ratings between the treatment group firms and the control group. T-statistics of the D-i-D estimators are calculated and shown in the 
brackets. *** 1% significance level; ** 5% significance level;    * 10% significance level 
Control Agency: S&P 
Treatment Group 
(Firms receiving 
unsolicited ratings from 
Moody’s but receiving 
solicited ratings from S&P) 
Control Group 
(Firms receiving solicited ratings from both Moody’s and S&P) 
 (No. of Obs:934) 
Matching Scheme 1: 
 (No. of Obs: 1580) 
Number of nearest neighbors 
in the PSM matching: 2 
Matching Scheme 2: 
 (No. of Obs:2166 ) 
Number of nearest neighbors 
in the PSM matching: 3 
Matching Scheme 3: 
 (No. of Obs:2673) 
Number of nearest neighbors 
in the PSM matching: 4 
Matching Scheme 4: 
 (No. of Obs:5372 ) 
Number of nearest neighbors 
in the PSM matching: All 
Average Ratings by Moody’s 7.4606 7.8651 8.0078 8.1269 7.7980 
Average Ratings by S&P 7.2859 8.4535 8.5090 8.5872 8.2351 
Dif of Average Ratings (Moody’s – S&P) +0.1745 -0.5883 -0.5012 -0.4603 -0.4371 









Control Agency: Fitch 
Treatment Group 
(Firms receiving 
unsolicited ratings from 
Moody’s but receiving 
solicited ratings from 
Fitch) 
Control Group 
(Firms receiving solicited ratings from both Moody’s and Fitch) 
 (No. of Obs: 1269) 
Matching Scheme 1: 
(No. of Obs: 1790) 
Number of nearest neighbors 
in the PSM matching: 
Matching Scheme 2: 
(No. of Obs:2102) 
Number of nearest neighbors 
in the PSM matching: 
Matching Scheme 3: 
(No. of Obs:2528) 
Number of nearest neighbors 
in the PSM matching: 
Matching Scheme 4: 
(No. of Obs:4764) 
Number of nearest neighbors 
in the PSM matching: 
Average Ratings by Moody’s 8.8944 8.4830 8.3698 8.4040 8.1383 
Average Ratings by Fitch 8.0221 8.6674 8.5535 8.5825 8.3482 
Dif of Average Ratings (Moody’s – Fitch) +0.8723 -0.1845 -0.1837 -0.1785 -0.2099 











4.5.2 Rating quality of unsolicited and solicited ratings issued by 
Moody’s 
Hypothesis 4-2 states that the qualities of unsolicited and solicited ratings are not 
different. The quality of Moody’s ratings is measured in two perspectives: rating 
predictability and timeliness.  
Rating predictability of unsolicited and solicited ratings is measured by the panel 
regression of Distance to Default indicator on unsolicited dummy along with other 
control variables. Also, I supplement the test by using a predicting model of DTD to 
test the relative rating accuracy between solicited and unsolicited ratings.  
Rating timeliness is measured by multi-agency comparison of the rating change speed. 
Moody’s rating change announcements are compared with those by S&P or Fitch to 
test who leads/lags another CRA. A higher probability of leading another agency and 
a lower probability of lagging another agency indicate a higher rating quality.  
The empirical analysis in this section (Section 4.5.2) is accompanied with the 
conclusion drawn in the theoretical analysis shown in Formula 4.2.11 and Formula 
4.2.13. Those two in-equations show that the unsolicited and solicited ratings provide 
the external investors with the extra information at the same level and the quality of 
the information is not weaker due to the non-solicitation status of the ratings. From 
the perspective of empirical analysis, I measure the concept ‘information’ by 
introducing two concepts, default-risk predictability (Section 4.5.2.1) and relative 
rating-change timeliness (4.5.2.2).  
4.5.2.1 Rating predictability 
The rating predictability reflects the accuracy of information provided by the ratings 
regarding the default risk variation of the rated firms. A rating with a higher quality 
should forecast the future variation of the firm’s default risk with a higher degree of 
accuracy. I follow Campbell et al. (2008) and Chava, S. & Purnanandam (2010) to 
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apply Distance to Default (DTD) to quantitatively measure firms’ default risk. A higher 
value of DTD is equivalent to a lower risk of default. To test whether the rating 
predictability is different for unsolicited and solicited ratings, I run a panel regression 
model of DTD on rating levels along with the unsolicited dummy. If the rating level is 
significant, it means that the rating has an ability of predicting DTD. Besides that, if 
the unsolicited dummy is insignificant, it provides evidence to show that the solicitation 
status does not impact the rating predictability.  
To enhance the results of panel regressions, I compare the observed DTD of 
treatment group firms with the predicted DTD which is derived from the model built 
using the rating and DTD information of control group firms to test whether the 
predictability has a significant gap between unsolicited and solicited ratings. 
Specifically, observed rating and DTD information of control group firms who receive 
solicited ratings are used to build a predicting model. The corresponding estimates 
obtained in the predicting model with control group data (solicited rating levels) are 
applied to predict the DTD of treatment group firms with their actual unsolicited rating 
levels. If the error (gap between observed DTD and predicted DTD of treatment group 
firms) is not significant, the hypothesis of no difference of rating predictability is 
enhanced.  
Regression Model 
I apply random-effect panel regression of DTD on the lagged terms of rating indicators 
along with the unsolicited dummy. The reason of using the random-effect model rather 
than the fixed-effect one is that the random-effect model is able to capture the impact 
of firms’ heterogeneity (solicitation status) on the dependent variable. If using fixed-
effect regressions, the effect on DTD of independent variables (ratings and solicitation 
status) at the entity level would be eliminated while such effect is the objective I study 
(the solicitation status is at an entity level).  
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The length of the lagging time period ranges from 1 quarter to 1 year (4 quarters). 
Estimates on rating indicators demonstrate the link between past rating forecasts and 
the future DTD variation, a reflection of rating predictability on firm default risk. 
Estimates on unsolicited dummy measure the bias of rating predictability due to the 
solicitation status.  
The panel regression is conducted based on the equation:  
𝐷𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡+𝑝 = 𝛼 + 𝛽4−3,1𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4−3,2𝑈𝑛𝑆𝐿𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑿
′𝜸 + 𝑈𝑖 + 𝑖,𝑡      (4.5.3) 
i: the sample firms (all treatment firms are included and the selection of control firms 
depends on the matching schemes which are described in Section 4.4.3); 
𝐷𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡+𝑝: Distance to default of firm i at time (t+p), p=1,2,3,4; 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡: the logarithm of numerically-transformed ratings offered by Moody’s to 
firm i at time t; 
𝑈𝑛𝑆𝐿𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖: dummy equal to 1 if the firm i is unsolicited rated by Moody’s at time t 
and 0 if it is solicited rated by Moody’s at time t; 
𝑿′: the vector of control variables and the components are the same as shown in 
Equation (4.1). 
𝑈𝑖 : random-effects term. 
The regression result is shown in Table 4-9. 
Coefficients on 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 are consistently negative which provide evidence of a 
significant Moody’s rating predictability. The intuition of the negative estimates is that 
a firm who receives a higher rating of Moody’s (equivalent to a lower value 
of 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡) will have a smaller default risk in the next 1 quarter to 4 quarters 
(equivalent to a higher value of DTD). Such association is significant after controlling 
the fundamental variables and it indicates that the past Moody’s ratings provide extra 
information regarding future DTD variation. The results are consistent with the 
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theoretical model findings shown in Formula 4.2.13 (credit ratings are informative 
regarding the firm actual status). 
Coefficients on 𝑈𝑛𝑆𝐿𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 are insignificant which indicates that rating predictability 
of unsolicited and solicited ratings is not different. The intuition is that after I control 
the rating factor, the solicitation factor is not associated with the future DTD variation. 
In other words, the unsolicited ratings (of treatment group firms) do not over-predict 
or under-predict the DTD relative to solicited ratings (of control group firms). This 
finding is consistent with the theoretical model results of Formula 4.2.11 (unsolicited 




Table 4-9 Rating predictability test (panel regression) 
This table shows the panel regression result of Equation (4.5.3). The panel regression is estimated by random-effect estimation. The sample firms include all unsolicited 
rating recipients in the dataset and the selection of solicited rating recipients depend on four different matching schemes of different nearest neighbor numbers in the 
PSM procedure. The dependent variable is the Distance to Default (DTD) of the firms at each quarter. Key independent variables are the lagged terms of logarithm of 
numerically-transformed rating indicator (the transformation details are shown in Table 4-4) and the unsolicited dummy. The number of lagging periods range from 1 
to 4 quarters.  Fundamental variables are controlled (details of fundamental variable setting are shown in Table 4-2). Region, sector, quarter and year effects are 
controlled. Figures in the brackets are corresponding t-statistics. 
*** 1% significance level; ** 5% significance level;   * 10% significance level. 
Dependent Var. DTD (Distance to Default)    
No. of lag terms  1 2 3 4 
Number of 
nearest 
neighbors in the 
PSM matching 



































































                 
Fundamental 
Control 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                 
N 79 93 106 174 79 93 106 174 78 91 104 174 75 88 101 169 
T 63 63 63 63 62 62 62 62 61 61 61 61 60 60 60 60 




Robustness check: the mutual impact between DTD and ratings 
Equation (4.5.3) only considers the unidirectional impact of current ratings on future 
DTD. However, it is reasonable to question whether there is a mutual impact between 
them. Although DTD is not directly observable in the public database, it can be 
calculated using components (stock prices, debt amount and risk-free interest rates) 
which can be collected from open sources. Therefore, past DTD may be considered 
by Moody’s to issue current ratings. From the results of Equation (4.5.3) I have found 
an association between past ratings and current DTD. My robustness check tests 
whether the past DTD is a factor which determines the current rating level. 
Furthermore, I examine whether solicitation status still impacts the rating level (shown 
in Equation (5.1)) after I add past DTD as the explanatory variable.  
The model equation is shown below and solved by the logit regression estimation. 
𝑅∗𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽4−4,1𝐷𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡−𝑝 + 𝛽4−4,2𝑈𝑛𝑆𝐿𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑝 + 𝑖,𝑡       (4.5.4) 
The dependent variable, 𝑅∗𝑖,𝑡  represents the unobservable latent variable which 
defines the thresholds of various alternatives of credit rating levels 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 of firm i at the 
quarter t. The details of the rating indicator transformation are described in Table 4-
4. 𝐷𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡−𝑝  is the distance to default indicator of firm i at the quarter (t-p), where 
p=1,2,3 and 4 respectively. 𝑈𝑛𝑆𝐿𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑝 indicates the solicitation status of firm i 
at quarter (t-p) (equal to 1 if the firm i receives unsolicited ratings at quarter t-p and 
equal to 0 if it receives solicited ratings at quarter t-p). The regression results are 
shown in Table 4-10. 
The significant link between past DTD and current ratings is observed and 
solicitation status is a significant factor determining rating levels after controlling past 
DTD. This enhances both Hypothesis 4-1 and Hypothesis 4-2. Significantly positive 
estimates of 𝛽4−4,2 prove the same conclusion as shown in Equation (4.5.1): more 
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conservative ratings are offered to unsolicited rating recipients by Moody’s. It shows 
additional evidence to enhance Hypothesis 4-1.  
Significantly negative estimates of 𝛽4−4,1 reflect that a higher past DTD (a lower 
default risk) is associated with a lower transformed rating indicator (a higher current 
rating level). It suggests that Moody’s may observe the historical DTD and regard it 
as a factor to determine its rating levels. Combined this with the result of Equation 
(4.5.1), I conclude that, 1) Moody’s current ratings contain the information of past 
DTD; 2) Moody’s offered more conservative ratings to unsolicited rating recipients 
after we control the factor of past DTD; 3) there is no significant gap of future DTD 
gap between two types of rating recipients controlling the same rating levels. In 
summary, although ratings are more conservative for unsolicited rating recipients, 
such conservatism is not biased because it accurately predicts the future DTD. It fits 
the hypothesis of self-selection: firms with potential bad future performances do not 
select to be rated, Moody’s observes that and offers more conservative ratings to 




Table 4-10 Logit regression of ratings on past DTD and unsolicited dummy 
This table shows the result of ordered logistic regression shown in Equation (4.5.4). Four matching schemes are applied to select the control group firms with different 
number of nearest neighbors. The dependent variable is the unobservable variable defining the thresholds of numerically transformed rating-notch indicators (details 
of the transformation are shown in Table 4-4). The key independent variables are DTD (t-p) and the unsolicited dummy. DTD (t-p) is the Distance to Default indicator 
in the quarter t-p where p ranges from 1 to 4. The unsolicited dummy is equal to 1 if the firm receives unsolicited ratings from Moody’s and equal to 0 if it receives 
solicited ratings from Moody’s. Year, quarter, country and sector are controlled. The estimation is by MLE method. Figures in  the brackets are corresponding Wald-
statistics. 
*** 1% significance level; ** 5% significance level;    * 10% significance level. 
Dependent Var. Ratings    
No. of lag terms 
(p) 
1 2 3 4 
Matching 
Scheme 




































































                 
Region Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                 
N 3904 4562 5174 8812 3828 4472 5070 8639 3749 4380 4964 8465 3671 4290 4861 8293 
AIC 19588.5 22871.2 25782.3 44663.7 19262.2 22469.4 25319.9 43873.0 18897.3 22041.4 24829.8 43055.2 18545.2 21637.0 24372.8 42253.5 
SIC 19845.5 23134.6 26050.9 44954.2 19524.7 22738.4 25594.2 44176.8 19158.9 22309.6 25103.2 43351.1 18805.9 21904.3 24651.8 42548.4 
-2Log 19506.5 22789.2 25700.3 44581.7 19178.2 22385.4 25235.9 43787.0 18813.3 21957.4 24745.8 42971.2 18461.2 21553.0 24286.8 42169.5 
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Predicting model method 
The panel regression model analyses the treatment group firms and the control group 
firms in an equation and splits the two types of firms by adding a dummy variable on 
the right side of the regression equation. To find a more intuitive way to distinguish 
the unsolicited ratings from solicited ones, I use a simple regression model of DTD 
with only control group firm data to obtain the estimates on rating factors and then 
apply those estimates to the treatment group ratings to predict the DTD of unsolicited 
rating recipients. The predicted value is compared with the observed value to 
demonstrate whether the estimates create biased predicted DTD.   
I use the actual observations of control group firms to estimate Equation (4.5.5). The 
selection of control group firms are varied according to the matching schemes (the 
number of nearest neighbors in the PSM procedure),  
Control_Group_DTDi,t+p = α + β4−5,1Control_Group_LogRatingi,t + XcontrolGroup′γ + εi,t      (4.5.5) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝_𝐷𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡+𝑝: Distance to default of the control group firm i at time (t+p), 
p=1,2,3,4; 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝_𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡: the logarithm of numerically-transformed ratings 
offered by Moody’s to the control group firm i at time t; 
𝑿′: the vector of control variables and the components are the same as shown in 
Equation (4.5.1). 
The corresponding estimates, ?̂?, ?̂?5,1 and ?̂? are obtained by the solution of Equation 
(4.5.5) before those estimates are applied to predict the treatment group firms’ DTD 
(𝐷𝑇?̂?) in the format of Equation (4.5.6). 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝_𝐷𝑇?̂?𝑖,𝑡+𝑝
= ?̂? + ?̂?4−5,1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝_𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑿𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒑′?̂?   (4.5.6) 
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In Equation (4.5.6), 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝_𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡  and 𝑿𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒑′  are 
observations in the treatment group dataset. ?̂?, ?̂?4−5,1 and ?̂? are obtained by solving 
Equation (4.5.5).  
The final step is to take the difference between observed 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝_𝐷𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡+𝑝 
and predicted 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝_𝐷𝑇?̂?𝑖,𝑡+𝑝 to calculate the relative rating bias between 
unsolicited and solicited ratings of Moody’s.  
Relative Prediction Bias = Treatment_Group_DTDi,t+p - Treatment_Group_DTD̂i,t+p.  
A significant positive bias indicates that the actual DTD of unsolicited rating recipients 
is larger than the predicted DTD using estimated coefficients derived from solicited 
rating recipients along with actual rating of unsolicited rating recipients. Thus, the 
unsolicited ratings under-estimate the DTD relative to solicited ones (equivalent to 
over-estimate the default risk). Conversely, a significant negative bias indicates that 
unsolicited ratings over-estimate the DTD relative to solicited ones and an insignificant 
bias indicates that unsolicited ratings neither under-estimate nor over-estimate the 
DTD relative to solicited ones. 
The results of the calculation of the average ‘relative rating bias’ are shown in Table 
4-11. 
In most of the cases shown in Table 4-11, the relative prediction bias of DTD between 
unsolicited and solicited ratings is insignificant which enhances my previous 
conclusion that the DTD predictability is not different for the two types of ratings by 
Moody’s. In some of the cases, the bias is significantly positive showing a weak 
evidence that Moody’s may over-estimate the future risk of default of firms (under-
estimate the DTD). This finding also fits the self-selection hypothesis by showing that 
Moody’s selects those firms whom it believes would have a worse future performance 
and offer unsolicited ratings to them at a more conservative level. The conservative 
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ratings under-estimate the future DTD of the rating recipients compared with the 
solicited rating recipients.  
Table 4-11 Rating predictability test (relative DTD prediction bias) 
This table shows the result of the calculation of relative prediction bias of DTD between solicited and 
unsolicited ratings. The value is calculated by the equation 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝_𝐷𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡+𝑝 -
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝_𝐷𝑇?̂?𝑖,𝑡+𝑝. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝_𝐷𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡+𝑝 is the actual observation of DTD of unsolicited 
rating recipients i (treatment group firms) at a future point t+p (p=1 to 4 quarters) and 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝_𝐷𝑇?̂?𝑖,𝑡+𝑝 is calculated in the format of Equation (5.5) using the actual observation of 
rating at time t along with other fundamental variables at time t, along with the estimates of prediction 
coefficients derived from Equation (5.4). Figures in the brackets are corresponding t-statistics, 
*** 1% significance level;  
** 5% significance level;    
 * 10% significance level. 

















bias of DTD 
1 
2 1677 1191 
0.46* 
(1.66) 
3 2090 1191 
0.12* 
(1.83) 
4 2591 1191 
-0.03 
(-0.24) 




2 1638 1167 
0.03 
(0.13) 
3 2041 1167 
0.13** 
(2.10) 
4 2532 1167 
-2.30 
(-1.18) 




2 1618 1154 
-1.01 
(-0.75) 
3 2008 1154 
0.05 
(0.63) 
4 2491 1154 
0.15* 
(1.64) 




2 1595 1136 
0.39** 
(2.48) 
3 1973 1136 
0.14 
(1.22) 
4 2448 1136 
-0.18 
(-0.81) 






4.5.2.2 Rating timeliness 
The timeliness of rating action announcements (downgrades, upgrades, warnings of 
rating change and the revision following the warnings) is an alternative indicator of 
rating quality applied in this paper. A rating agency is thought to be of higher quality if 
the rating changes announced by that agency are more likely to lead and less likely 
to lag other agencies. The timeliness reflects the information contents delivered to the 
market by rating action announcements. Assume I have two agencies, A and B. If 
announcements by A are released a couple of days before B, the information content 
of B’s announcement should be lower than A’s because the market participants have 
received and responded to the signal of A’s announcements and would not obtain 
new information from B’s announcements. In this paper, Moody’s rating timeliness is 
measured by a relative lead-lag relationship of rating action announcements between 
Moody’s and S&P (or Fitch). A higher probability of the case that ‘Moody’s lead 
S&P/Fitch’, or a lower probability of the case that ‘Moody’s lag S&P/Fitch’ indicates a 
better rating quality of Moody’s, and vice versa. If the probability that Moody’s 
unsolicited ratings lag or lead its peers’ (S&P and Fitch) ratings is not significantly 
associated with Moody’s solicited ratings, I find evidence to show that relative rating 
quality of Moody’s ratings is not related to the status of solicitation.  
I find that Moody’s unsolicited rating changes are neither significantly faster nor 
significantly slower, than the solicited rating changes. It demonstrates that the rating 
quality of unsolicited and solicited ratings by Moody’s does not have a significant 
difference between the two types of ratings in terms of rating timeliness.  
 
Measurement of rating timeliness: lead-lag relationship between Moody’s and the 
control agency 
Rating timeliness is reflected by the sequence of occurrence of Moody’s and other 
two agencies’ rating actions. Rating actions of Moody’s should be defined first. In the 
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analysis of this paper, I identify three segments of rating actions: negative actions 
include downgrades and possible downgrade announcements; positive actions 
include upgrades and possible upgrade announcements and revision actions are 
announcements that Moody’s exclude the firm from the possible downgrade/upgrade 
list. From the sample dataset, I identify 1191 Moody’s adjustment actions for 142 
sample firms in the sample period (2001Q1-2017Q4). Of them, 927 actions are taken 
for solicited ratings and 264 actions are for unsolicited ratings.   
After identifying Moody’s rating actions, I search the actions of S&P and Fitch, for 
each of Moody’s actions, to find the cases of ‘Moody’s lead S&P/Fitch’ and ‘Moody’s 
lag S&P/Fitch. 
For each of the rating actions taken by Moody’s, I find the specific actions by S&P and 
Fitch which satisfy the conditions as follows and identify them as the case ‘Moody’s 
lead S&P or Fitch’: 1) they are of the same type of actions by Moody’s (negative, 
positive or revising); 2) they occurred no more than 90 days after the actions of 
Moody’s were taken. Similarly, for each of the rating actions taken by Moody’s, I find 
the specific actions by S&P and Fitch which satisfy the conditions as follows and 
identify them as the case ‘Moody’s lag S&P or Fitch’: 1) they are of the same type of 
actions by Moody’s (negative, positive or revising); 2) they occurred no more than 90 
days before the actions of Moody’s were taken.  
To be more intuitive, I raise two actual examples (selected from the dataset) to show 
how the ‘Moody’s lead S&P/Fitch’ and ‘Moody’s lag S&P/Fitch’ cases are identified. 
The examples are displayed in Appendix 4-3. 
Previous literature ignores some complicated cases of lead-lag relationships where 
multiple rating actions of different agencies, or by same agency are taken sequentially 
at close dates. In these cases, Moody’s actions may be identified as simultaneously 
‘leading’ and ‘lagging’ S&P or Fitch, which is unreasonable from an intuition 
perspective. Therefore, some complicated cases are stated also in Appendix 4-3.  
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Comparison of lead-lag relationships between Moody’s and S&P/Fitch for solicited 
and unsolicited cases 
I analyze the lead-lag relationship for Moody-S&P and Moody-Fitch pairs respectively. 
For the Moody-S&P pair, 799 out of 1191 Moody’s rating actions are valid to be 
compared with S&P actions16. Among all the valid actions, 117 actions (14.64% of 
799) are identified as ‘leading S&P and 154 actions (19.27% of 799) are identified as 
‘lagging S&P.  
For Moody-Fitch pair, 947 out of 1191 Moody’s rating actions are valid to be compared 
with Fitch actions17. Among all the valid actions, 123 actions (12.99% of 947) are 
identified as ‘leading Fitch’ and 112 actions (11.83% of 799) are identified as ‘lagging 
Fitch’.  
The details are shown in Table 4-12. Since the total number of ‘revising actions’ are 
very small, I only keep negative and positive actions in the further analysis.  
Table 4-12 The detail of the lead-lag relationship between Moody's and S&P (or Fitch) 











No. of all valid 
cases of Moody’s 
actions 
116 683 60 435 45 169 
Ratio of cases 
when Moody's 
leads S&P out of 
all valid cases 
11.21%  15.23% 13.33%  17.93% 11.11%  8.28% 
Ratio of cases 
when Moody's 
lags S&P out of 
all valid cases 
19.83% 19.18% 26.67% 23.22% 11.11% 11.24% 
Moody-
Fitch 
No. of all valid 
cases of Moody’s 
actions 
219 728 116 455 87 191 
Ratio of cases 
when Moody's 
leads Fitch out of 
all valid cases 
11.42%  13.46% 14.66%  16.26% 9.20% 8.38% 
Ratio of cases 
when Moody's 
lags Fitch 
out of all valid 
cases 
11.87% 11.81% 13.79% 14.07% 11.49% 10.47% 
                                                          
16 The ‘invalid’ actions refer to those Moody’s rating actions occurring at the date when S&P does not 
rate the corresponding firms so they are excluded from the analysis. 
17 The ‘invalid’ actions refer to those Moody’s rating actions occurring at the date when Fitch does not 




To measure the relative quality of Moody’s ratings, I focus on the ratio of cases when 
Moody’s lead/lag S&P/Fitch. A higher ratio of ‘Moody’s leading’ cases or a lower ratio 
of ‘Moody’s lagging’ cases indicates a better Moody’s rating quality. The comparison 
between ratios of unsolicited and solicited ratings show me the impact of solicitation 
status on relative rating qualities.  
From the above table I can observe some potential slight evidence of a worse quality 
of unsolicited ratings than solicited ones for the negative action sample, solicited 
Moody’s ratings have a greater proportion of cases of ‘Moody’s leads S&P /Fitch’ than 
unsolicited Moody’s ratings (15.32%>11.21% for Moody- S&P pairs of ‘all types of 
actions’; 13.46%>11.42% for Moody-Fitch pairs of ‘all types of actions’; 17.93%>13.33% 
for Moody- S&P pairs of ‘negative actions’; 16.26%>14.66% for Moody-Fitch pairs of 
‘negative actions’). It shows that Moody’s lead S&P /Fitch negative rating actions with 
a lower probability if the ratings are unsolicited by firms, which mirrors a worse rating 
quality. Except that, I do not find a consistent and significant gap between the rating 
timeliness of unsolicited and solicited ratings by Moody’s.  
To statistically test the association between solicitation status and rating timeliness, I 
use Chi-square test to examine the significance of the relation between the dummy 
indicating whether Moody’s lead/lag S&P /Fitch, and the dummy indicating whether 
Moody’s ratings are solicited or unsolicited. The response variable is the lead/lag 
dummy and the category variable is the solicitation status. The null hypothesis of the 
Chi-square test is that there is no association between lead/lag dummy variable and 
the solicitation variable.  
The tests are taken for each type of rating actions, each PSM scheme and for each 
pair of rating agencies. The results of the Chi-square test are shown in Table 4-13. 
I do not find a case when the association is significant by observing all Chi-square 
values, which are not big enough to reject the null hypothesis of no association. The 
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results show evidence that even if I have found some potential evidence of better 
quality of solicited ratings in terms of timeliness (shown in Table 4-12), the association 
is not statistically significant (Table  4-13). Therefore, I conclude that rating qualities, 
regarding the rating adjustment action timeliness, are not different between Moody’s 
solicited and unsolicited ratings.  
To enhance the results of Chi-square tests, I conduct logit regressions to test the 
association between the solicitation status of Moody’s ratings and its lead-lag 
relationship with S&P/Fitch’s ratings. Dependent variables are dummy variables 
indicating whether the rating change of Moody’s is followed by/follows the other two 
agencies (=1) or not (=0), the key independent variables are dummy variables 
indicating whether this corresponding firms are unsolicited rated (=1) or solicited rated 
(=0). Year, sector and region are also controlled in the independent variables set.  
The results of logit regressions are shown in Tables 4-14 and 4-15. The situations of 
Moody’s lead and lag the other two are separately reported in the two tables. In each 
table, I present the cases of negative and positive rating actions respectively and 
consider different PSM matching schemes.  
Coefficients on ‘un-solicited’ dummy in the two tables report similar results as the Chi-
square that significant association cannot be found, even if I find that some cases with 
marginally significant estimates. In the table of Moody’s lead S&P/Fitch, I find 
marginally significantly negative estimates in negative action cases for the Moody-
S&P pairs. Negative estimates, in this case, indicate a worse quality of unsolicited 
ratings: if the Moody’s ratings are unsolicited (the dummy is 1), Moody’s is less likely 
to lead S&P regarding negative rating actions. However, the association only exists 
for Moody-S&P pairs for negative actions and is not persistent for other cases.  
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4.5.3 Summary of the empirical results 
I validate the statement of Hypothesis 4-1 by providing evidence to show that Moody’s 
issue ratings with more conservative levels to unsolicited rating recipients. The tests 
are composed into two parts: the single-agency test and the multi-agency test. The 
single-agency test focuses on the ratings of Moody’s and finds that unsolicited ratings 
of Moody’s are lower than solicited ratings controlling fundamental factors as well as 
other basic variables. The multi-agency test supplements the single-agency test result 
by introducing the ratings issued by S&P and Fitch and applying the concepts of 
‘relative rating gap’ between Moody’s and S&P/Fitch to measure the conservatism of 
ratings. I find that for those firms who receive Moody’s unsolicited ratings and 
S&P/Fitch’s solicited ratings, Moody’s ratings (unsolicited) are lower than S&P/Fitch’s 
(solicited) while for those firms who receive Moody’s solicited ratings and S&P/Fitch’s 
solicited ratings, Moody’s ratings (solicited) are higher than S&P/Fitch’s (solicited). It 
shows that the solicitation status of Moody’s is associated with a lower rating level (a 
higher value of numerically-transformed rating indicator) than its solicited counterpart. 




Table 4-13 Chi Square test of association between rating action timeliness and Moody's solicitation status 
This table shows the result of Chi-square test which is conducted to test the association between rating action timeliness, measured by Moody’s lead-lag relationship 
with another rating agency, and the solicitation status. Four cases of Moody’s lead-lag relationship (lag S&P, lead S&P, lag Fitch and lead Fitch) are identified. For 
each of the cases, the association between the dummy indicating the case (equal to 1 if the action fits the condition of lead/lag and 0 else) and solicitation status dummy 
(equal to 1 if the rating is unsolicited and 0 if it is solicited) is calculated in the format of Chi-square statistics. The null hypothesis of the Chi-square is that there is no 
association between Moody’s and the control agency’s lead-lag relationship and Moody’s solicitation status. Figures in the cells are corresponding Chi-square statistics 



























































































































Table 4-14 Logit regression of ‘Moody’s lead’ indicator on solicitation status dummies 
This table reports the results of logistic regressions of ‘Moody’s lead’ dummies on solicitation status dummies. The regressions are run on the basis of Moody’s rating 
actions. Dependent variable is the dummy equal to 1 if the corresponding rating action is identified as leading S&P or Fitch and to 0 else. The key independent variable, 
‘un-solicitation dummy’ is equal to 1 if the corresponding rating action of Moody’s is provided to unsoliciting firms and to 0 if that is provided to soliciting firms. Dummies 
indicating the year when the actions are taken, the sector of the rated firm, and the region where the firm is registered, are also included in the independent variables. 
Figures in the brackets are Wald-statistics for the corresponding estimators. 
Logistic 
Regression 
Action Type All Negative Positive 
 Matching Scheme 1:2 1:3 1:4 All 1:2 1:3 1:4 All 1:2 1:3 1:4 All 
 Dependent Variable (Dummy) Moody's Lead S&P/Fitch 
Pair              
Moody-S&P 


























 Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Sector Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Region Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 N 323 381 471 799 192 227 287 495 94 112 130 214 
 AIC 274.670 307.109 391.323 681.750 184.148 202.341 259.638 467.268 72.426 87.754 93.544 142.227 
 SC 350.223 385.965 474.420 775.417 249.298 270.840 332.827 551.359 118.205 142.124 150.894 209.547 
 -2LogL 234.670 267.109 351.323 641.750 144.148 162.341 219.638 427.268 36.426 47.754 53.544 102.227 
              
Moody-Fitch 


























 Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Sector Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Region Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 N 521 559 643 947 307 327 385 571 161 175 191 214 
 AIC 410.437 427.103 529.400 726.154 281.567 289.581 367.732 494.165 119.732 124.130 130.260 184.737 
 SC 495.552 513.626 618.723 823.220 356.104 365.380 446.797 581.113 181.360 187.426 195.305 257.289 





Table 4-15 Logit regression of ‘Moody’s lag’ indicator on solicitation status dummies 
This table reports the results of logistic regressions of ‘Moody’s lag’ dummies on solicitation status dummies. The regressions are run on the basis of Moody’s rating 
actions. Dependent variable is the dummy equal to 1 if the corresponding rating action is identified as lagging S&P or Fitch and to 0 else. The key independent 
variable, ‘un-solicitation dummy’ is equal to 1 if the corresponding rating action of Moody’s is provided to unsoliciting firms and to 0 if that is provided to soliciting 
firms. Dummies indicating the year when the actions are taken, the sector of the rated firm, and the region where the firm is registered, are also included in the 
independent variables. Figures in the brackets are Wald-statistics for the corresponding estimators. 
Logistic 
Regression 
Action Type All Negative Positive 
 Matching Scheme 1:2 1:3 1:4 All 1:2 1:3 1:4 All 1:2 1:3 1:4 All 
 Dependent Variable (Dummy) Moody's Lag S&P/Fitch 




























 Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Sector Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Country Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 N 323 381 471 799 192 227 287 495 94 112 130 214 
 AIC 336.508 403.521 492.636 794.575 232.848 281.932 341.031 560.469 79.072 94.101 109.266 150.583 
 SC 412.061 482.377 575.733 888.242 297.998 350.431 414.220 644.560 124.851 148.471 166.617 217.903 
 -2LogL 296.508 363.521 452.636 754.575 192.848 241.932 301.031 520.469 43.072 54.101 69.266 110.583 




























 Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Sector Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Country Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 N 521 559 643 947 307 327 385 571 161 175 191 278 
 AIC 413.259 450.947 513.618 684.106 273.387 290.556 335.920 465.445 126.310 133.797 141.632 162.333 
 SC 498.374 537.470 602.941 781.171 347.923 366.355 414.985 552.393 187.938 197.093 206.677 234.885 




Hypothesis 4-2 is related to the concept of rating quality. I use two indicators to 
measure the rating quality: rating predictability and rating action timeliness. For the 
rating predictability measure, I use Distance to Default and its relations with past 
ratings to test the predictability of Moody’s ratings. Both the regression model method 
and predicting model method show the conclusion that there is no gap between the 
predictability of unsolicited and solicited ratings. For the rating action timeliness, I 
identify Moody’s rating actions and match each of these with the actions taken by S&P 
and Fitch to define the cases of ‘Moody’s lead S&P/Fitch’ or ‘Moody’s lag S&P/Fitch’. 
I find that the likelihood of either of the two cases is not associated with the solicitation 
status, which demonstrates that rating timeliness is not a function of solicitation status. 
The empirical results for Hypothesis 4-2 also fit the theoretical discussion in Formula 
4.2.11 and Formula 4.2.13. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This paper studies the association between rating solicitation and rating levels as well 
as rating qualities. An empirical analysis is conducted to show evidence for the self-
selection hypothesis: weak firms tend to opt not to be rated by rating agencies and 
rating agencies take the solicitation status into account and rate lower for those 
unsolicited rating recipients.  
My research is designed to identify the phenomenon of more conservative ratings for 
unsolicited cases than for solicited cases and justify ratings’ behavior of unsolicited 
rating conservatism by observing same rating quality for both types of ratings. By the 
simplified theoretical model, I conclude that if the self-selection hypothesis holds I 
would have two findings: 1) the solicitation status implies the rating agencies about 
the potential quality of the firms so it is rational for them to rate unsoliciting firms with 
lower rating levels and 2) the rating quality (i.e. the information provided by both types 
of ratings) should be at the similar level.  
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Those two hypothesized theoretical findings based on the self-selection assumption 
is empirically enhanced.  
I find that controlling for the fundamentals, Moody’s unsolicited ratings are significantly 
lower than solicited ratings. The result is supplemented by the investigation of multi-
agency comparison which finds that Moody’s unsolicited ratings are lower than 
solicited ratings for the same firms offered by S&P and Fitch.  
To examine the rating quality, I use two measures, rating predictability and rating 
action timeliness, to reflect the rating quality and compare the average quality 
between solicited and unsolicited ratings. No significant gap of rating quality is found 
which demonstrates that unsolicited ratings are not related to a deterioration of rating 
quality. Both findings enhance the two sub-hypotheses of self-selection hypothesis: 
ratings are more conservative in solicited rating cases and unsolicited ratings are 
rational in terms of rating quality.  
In conclusion, the findings in this paper justify Moody’s behavior of offering lower 
ratings for unsolicited rating recipients and show that unsolicited ratings still provide 
useful information regarding firms’ risk of default for market participants even though 
rating agencies neither charge fees nor collect internal information from rated firms in 
unsolicited rating decision. This is in accordance with the claim of Moody’s and 
financial regulators who believe that unsolicited ratings are not biased and provide 
transparency to the market.  
My research is restricted by data access and does not consider the stock returns as 
an indicator of rating quality. Further research may be conducted to include this 




5 Chapter V: Conclusions 
Those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it. 
-- George Santayana 
5.1 Summary of the essays 
This thesis starts with an introduction of a phenomenon in the contemporary financial 
market: the role transformation of CRAs from a pure information provider to a mixture 
of an information provider and a market influencer. The initial aim of the establishment 
of the credit rating industry was to reduce the information gap between firms 
(borrowers) and investors (lenders), which refers to the role of information providers. 
However, with the expansion of the CRA business, the strong reliance of investors on 
the opinions given by the CRAs and the creation of rating-based regulation clauses 
linking the compulsory actions of financial market participants (forced selling, capital 
requirement holding etc.) with the ratings given by specific CRAs, CRAs have 
gradually become not only professional institutions providing information for investors, 
but also an essential participant influencing the financial market.  
In the three independent studies following the introduction, I investigate the behavior 
of CRAs and the reaction of other financial market participants in the context of this 
role transformation. For the demand side of the credit rating industry, rated entities 
can be categorized in three types: sovereign countries, innovative financial products 
(for example, ABS) and individual firms (including banks). Therefore, the three 
independent studies are focused on sovereign ratings (Chapter II), ABS ratings 
(Chapter III) and firms (Chapter IV). Besides, for the supplying side of the credit rating 
industry, the key components of the CRA’s function can be categorized in three 
perspectives: the information transmission channel, investors’ reaction to rating 
changes and the rating bias due to the conflict of interests. Therefore, the three 
studies cover the topics of the information channel of sovereign ratings (Chapter II), 
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the connection between market prices and rating levels/changes (Chapters II and III) 
and the effect of fee payment models on the rating quality (Chapter IV). 
Sections 5.1.1 to 5.1.3 show the summary of the main findings of three chapters and 
in Section 5.2 I show the limitations of my thesis and raise some potential topics in 
the further research. 
5.1.1 Extra information provided by bank rating downgrades which 
follow sovereign rating downgrades 
In Chapter II, I present my first paper where I study the information transmission 
channel in the case of ‘sovereign rating downgrades  bank rating downgrades  
bank performances’. My main findings are: 1) sovereign rating downgrades and bank 
rating downgrades are both associated with a negative shock of stock returns for 
downgraded banks (short-term) and with an increase of bank insolvency risk (long-
term); 2) the bank rating downgrades provide extra information to the market even if 
they follow sovereign ratings in a very short interval.  
The first conclusion is drawn by an empirical finding that the downgrade of sovereign 
ratings is a significant factor of the stock return decrease in the time window of no 
more than 10 transaction days and of the increase of Z scores in the following year. 
The degree of stock return drop and Z score rise is higher if the sovereign rating 
downgrades are followed by bank rating downgrades in certain intervals.  
I obtain the second conclusion by additionally applying ‘sovereign ceiling policy’ which 
creates an exogenous shock to the bank downgrades which compulsorily follow 
sovereign downgrades. I find that if the bank downgrades are triggered by the ceiling 
policy (which are ‘semi-active’ because the ratings are downgraded partially due to an 
external policy), the corresponding shock on both the stock returns and Z scores is 
weaker than those downgrades not triggered by the ceiling policy (which are ‘fully-
active’ because the rating downgrades are not regulated by external policies).  
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In sum, this chapter shows evidence that the information released by sovereign 
ratings is enhanced by the following of bank ratings. In other words, sovereign ratings 
affect the bank performances partially via the channel of bank ratings. This finding 
contributes the strand of literature which discusses the channel by which sovereign 
ratings impact domestic commercial banks.  
5.1.2 The ABS price reaction to credit ratings and the weakening of 
such connection after the global financial crisis 
The second paper (Chapter III) is an empirical investigation on the ABS market and 
its relationship with credit ratings. I test the link between prices of ABS for different 
tranches and the levels/changes of credit ratings issued for the corresponding ABS 
tranche. The test is conducted for both the issuance period and the transaction period 
of ABS. For the issuance period, I find a significant relationship between the issuance 
spreads (the component of yields which is above the benchmark rate) and the 
issuance ratings given to the ABS. For the transaction period, I find that the 
transaction prices of ABS are sensitive to the changes of ABS ratings in no more than 
a 5-day interval (the reaction is more sensitive for downgrades than for upgrades).  
Furthermore, I empirically check whether the link between issuance/transaction prices 
of ABS and levels/changes of credit ratings has been weaker since the 2008 global 
financial crisis. The data analysis result shows a weaker connection after the crisis by 
significant D-i-D estimates on the interaction terms between the rating factors and the 
post-crisis dummy. 
The strong link between ABS spreads/prices and the ratings implies a reliance of ABS 
investors on the CRAs. This is consistent with the general topic of this thesis: the role 
transformation of CRAs from information providers to market influencers. ABS is a 
financial innovation which is associated with a very complex structure and payment 
mechanism. Therefore, investors are more likely to turn to the CRAs, who are 
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regarded as professional institutions, to price ABS products. However, the findings of 
a weaker link in the post-crisis period indicate that the role of market influencers has 
been weakened since the big shock of the financial crisis.  
5.1.3 The comparison of levels and qualities between unsolicited and 
solicited ratings 
In Chapter IV, I study the issue of conflict of interests, which is a widely-discussed 
topic within the credit rating field. The conflict of interests is measured by the effect of 
solicitation status (i.e. whether the rating is paid by the issuers) on the rating levels 
and rating qualities. I find theoretical evidence to show a self-selection effect of 
unsolicited rating recipients: given the assumption that weak firms are less likely to 
solicit the rating services from big CRAs, CRAs regard the fact that a firm does not 
solicit rating services from them as a negative signal of the firm’s actual quality and 
then rate them at a lower level compared with those firms who solicit the rating 
services. In the context of self-selection hypothesis, two facts should be observed: the 
ratings given to unsolicited rating recipients are lower than those given to solicited 
rating recipients, and the rating quality in terms of their predictability of default risks is 
not related to the solicitation status.  
I find empirical evidence to support the two facts drawn by the theoretical model. By 
analyzing the data of unsolicited ratings issued by Moody’s, I find that rating levels are 
lower for unsolicited ratings than for solicited ratings. This conclusion is consistent for 
the single-CRA test, which only analyzes the ratings given by Moody’s, and for the 
multi-CRA test, which uses the ratings given by other two CRAs (S&P and Fitch) as 
the benchmark. In addition, the link between past ratings and future variation of default 
risks (measured by Distance to Default) is not affected by the solicitation status. The 
test of default risk predictability is further supplemented by taking rating change 
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timeliness into account as another indicator of the rating quality. I also find that the 
rating timeliness is not related to the solicitation status.  
The finding of self-selection effect indicates that although CRAs rate firms lower if the 
firms do not pay them, it does not negatively impact the quality of the unsolicited 
ratings.  
5.2 Limitations and future research 
Restricted by the data availability, the time constraint and research capabilities, my 
thesis has some limitations in terms of the following perspectives.  
In Chapter II, I determine the channel of bank ratings in the information transmission 
of sovereign ratings. However, other potential channels, which have been discussed 
by the literature, are not included in my study. Those potential channels are the 
government debt held by banks, government guarantee for domestic banks and the 
free capital mobility factor. 
Furthermore, in order to have a sufficient number of sovereign rating downgrades in 
the sample, I only study the PIIGS countries. Moreover, to identify the case of ‘bank 
downgrades triggered by sovereign ceiling policy’, I only include downgrade cases, 
but not upgrade cases in my analysis. 
In Chapter III, as the financial market experienced a huge change after the financial 
crisis, it may be questionable whether the ratings can be directly compared for the 
pre- and post-crisis periods. For example, due to the restricted data availability, I only 
obtain the data of ABS market liquidity in the post-crisis period and hence am unable 
to show whether the liquidity in the secondary ABS market is significantly smaller after 
the crisis, which creates the result of a weaker ABS price reaction to rating changes. 
In addition, the reason why ABS prices follow credit ratings at a lower degree after the 
crisis is not discussed in details. Although I raise some possible explanations, such 
as the reputational collapse of CRAs and the issuance of the Dodd-Frank Act which 
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aims at reducing the power of CRAs, these reasons are not empirically tested in my 
research. 
Regarding Chapter IV, compared with solicited ratings, Moody’s published only a very 
few unsolicited ratings. That causes a problem of imbalanced data. I use the 
propensity score matching (PSM) method to match each of the unsolicited ratings by 
their counterparties in the solicited rating sample. However, the issue of imbalanced 
data cannot be fully solved by PSM. Furthermore, stock return reactions are not used 
to reflect the rating quality due to the limited data availability of unsolicited rating 
recipients with stock price records. 
To address these limitations, I raise some potential topics for my future research. 
Firstly, the channels by which sovereign ratings affect the bank performances should 
be comprehensively studied. Additionally, it is worth investigating the reasons why the 
reactions of ABS investors after the financial crisis have become weaker and studying 
whether this is a consequence of the issuance of the Dodd-Frank Act. Lastly, data of 
other CRAs who issue more unsolicited ratings as well as the stock market information 
of unsolicited rating recipients could be used to research the effect of solicitation 
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Appendix 2-1  
Descriptive statistics of Model 2-1-1 
Table.A 1 
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Appendix 2-2  
Table.A 2 









































Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Rating Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
RL*SRD Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 30.37% 31.15% 31.51% 31.45% 31.39% 31.35% 31.37% 31.48% 31.83% 32.17% 
N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
T 7500 7499 7498 7497 7496 7495 7494 7493 7492 7491 
 
Table.A 3 
Time window (0,1) (0,2) (0,3) (0,4) (0,5) (0,6) (0,7) (0,8) (0,9) (0,10) 








































Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rating Level (RL) Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
RL*SR Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 30.39% 31.17% 31.53% 31.46% 31.40% 31.34% 31.35% 31.47% 31.82% 29.28% 
N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 







Time window (0,1) (0,2) (0,3) (0,4) (0,5) (0,6) (0,7) (0,8) (0,9) (0,10) 


















































































Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rating Level (RL) Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
RL*Followed Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 30.72% 31.34% 31.63% 31.54% 31.47% 31.40% 31.40% 31.52% 31.86% 29.32% 
N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 




























































Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Rating Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
RL*SRD Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 31.14% 31.51% 31.47% 31.40% 31.35% 31.35% 31.47% 31.82% 32.17% 32.43% 34.76% 
N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 




Time window (-1,1) (-1,2) (-1,3) (-1,4) (-1,5) (-1,6) (-1,7) (-1,8) (-1,9) (-1,10) (-1,20) 












































Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rating Level (RL) Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
RL*SR Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 31.17% 31.53% 31.49% 31.42% 31.35% 31.36% 31.47% 31.82% 32.17% 32.43% 34.76% 
N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 






Time window (-1,1) (-1,2) (-1,3) (-1,4) (-1,5) (-1,6) (-1,7) (-1,8) (-1,9) (-1,10) (-1,20) 


























































































Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rating Level (RL) Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
RL*Followed Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 31.67% 31.69% 31.60% 31.50% 31.44% 31.42% 31.53% 31.87% 32.22% 32.48% 34.76% 
N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 














































Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
R2 19.51% 19.75% 18.51% 
N 29 29 26 












Model 2.2.2  2.2.3 
Rating Agency Moody S&P Fitch  Moody S&P Fitch 




























Accounting-Based Controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
R2 18.61% 19.46% 19.13%  19.17% 19.72% 80.50% 
N 29 29 26  29 29 26 

















  Non-MBS Dataset  MBS Dataset 
  Mean Std Q1 Median Q3 Range  Mean Std Q1 Median Q3 Range 
Pre-
Crisis  
Ln(Spread) 4.15 1.25 3.37 4.03 5.08 8.52  3.88 1.04 3.14 3.83 4.61 8.23 
Par_amount(× 108) 1.43 2.90 0.19 0.41 1.44 87  2.01 3.81 0.18 0.44 1.97 57.00 
CPN (%) 2.16 2.21 0.63 1.13 3.22 25.25  2.61 12.07 0.69 1.42 3.94 932.78 
Tranche_num 3.61 2.38 2 3 5 21  6.03 6.46 2 4 8 67 
Length (year) 22.34 14.53 11.97 15.48 35.31 92.84  28.83 13.65 14.8 31.3 37.7 93.10 
WAL (year) 7.04 2.86 5 7 9 19.76  4.75 2.75 2.7 4.8 6.0 40.77 
WAC (%) 7.62 3.41 5.1 7.1 9.1 22.49  5.82 1.78 4.40 5.68 7.02 13.11 
Issuer size (%) 0.27 0.90 0.013 0.03 0.09 4.68  0.15 0.21 0.021 0.075 0.16 1.05 
Credit_support (%) 17.17 17.50 5.00 12.40 24.56 148.76  13.08 16.46 2.75 8.56 18.02 194.60 
Number of CRAs rating the security 
(N) 
2.24 0.51 2 2 3 3  2.55 0.59 2 3 3 3 




Ln(Spread) 4.91 0.98 4.24 4.83 5.62 6.17  4.83 0.85 4.25 4.87 5.52 4.71 
Par_amount(× 108) 2.98 6.24 0.23 0.66 3.07 99.12  2.58 5.41 0.16 0.47 2.50 60.00 
CPN (%) 2.56 2.48 1.04 1.74 3.24 25.60  2.83 2.12 1.31 2.22 3.85 10.93 
Tranche_num 3.25 2.38 1 3 4 21  4.11 3.36 2 3 5 22 
Length (year) 15.99 11.98 7.18 12.01 21.17 57.80  35.56 13.77 30.0 32.1 42.6 83.68 
WAL (year) 4.84 3.05 2.16 4.16 7.1 16.36  5.71 4.36 3 5 7 29.70 
WAC (%) 7.50 2.79 5.48 6.15 9.92 16.85  6.54 2.47 4.91 5.42 8.51 10.50 
Issuer size (%) 0.41 1.08 0.011 0.033 0.165 4.68  0.10 0.11 0.034 0.053 0.115 0.58 
Credit_support (%) 22.15 23.39 7.29 16.84 25.69 99.20  9.40 14.84 3.39 7.53 16.60 118.66 
Number of CRAs rating the security 
(N) 
2.16 0.66 2 2 3 3  2.03 0.68 2 2 2.5 2 
Number-format Average rating (NR) 3.55 3.37 1 1.5 6 21  4.00 4.05 1 2.5 6 20 
Post-
Crisis  
Ln(Spread) 5.31 0.82 4.91 5.38 5.93 4.63  5.05 0.73 4.70 5.04 5.52 6.88 
Par_amount(× 108) 1.69 3.60 0.20 0.36 2.07 60.4  3.21 5.20 0.38 1.22 4.00 60.00 
CPN (%) 2.92 1.83 1.60 2.54 4.07 16.56  2.83 2.28 1.35 2.17 3.64 16.72 
Tranche_num 3.89 2.92 2 3 5 22  4.06 3.50 2 3 5 21 
Length (year) 12.94 9.04 10.03 11.90 12.10 88.56  31.34 14.13 17.1 31.2 40.8 81.68 
WAL (year) 5.56 3.02 2.95 5.50 7.74 29.80  4.50 2.66 2.70 4.80 5.10 19.45 
WAC (%) 6.60 3.27 4.43 5.47 8.05 10.69  4.47 1.49 3.83 4.55 4.80 12.38 
Issuer size (%) 0.22 0.77 0.018 0.043 0.108 4.68  0.19 0.19 0.037 0.14 0.28 0.76 
Credit_support (%) 19.80 14.84 7.91 16.90 27.38 108.65  18.92 22.56 2.50 8.69 30.00 105.70 
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  Non-MBS Dataset  MBS Dataset 
  Mean Std Q1 Median Q3 Range  Mean Std Q1 Median Q3 Range 
Number of CRAs rating the security 
(N) 
1.99 0.39 2 2 2 3  1.93 0.69 1 2 2 2 




















 Moody’s S&P Fitch 
 Non-MBS MBS Non-MBS MBS Non-MBS MBS 
























































































































No. of Observations 439 2522 439 2522 439 2522 





Appendix 3-3 Estimates on Control Variables of Model 3-1 and Model 3-2 
Table A.12 
 Non-MBS MBS 
Model 3-1 3-2 3-1 3-2 
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Number of CRAs rating 









































































             
Country Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Char. Control 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Char. Control 2 Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Char. Control 3 Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No 
N 248 590 9985 248 590 9985 1652 2129 4609 1652 2129 4609 










  Time windows 
  1 day 3 days 5 days 
 Boundary dE dP ×  dE (𝛿) dE dP ×  dE (𝛿) dE dP ×  dE (𝛿) 














































































































Security Fixed Effect   Yes    
Year Fixed Effect   Yes    
Rating-level Control   Yes    
T   3914    










  Time windows 
  1 day 3 days 5 days 
Variables Coefficient 
Descriptor 
Eq (8) Eq (9) Eq (8) Eq (9) Eq (8) Eq (9) 
























Security Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rating-level Control  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Index Return Control  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
T  3914 3914 3914 3914 3914 3914 
N  72 72 72 72 72 72 







  Time windows 
  1 day 3 days 5 days 
Variables Coefficient 
Descriptor 
Eq (3-10) Eq (3-11) Eq (3-10) Eq (3-11) Eq (3-10) Eq (3-11) 










































Security Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rating-level Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Index Return Control  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
T  3914 3914 3914 3914 3914 3914 
N  72 72 72 72 72 72 







  Time windows 
  1 day 3 days 5 days 
Variables Coefficient 
Descriptor 
Index 1 Index 2 Index 3 Index 1 Index 2 Index 3 Index 1 Index 2 Index 3 
Equation (3-3): 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽3−12,1 × 𝑑𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡  


















T  3914 3914 3914 3914 3914 3914 3914 3914 3914 
N  72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 
R2  0.3% 0.4% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 
Equation (3-4): 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽3−13,1 × 𝑑𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3−13,2 × 𝑑𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿3−13 × (𝑑𝑃𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑑𝐸𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 






















































T  3914 3914 3914 3914 3914 3914 3914 3914 3914 
N  72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 
R2  0.3% 0.5% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.4% 
Security Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rating-level Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Index Return Control  No No No No No No No No No 
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Appendix 4-1.1 The inference of Equation (4.2.7)  
Equation (4.2.7) is a technical assumption regarding the CRA’s adjustment of 𝑝1 and 
𝑝2. The key principle of this assumption is to equate 𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐺|𝑆𝐿 = 1, 𝐶𝐴 = 1) and 
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐺|𝑆𝐿 = 0, 𝐶𝐴 = 1). According to the rule of conditional probability, if we have 














Replacing A, B, C with S=G, SL=1(0) and CA=1 respectively, I have  
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐺|𝑆𝐿 = 1, 𝐶𝐴 = 1) =
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐺)𝑃(𝑆𝐿 = 1|𝑆 = 𝐺)𝑃(𝐶𝐴 = 1|𝑆 = 𝐺, 𝑆𝐿 = 1)
𝑃(𝑆𝐿 = 1)𝑃(𝐶𝐴 = 1|𝑆𝐿 = 1)
 
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐺|𝑆𝐿 = 0, 𝐶𝐴 = 1) =
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐺)𝑃(𝑆𝐿 = 0|𝑆 = 𝐺)𝑃(𝐶𝐴 = 1|𝑆 = 𝐺, 𝑆𝐿 = 0)
𝑃(𝑆𝐿 = 0)𝑃(𝐶𝐴 = 1|𝑆𝐿 = 0)
 
For the numerators in both equations, the common factor 𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐺) can be ignored. 
Besides, based on the non-biased assumption in Equation 4.2.9, 
𝑃(𝐶𝐴 = 1|𝑆 = 𝐺, 𝑆𝐿 = 1) = 𝑃(𝐶𝐴 = 1|𝑆 = 𝐺, 𝑆𝐿 = 0) , so these two factors can be 
ignored. Therefore, to equate 𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐺|𝑆𝐿 = 1, 𝐶𝐴 = 1) and 𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐺|𝑆𝐿 = 0, 𝐶𝐴 = 1), 
what I actually need is  
𝑃(𝑆𝐿 = 1|𝑆 = 𝐺)
𝑃(𝑆𝐿 = 1)𝑃(𝐶𝐴 = 1|𝑆𝐿 = 1)
=
𝑃(𝑆𝐿 = 0|𝑆 = 𝐺)
𝑃(𝑆𝐿 = 0)𝑃(𝐶𝐴 = 1|𝑆𝐿 = 0)
 
                     
𝜏1𝜃
𝑝1[𝜏1𝜃 + 𝜏2(1 − 𝜃)]
=
𝜃(1 − 𝜏1)
𝑝2[(1 − 𝜏1)𝜃 + (1 − 𝜏2)(1 − 𝜃)]
 




𝜏1[𝜃(1 − 𝜏1) + (1 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝜏2)]
(1 − 𝜏1)[𝜏1𝜃 + 𝜏2(1 − 𝜃)]




Appendix 4-1.2 Inference of Equation (4.2.12) 
P(S = G|CA = 1) 
=
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐺, 𝐶𝐴 = 1)
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐺, 𝐶𝐴 = 1) + 𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐵, 𝐶𝐴 = 1)
=
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐺, 𝐶𝐴 = 1, 𝑆𝐿 = 1) + 𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐺, 𝐶𝐴 = 1, 𝑆𝐿 = 0)
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐺, 𝐶𝐴 = 1, 𝑆𝐿 = 1) + 𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐺, 𝐶𝐴 = 1, 𝑆𝐿 = 0) + (𝑆 = 𝐵, 𝐶𝐴 = 1, 𝑆𝐿 = 1) + 𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐵, 𝐶𝐴 = 1, 𝑆𝐿 = 0)
=
𝜃𝜏1𝑝1 + 𝜃(1 − 𝜏1)𝑝2
𝜃𝜏1𝑝1 + 𝜃(1 − 𝜏1)𝑝2 + (1 − 𝜃)𝜏2𝑝1 + (1 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝜏2)𝑝2
 
 
P(S = G|CA = 1) − 𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐺) 
=
𝜃𝜏1𝑝1 + 𝜃(1 − 𝜏1)𝑝2
𝜃𝜏1𝑝1 + 𝜃(1 − 𝜏1)𝑝2 + (1 − 𝜃)𝜏2𝑝1 + (1 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝜏2)𝑝2
− 𝜃 
=
𝜃(1 − 𝜃)(𝑝1 − 𝑝2)(𝜏1 − 𝜏2)
𝜃𝜏1𝑝1 + 𝜃(1 − 𝜏1)𝑝2 + (1 − 𝜃)𝜏2𝑝1 + (1 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝜏2)𝑝2






Appendix 4-2 Descriptive statistics of fundamental variables 
Table A.18 
Variable N Mean Std Dev 
Total Assets (thousand dollars) 
Total Debt to Total Asset (%) 
Financial Leverage (%) 
Return on Assets (%) 
Growth Rate of Assets 
(Quarterly, %) 
Total Investment to Total Assets (%) 
Asset Turnover (%) 






























   





Appendix 4-3: Example of the identification of ‘lead-lag’ relationship between 
Moody’s and S&P/Fitch rating changes 
Example 1:  
Firm Bloomberg code: GAZP RM  
Rating actions by Moody’s: Sep 8th, 2005, put into the possible upgrade list by 
Moody’s (a positive action) 
Rating actions by S&P: Oct 13th, 2005, upgraded by S&P at 1 notch (a positive action) 
S&P’s action occurs 35 days (<90) after the action of Moody’s so I identify this case 
as ‘Moody’s lead S&P’. 
Example 2:  
Firm Bloomberg code: GAZP RM  
Rating actions by Moody’s: June 12th, 2012, downgraded by Moody’s at 1 notch (a 
negative action) 
Rating actions by Fitch: May 21st, 2012, put into possible downgrade list by Fitch (a 
negative action) 
Fitch’s action occurs 22 days (<90) before the action of Moody’s so I identify this case 
as ‘Moody’s lag Fitch’. 
Appendix 3B: Some complicated cases for identifying ‘lead-lag’ relationship between 
Moody’s and S&P/Fitch rating changes 
If Moody’s takes actions at date t and no actions of Moody’s are taken during the 
period (t-90,t+90), S&P (or Fitch) take actions of same type at both dates (t-p) and 
(t+q), (p and q are smaller than 90), I identify the case as ‘Moody’s lag S&P or Fitch’ 




If Moody’s takes actions at both t and t+n (n<90), and S&P (or Fitch) have actions of 
same type at t+m (m<n) between t and t+n, I identify the case of date t as ‘lead S&P 
or Fitch’ and ignore the action of Moody’s at t+n; 
 
In some extreme cases, the two situations above happen simultaneously (the figure 
below demonstrates two scenarios). To deal with those cases, I regard the rating 
agency who takes the first action in certain time windows (90 days) as the one who 
always lead the other. 
 
 
 
